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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the 
issues of confidentiality and privileged communication in 
psychotherapy. The term "confidential communication" is 
generally used to describe those statements that are told 
with the belief and trust that the other person will keep 
them private. In psychotherapy, there is an implicit 
understanding that the therapist will maintain the privacy 
of all statements the client makes. 'I'he term "privileged 
communication" is more specific in its use in that it 
refers only to communications that are protected from use 
as evidence in a legal proceeding. Depending upon the 
specific situation and the law of each state, statements a 
patient makes in psychotherapy may or may not be privileged 
communication or legally respected as private. 
The term "psychotherapy'' is derived from the Greek 
words "psyche" and "therapeoi.:J.", meaning "spirit, soul" and 
"to nurse, cure", respectively, or "cure of the spirit". 
Webster (1970) defines "ps;[chctherapy" as treatment of 
mental disorder by any of various means involving communi-
cation between a trained person and the patient .•. " (p. 
1148). This co~munication! the manner in which it is 
treated and the ways it may or ~ay not be used has increas-
1 
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ingly become an issue for psychotherapists, psychotherapy 
patients and lawmakers. 
Psychotherapists have generally regarded such com-
munications as private and confidential and professions 
involved in the work of psychotherapy have incorporated 
privacy into their various ethical codes. However, the 
codes are often unclear in their statements and definitions. 
For example, the phrase "clear and imminent danger" is used 
to describe a situation under which information may be dis-
closed in the Ethical Standards for Psychologists (1979). 
Would or would not this phrase include such acts as rob-
bery, adultery or driving while intoxicated? 
The legal system has not been any clearer. English 
common law, upon which our laws are based, does not allow a 
psychotherapist to refuse to give testimony in court about 
communications with a client and laws of privileged commu-
nication vary from state to state. While some states have 
statutes to protect confidentiality in psychotherapy, in 
many states courts have the right to require testimony as 
they deem necessary, regardless of ethical considerations. 
Needless to say, conflicts and issues have arisen, both 
within those professions involved in providing psychother-
apy and in their interactions with the legal system. 
In a well-intentioned rush to resolve these con-
flicts and issues regarding confidentiality in psychother-
apy and to demonstrate the high ethical standards of their 
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professions, psychotherapists have been pushing and convinc-
ing lav~rnakers to pass legislation explicitly stating how 
communications between a psychotherapist and client may 
or may not be disclosed; hcwever, this seems to be taking 
place without a ccmplete examination of the subtle effects 
that such laws could have o~ the practice of psychotherapy. 
I~ addition, courts of law are assuming the responsibility 
of deciding what legal duties are involved in being a 
psychotherapist (e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the University 
of California, 1976). 
The resulting confusion is sharply evident in the 
professional literature of psychotherapists as well as in 
legal writings on evidentiary issues and on the rights of 
patients. Slovenko (1974), for example, notes that there 
are so many exceptions in laws of psychotherapist-patient 
privilege, that there might as well be no privilege. 
Reynolds (1976), Sadoff (1974), Siegel (1979), Slawson 
(1969), Strassburger (1975) and numerous others address 
concerns raised in response to the laws and court decisions. 
The title of Bersoff's (1976) article, "Therapists as 
protectors and policemen: New roles as a result of Tarasoff?" 
suffices to indicate the identity crises and role conflicts 
that therapists are facing in trying to reconcile their 
legal duty, their duty to society, their duty to the prac-
tice of psychotherapy and their duty to the individual 
client. 
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If one is to understand and evaluate the current 
issues regarding confidentiality in psychotherapy, it is 
necessary to have a full understanding of those factors 
having a significant influence on the development of the 
present situation. This dissertation is an attempt to 
thoroughly examine the moral, medical-therapeutic and legal 
rationales of confidentiality in psychotherapy, to discuss 
and explore the implications and subtle effects of current 
legal interventions and to clarify what this means for the 
individual psychotherapist and for the profession as a 
whole. Most of the published literature on privacy in 
psychotherapy centers on the legal philosophy and techni-
calities of privileged communication. Much less has been 
written on the client's need and desire for confidentiality 
in psychotherapy unrelated to testimony in a legal proceed-
ing. This dissertation includes a discussion of privileged 
communication, but differs from previous writings by giving 
greater emphasis to the individual's need for privacy by 
examining the position on confidentiality of major 
practitioner-theorists in psychotherapeutic techniques, 
historical and philosophical discussions on secrets, the 
legal history of privacy, research that either directly or 
indirectly assesses whether confidentiality or lack of 
confidentiality has any effects on success in psychotherapy 
and the impact that legal intervention has on the practice 
of traditional psychotherapy. 
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This dissertation can be divided into six major 
sections. The first four sections make up the literature 
review and of=er a background for understanding issues of 
confidentiality in psychotherapy. The first part of the 
literature review deals with trends in medicine, mental 
health care and society that have led to the current high 
level of interest in confidentiality. The second part of 
the literature review offers a historical and moral back-
ground to confidentiality by exploring the concept of nat-
ural law, the seal of confession and the committed secret 
as discussed in Roman Catholic writings. Although this 
part is largely a review of material published elsewhere, 
the discussion of the parallels between debates regarding 
the seal of confession and confidentiality in psychotherapy 
is original. The third part of the literature review 
discusses the viewpoints of major theorists in psychothera-
peutic techniques as they relate to confidentiality and 
examines the development of codes of ethics for psychother-
apists, particularly psychologists. 
The fourth part of the literature review focuses on 
legal intervention in confidentiality in psychotherapy. 
This part discusses laws and court decisions related to 
privacy, specifically those regarding confidentiality in 
psychotherapy and reviews privileged communication as it 
relates to psychotherapy. 
The fifth major section, the "Integration and 
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Hypotheses", brings together the previous chapters and 
focuses on the differences in the approaches of natural 
law, psychotherapists and the legal system to confidenti-
ality and on the specific and subtle implications that 
current legal intervention in confidentiality has on the 
practice of psychotherapy. This chapter is viewed as a 
statement of the problems which confront the professions of 
psychotherapy as well as the individual therapist. It also 
reviews research regarding attitudes toward confidentiality 
and raises hypotheses for evaluation. 
The sixth major section is an attempt to grapple 
with a portion of the problems raised in the integration of 
the early chapters. Chapters Four and Five offer the meth-
odology and results of a test of the hypotheses in a survey 
of the reactions of mental health professionals, mental 
health care recipients and Illinois State's Attorneys to 
hypothesized situations where a psychotherapist either 
discloses specific kinds of information to specific persons 
without the client's clear consent or does not disclose 
information because he/she does not have the client's clear 
consent to disclose. Chapter Six discusses these results 
and offers conclusions for the professions of psychother-
apists, particularly psychologists, based upon the survey 
and literature review. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Confidentiality - ~ Recent Issue 
The issues of confidentiality and privileged commu-
nication in psychotherapy are gaining increased interest 
from lawmakers, psychotherapists and mental health care 
r~cipients. As will be seen in the section discussing con-
fidentiality from a historical and moral perspective, 
interest in privacy is not new in our society, but it is 
accentuated in recent times. The growth of interest at 
this time occurs for a wide variety of reasons including 
the following developments: (l) a growing number of people 
receiving mental health care, usually in their horne commu-
nity; (2) an increasing interest in privacy by society in 
general, due at least partially to sophisticated systems of 
record keeping and fears of their potential abuse; and (3) 
increasing requests for information or testimony from 
mental health professionals by third party payers and the 
courts. This chapter will discuss each of these three 
developments, how and why they have come to occur and how 
they contribute to an increased interest in confidentiality 
in psychotherapy. 
Growth of Mental Health Care: In the last 15 years 
the number of people receiving mental health care has 
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increased at a rate considerably greater than the rate of 
population growth. In June of 1963, the inpatient and 
outpatient census of people receiving mental health care at 
state hospitals, zone centers and state operated or state 
aided mental health centers in Illinois was less than 
54,000. In June, 1978, the census was nearly 118,000. 
This latter figure is considered a very low estimate of the 
people actually receiving mental health care in Illinois 
during all of 1978 as it represents only the number of 
active cases, i.e., the number of people receiving mental 
health care in the month of June, 1978 (Bronk, 1979). 
A breakdown of these figures indicates a trend 
toward seeking outpatient mental health care in one's own 
community. In 1963, over 34,000 of those persons receiving 
mental health care in Illinois were inpatients in state 
hospitals or zone centers, compared to less than 20,000 
persons receiving outpatient services. In June, 1978, less 
than 5,000 of the active cases were residents in state 
hospitals or zone centers. Over 113,000 active cases were 
outpatients at state operated or state aided mental health 
centers (Bronk, 1979) . 
Advances in the fields of psychiatric medicine, 
psychotherapy and counseling have probably contributed more 
than any one other factor to more people seeking mental 
health care and to the trend toward outpatient treatment in 
one's own community. Discoveries in psychopharmacology and 
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new psychotherapeutic techniques have led to vast changes 
in the entire mental health care delivery system. With the 
use of psychiatric medications, starting in the 1950's, the 
need for long term confinement in asylums or mental insti-
tutions has been greatly reduced. In the United States, 
the number of patients in state and county mental insti-
tutions dropped from about 560,000 in 1955 to 350,000 in 
1970 despite the fact that the population as a whole in-
creased about 40%, from 166 million to 205 million (United 
States Public Health Service, 1970). 
Reports by the American Medical Association (1973) 
state that psychiatric admissions to hospitals rose from 
362,000 in 1960 to 602,000 in 1971, but the average daily 
census of psychiatric patients dropped from 672,000 to 
339,000, indicating a considerably shorter average length 
of hospital stay. More people are receiving psychiatric 
treatment in hospitals, but they are recovering more quickly 
and being released and treated on an outpatient basis. In 
addition, many patients can now entirely avoid psychiatric 
hospitalization, remaining at home and functioning in a 
number or all of their usual daily activities while under-
going treatment. 
People with less serious emotional problems, who 
would not have sought psychiatric help in the past, are 
also seeking mental health care in their home communities 
due to increased knowledge and awareness of the public that 
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something can be done to alleviate stress, depression and 
other difficulties. Problems that might have previously 
been handled in the home or family doctor's office are 
increasingly being referred to the mental health profes-
sional. People are learning that the mental health profes-
sional can often be an important resource. 
More people are also receiving mental health care 
in their home communities because of the increased avail-
ability of such services to persons of all income levels. 
The public was made more aware of mental health problems 
during World War II when five million men were disqualified 
from military service by the Selective Service, 40% of 
these for neuropsychiatric defects. Of those inducted and 
later discharged for medical reasons, neuropsychiatric 
disability was the most frequent cause (Beigel & Levenson, 
1972). The first National Mental Health Act was passed 
just after the end of the war in 1946. This awareness of 
mental health problems and financial support by the govern-
ment and charitable organizations have made it possible for 
most anyone who desires mental health care to receive it at 
costs they can afford. In fact, mental health care has 
become a significant part of government budgets. In 
Illinois, the Department of Mental Health and Developmental 
Disabilities employs more workers than any other state 
department. Its budget for 1963 was-91.7 million dollars 
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and by 1978 had grown to over 400 million dollars (Flood, 
1979). 
Since the Community Mental Health Centers Act was 
passed by Congress in 1963, the emphasis of government 
funding has been on community facilities rather than large, 
custodial-residential institutions. Studies have shown 
that when mental health care facilities are available 
within a close distance of where people live, they will 
make greater use of them (Babigian, 1977). The growth in 
the number of community mental health centers has made 
mental health care more accessible. 
Health insurance has also served to make mental 
health care more affordable. Comprehensive insurance 
programs have increased their coverage of mental illness so 
that many persons having medical insurance can afford 
prompt psychiatric care in a hospital or on an outpatient 
basis. 
Increased involvement of professionals other than 
physicians in the mental health care delivery system has 
augmented the accessibility of mental health services. In 
1970, there were 8.35 mental health care workers and profes-
sionals in federally fun~ed mental health centers for every 
one psychiatrist. In 1975, this number had grown to 15.14 
mental health workers and nonphysician professionals for 
every one psychiatrist (Provisional Data, 1976). Profes-
sionals such as psychologists and psychiatric social workers 
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are trained to handle most mental health problems that do 
not involve medication. With the limited number of psychia-
trists available, increased numbers of other mental health 
professionals make it much easier to obtain mental health 
care. 
More people with problems are inclined to seek 
mental health care due to increased enlightenment and 
decreased stigma regarding mental illness. Mental illness 
is no longer considered to be associated with demonology or 
witchcraft as in past centuries and the fears about it have 
been greatly reduced. Crocetti, Spiro and Siassi (1974) , 
in their extensive literature review and research on atti-
tudes toward mental illness, go so far as to conclude that 
the mentally ill are being shown 11 nearly total acceptance 
in all but the most intimate relationships.. (p. 88). As 
age was negatively correlated with acceptance, they pre-
dicted that acceptance of the mentally ill will continue to 
increase in the future. Reduced stigma and increased know-
ledge have made seeking mental health care more acceptable 
and less frightening. 
All of the above developments, i.e., scientific ad-
vances in medication and therapeutic techniques, public 
awareness of emotional problems, government funding of 
mental health care, more outpatient mental health centers, 
increased numbers of non-physician mental health profes-
sionals, payment of mental health care by health insurance 
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plans and decreased stigma, have contributed to more people 
receiving mental health care, most in their home communities. 
These developments reflect broad social changes that have 
resulted in a democratization of mental health care. These 
developments have also added to the problems of confiden-
tiality in psychotherapy. 
Prior to the last generation, for the majority of 
people receiving mental health care, absolute confidenti-
ality was not as important as today. In times when mental 
health treatment took place over extended periods in asy-
lums, it was often common knowledge in a community as to 
whom had been "sent away" and why. People were labelled 
because of their past behavior and confinement and were 
treated accordingly, often very courteously, but as the 
"odd" person in the community. Few people sought mental 
health care unless they had problems that were very obvious 
to others. 
Now, because of scientific advances in treatment 
and changing attitudes, many people seeking mental health 
care are not seriously emotionally disturbed. And many of 
those who are presently diagnosed as seriously emotionally 
disturbed are sub~tantially helped with psychopharmacology. 
Frequently they are helped to the extent that their neigh-
bors or work colleagues may not be aware of the extent of 
their mental illness. Most patients receiving outpatient 
mental health care are able to continue in their jobs and 
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daily activities. Behaviors resulting from mental illness 
and emotional problems may or may not interfere signifi-
cantly with functioning in these areas. 
Despite the evidence that there has been a reduc-
tion in stigma towards mental health care, this stigma 
still does exist to some degree. Regardless of a person's 
real abilities or level of functioning, there are discrimi-
nating acts frequently practiced toward those who have 
sought mental health care. Applications for employment 
frequently ask whether a person has a history of psychi-
atric care. Life insurance companies frequently demand 
case histories before considering a mental health care 
recipient's application and the fact that a person has 
received mental health care may influence the decision of 
whether or not they are issued a policy and at what rate, 
whether or not there is any indication that the individual 
would have a shorter life expectancy than most people. 
People who have been hospitalized for psychiatric reasons 
are forbidden to have a gun permit in Illinois, whether or 
not they have ever evidenced any behavior that would sug-
gest they might be dangerous to themselves or others. 
Public reaction to the news that Senator Thomas Eagleton 
had received electric convulsive therapy forced him to 
withdraw himself as a candidate for Vice-President of the 
United States. A negative stereotype of the mental health 
patient not only still exists, but more importantly, 
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enroaches on the right and privacy of former patients. 
In times when many mental health care recipients 
are not diagnosed as seriously emotionally disturbed and 
are attempting to continue their usual daily activities, 
the person who is labelled and discriminated against because 
he is receiving mental health care and not because of 
inappropriate behaviors resulting from psychopathology, has 
much to lose in terms of finances, social relationships and 
self-esteem. The individual patient now has more reason to 
desire confidentiality, but the growth of the mental health 
care delivery system has made confidentiality more diffi-
cult. 
Increased availability of mental health services 
and financial support by the government raise concerns 
regarding confidentiality since more mental health care and 
funding have meant a greater need for records and account-
ability. Accountability for receipt of funds and for 
licensing has meant not only that a minim~~ amount of 
specific information must be in patient records, but that 
outside evaluators must be permitted to review at least 
some of the records to make sure that certain regulations, 
intended to upgrade and maintain a good quality of patient 
care, are being followed. In Illinois, it is a requirement 
that mental health centers receiving state funds submit 
specific information to the Department of Mental Health and 
Developmental Disabilities (DMHDD) on each mental health 
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care recipient. Outpatient facilities are not required to 
submit names or other identifying information, but DMHDD 
does keep a record of the name, diagnosis and other infor-
mation of all persons who have been patients in state 
hospitals or zone centers. A policy on the length of time 
this information is saved has not been clearly stated. 
In a study by Noll and Hanlon (1976) 51% of mental 
health programs responding to a questionnaire indicated 
that they reported at least one piece of identifying 
information, i.e., name, address or social security number, 
to their state department of mental health or its equiva-
lent. Of those state mental health program directors 
responding to the questionnaire (with an 87% return rate 
for the 50 states and four territories) , 66% reported that 
they received at least one kind of the above types of iden-
tifying information from mental health centers. In addi-
tion 36% of mental health centers who submit identifying 
information to their state departments reported that they 
"did not inform their patients that they did so" (p. 1287). 
Needless to say, the more widely that such information is 
disclosed, the less private and confidential it is. 
Some minimal records are necessary for continuity 
of care, both over a long period of time with one therapist 
and if it is necessary to transfer to another therapist. 
Records are especially necessary in documenting the pro-
gress and the effects of types of intervention, including 
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medication. As the number of patients and records in-
crease, there are more medical librarians, typists, file 
clerks, i.e., more people outside of the therapist having 
contact with and access to confidential information. With 
more people having access to such information, there is a 
greater possibility of a breach of confidentiality. 
Third-party payers add another source of difficulty 
in confidentiality in psychotherapy. Before health insur-
ance companies and other health care programs (e.g., Public 
Aid) will reimburse for services, they require the diag-
nosis, type of treatment and dates of treatment for each 
individual client. This information is frequently given 
without the client's knowledge and/or formal consent. 
Professionals other than psychiatrists becoming 
involved as therapists in the delivery of mental health 
care have also added to concerns of confidentiality. The 
added concern was initially due to the fact that most state 
laws in effect that protected the confidentiality of psy-
chotherapy specifically stated that the therapist was a 
physician. Fortunately, psychologists and social workers 
have worked to develop stringent ethical standards regard-
ing confidentiality and have sought to have these standards 
put into law. For example, in Illinois, a psychologist can 
disclose information only under very specific conditions. 
However, there are many people who do not meet the licens-
ing standards of the above professions who are directly 
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involved as therapists in the delivery of mental health 
care, but who are not covered by laws protecting confiden-
tiality. Illinois' new Confidentiality Act has possibly 
resolved this problem by including in the definition of 
"therapist", "any other person not prohibited by law from 
providing such services or from holding himself out as a 
therapist if the recipient reasonably believes that such 
person is permitted to do so" (Illinois Revised Statutes, 
1979, p. 1489). Regardless of the credentials of the 
therapist, most patients receiving mental health care 
probably assume that their statements will be kept private. 
Under current law in most states this is not necessarily 
possible. 
The growth, development and advances of mental 
health care have made confidentiality more important to the 
individual patient, as well as more difficult to assure. 
Increased Interest in Privacy: A second major 
development contributing to increased concern about confi-
dentiality in psychotherapy is that society has become more 
interested in the general issue of privacy. This concern 
for privacy has grown with our advanced technology that 
allows for swift communication, easy and complete surveil-
lance and efficient record keeping. There is increased 
public awareness of the extent to which private and govern-
ment agencies keep records on numerous aspects of our lives 
from the vital statistics of birth and death to vehicle 
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violations, medical records and political party affilia-
tion. 
In any ordered society there must be some measure 
of restraint on individuals in order to keep them from in-
fringing on the lives of others. For example, in order to 
keep people who do not pay their bills from abusing the 
privilege of credit and loans, it is necessary for persons 
applying for loans to give information and allow for investi-
gations of their credit histories. The price that all 
members of society pay is a loss of some degree of privacy. 
Such invasions of privacy, though not appreciated, are 
generally viewed as necessary and therefore acceptable. 
However, there is a growing concern that informa-
tion such as that above is being used for purposes other 
than that for which it was obtained and that much infor-
mation is being obtained without sufficient purpose or 
consent. Incidents of record keeping and of observing 
private citizens for malevolent purposes, not for effi-
ciency or for the protection of society, have come to the 
public's attention. The wiretapping of Martin Luther 
King's telephone (New York Times, 1969), the attempt to 
steal Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatric records, government 
records of such things as the members of organizations 
opposed to the Vietnam War and other abuses of privacy by 
federal and local branches of law enforcement have raised 
considerable alarm. This alarm has led to state and fed-
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eral legislation, including the Public Information Act of 
1966 (Public Law 89-554) and the Privacy Act of 1974 
(Public Law 93-579). 
The Public Information Act of 1966 sets procedures 
for public access to records kept by the federal government 
and for declassification of government information previ-
ously kept secret. It is an irony typical of our varied 
and ever stimulating society that at the same time when 
there is an increase in concern about individual privacy, 
there is increased public pressure for the right to ''know". 
The Federal Privacy Act follows the Public Information Act 
and has the purpose of giving individuals greater control 
over the release of information about themselves by grant-
ing the right of individuals to find out what information 
the government has recorded on them and by limiting dis-
closure of so-called public information without the consent 
of the individual. Included in this is the right to in-
spect, copy, correct and update records and to determine 
what records pertaining to the individual are collected, 
maintained, used and disseminated by the government. 
Government is not the only offending invader of an 
individual's privacy. Insurance companies store and rou-
tinely share medical information regarding their applicants 
and clients. Any information attached to a social security 
number through a computer can follow a person for life 
without one even being aware of it. Agencies for rating 
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credit have been known to give out information without due 
discretion and without always thoroughly checking for 
accuracy. Once incorrect information is stored in a com-
puter, it is generally a much more laborious task to have 
it corrected or removed that it was to put it in or than it 
is to retrieve it for examination. In addition, big busi-
ness has been known to seek information on individuals whom 
they view as antagonistic to their practices (Nader ~ 
General Motors, 1969). Increased public awareness of the 
amounts of information recorded with our computer tech-
nology and incidents of misuse of information or undue 
investigation for information have led to increased demand 
for the protection of privacy. 
This increased demand is visible in the increased 
attention given to the right of privacy in civil suits and 
new laws. Several state constitutions have included pro-
visions recognizing a right to privacy and several more 
states have enacted comprehensive privacy statutes or fair 
information practices laws. 
As one of many areas where greater privacy is being 
sought, confidentiality in psychotherapy has received its 
share of attention. Numerous suits and court cases have 
raised the issue of the right to privacy in psychotherapy. 
Federal laws, designed to protect the confidentiality of 
persons in federally funded drug or alcoholism programs, 
have been enacted. In addition, individual states are 
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taking steps to insure the protection of confidentiality in 
psychotherapy. For example, in Illinois, a state which has 
passed much reform legislation in recognition of patient 
rights, a comprehensive Confidentiality Act to "protect the 
confidentiality of records and communications of recipients 
of mental health or developmental disability services" went 
into effect in 1979. This act very specifically limits and 
defines the situations in which commu~1ications and records 
may or may not be disclosed. Whether or not the Confi-
dentiality Act accomplishes its stated purpose will be 
discussed in later sections. 
This federal and state legislation reflects the 
growing concern with privacy in our society. These laws 
and court cases that pertain to privacy in psychotherapy 
will also be discussed in later sections. 
Increased Requests for Information: A third factor 
contributing to increased professional and legal concern 
regarding confidentiality in psychotherapy is that mental 
health professionals are receiving a greater number of 
requests for information or testimony about clients from 
outside sources such as third-party payers, the courts and 
employers. The trends and advances that have led to greater 
numbers of people seeking mental health care have also 
enhanced the prestige of psychiatry and psychology. Mental 
health professionals are increasingly viewed as experts 
having special insight, training and ability to understand 
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and describe an individual's personality and suitability 
for employment, parole, etc. Mental health professionals 
are called upon to give opinions on a wide variety of 
matters including those related to the courts (child cus-
tody, juvenile cases, insanity and more), education and 
industry. In addition, mental health problems have gained 
increased respectability as an illness and their treatment 
is covered by an increasing number of health insurance 
companies. 
Third-party payers, including health insurance com-
panies, are one of the biggest requesters of information 
about mental health clients. Grossman (1971) reports that 
in a survey of Northern California District Branch psychia-
trists, 89% reported that they received requests from 
health insurance companies for information about clients. 
As mentioned previously, third-party payers require a 
minimum disclosure of the psychiatric diagnosis, the dates 
of therapy sessions and the kind of therapy involved before 
giving compensation for mental health care. Occasionally, 
they will request additional information including case 
histories, medications prescribed and even a review of the 
patient's entire record which may contain highly personal 
thoughts and feelings that the patient has expressed to a 
psychotherapist. This information is similar to that 
requested by health insurance companies when processing 
claims for any type of health disorder and does not suggest 
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an attempt to obtain psychiatric "secrets" about a client. 
Rather, it is an effort on the part of the insurance com-
pany to make sure that reimbursement is paid only for those 
conditions covered by the policy and that the frequency of 
treatment is justified by the existing condition. However, 
as Grossman (1971) points out, such information usually 
becomes a part of a permanent record, often in a clearing-
house where insurance companies exchange information. He 
cites possible areas of abuse and states, "There is no 
predicting the ultimate use and misuse of permanent records 
of this nature" (p. 65) . Third-party payers are an area of 
concern for the mental health professionals who are inter-
ested in the best welfare of their clients, yet need to 
receive a fair payment from persons who might otherwise not 
be able to afford their services. 
Mental health professionals have established them-
selves as specialists in the areas of human behavior and 
mental illness and their expertise is frequently requested 
for testimony in a court of law. In cases of court requested 
examinations and evaluations there need be no conflict re-
garding confidentiality if the person is agreeable to the 
evaluation and is aware of its purpose at the time of the 
evaluation. However, many times, a psychotherapist whom a 
person has been seeing with no intention that the therapist 
will be called as an expert witness, is requested to pro-
vide information such as an opinion of a client's effectiv~-
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ness as a parent, suitability for various choices of crimi-
nal sentencing (e.g., probation versus incarceration) or 
stability in general. The legal aspects of these requests 
will be discussed in greater depth in later sections. 
These requests by the courts present a significant 
threat to confidentiality in psychotherapy and to its value 
to society as a whole. Obviously, divulging such informa-
tion as mentioned above will interfere with the progress of 
the specific client; it could also interfere with the value 
of psychotherapy as a whole. People in need of treatment 
because of the stress of such things as marital disharmony 
or the fact that they engage in anti-social activities may 
not seek treatment if they have reason to fear that infor-
mation they discuss with a psychotherapist may later be 
used against them in a court of law. Needless to say, 
these are probably some of the very same people for whom 
society has a strong interest in seeking mental health 
care. 
In addition to requests for information by third-
party payers and the courts, mental health professionals 
are asked to provide expert information, recommendations 
and opinions to a host of other sources including schools 
(especially when children are involved in treatment) , 
Social Security offices (for evaluating disability claims) , 
employers (especially as to whether a person is ready to 
return to work, but sometimes with less honorable ques-
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tions) and friends and relatives (some with good intentions 
and some with not so good intentions). The list of people 
requesting information and their varied reasons could go on 
and on. 
In summary, the mental health professionals have 
established themselves as specialists and now others want 
to make use of their expertise. This position is very 
flattering and would be quite comfortable were it not for 
some of the ethical dilemmas that may arise. This disser-
tation is devoted to further exploring these dilemmas. 
Confidentiality - ~Moral and Historical Perspective 
Confidentiality and privacy in our Western culture 
have been respected for centuries in certain specified re-
lationships such as husband-wife, client-attorney, patient-
physician and penitent-clergyman. Although confidentiality 
in the patient-physician association, based upon the Hippo-
cratic Oath dating from the fourth century B.C., is the 
oldest of the nonfamily relationships, historically and 
philosophically, privacy has been most thoroughly discussed 
in the writings of the 13th through 17th century Roman 
Catholic theologians. These theologians debated the cir-
cumstances under which the seal of confession, which pro-
tects the privacy of confession, should be applied and 
whether there could or should be any exceptions to the 
obligation of the seal. 
These discussions and the issues they address are 
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remarkably similar to modern day debates regarding confi-
dentiality in psychotherapy. A review of the philosophical 
and historical writings related to confidentiality, secrets 
and privacy is helpful to understand the foundations of the 
moral right to secrecy and privacy, to explore how others 
have handled the conflicts and dilemmas inherent in the 
concept of a private individual in society, to provide a 
background of ethical decision making and to demonstrate 
how similar struggles have gone on for hundreds of years 
despite the fact that privacy is a relatively new legal 
issue. 
The discussions regarding the seal of confession 
are additionally pertinent as "confession'', though often 
called by other names, is usually considered a significant 
part of the therapeutic process. Mowrer (1961) compared 
the psychotherapeutic process with the sacrament of con-
fession and expiation. He noted that psychotherapy allowed 
for a confession of one's errors, but did not encourage 
atonement or reparation. Jung (1975) directly compared the 
role of the priest with that of the psychotherapist and 
stated, "The first beginnings of all analytic treatment of 
the soul are to be found in its prototype, the confes-
sional" (p. 55) . The Roman Catholic church also recognizes 
the commonality of these roles. Religious writers refer to 
confessors as "spiritual physicians" and state that they 
have a duty to become knowledgeable in mental hygiene and 
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psychiatry (Halligan, 1967, p. 144). 
~ Brief History of the Seal of Confession: In 
modern day practice, the seal of confession is the strict-
est obligation to maintain absolute secrecy regarding all 
information learned from a penitent during the sacrament of 
penance. The Code of Canon Law, the body of laws of the 
Roman Catholic church, states: 
The sacramental seal is inviolable. Consequently, the 
confessor must exercise all diligent care not to be-
tray the penitent in any degree by word, sign or in any 
other way or for any cause whatsoever (c. 889; as 
quoted in McCarthy, 1967, p. 133). 
The phrase "any cause whatsoever" emphasizes the absolute 
nature of the seal, whether there be risk of death, harm to 
others or treason. 
In light of modern day practices, it seems anoma-
lous that some historians report it was the custom among 
early Christians to have public confession (McCarthy, 
1967). This may be true as early Christians lived in very 
closely knit communities. Their zeal and enthusiasm for 
following the teachings of Christ and making reparation in 
many circumstances outweighed their concern with the con-
sequences of public confession and penance. It is also 
thought that confession by the earliest Christians was 
practiced only once, when they converted from paganism; 
therefore, it was not a frequent practice or an integral 
part of Christian life. Confession did not receive much 
attention from theologians during the first few centuries, 
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A.D., and it is difficult to know precisely how the early 
Christians practiced confession and penance, especially as 
the word that has frequently been translated to mean "con-
fession" can also refer to the entire rite involved in 
gaining absolution, not just the specific part of confes-
sion (Harrington, 1950). 
Church historians to this day disagree on whether 
public confession was actually practiced or required by the 
early church and it is believed that the practice of rites 
varied greatly from place to place (Barton, 1961; Harrington, 
1950; Jungmann, 1959). Most of the evidence from early 
theologians suggests that private confession was available 
for sins that were committed in secret (Origen, Homily on 
Psalm 37, ii, St. Cypian, De Lapsis, xxviii, as reviewed 
and discussed in Harrington, 1950; Epistle of Barnabas, 1st 
century, Bishop Aphraates of Syria, 4th century, St. Ambrose, 
4th century, as reviewed and discussed in Kurtscheid, 
1927). 
Although strong evidence of public confession in 
the early church is lacking, public penance seems to have 
been customary, usually even for sins committed in secret. 
Often this was exercised only in the gravest of secret sins 
(murder, apostacy or adultery) and consisted of a form of 
excommunication (Barton, 1961; Jungman, 1959). However, 
there developed an awareness of the impact society can have 
on the individual when a public penance gives clues as to 
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what sins may have been confessed. For example, the 
churches of Asia Minor had very specific lengths of time as 
penance for various sins, thereby making it possible to 
figure out one's sin from the public penance the person was 
required to perform (Palmer, 1963). St. Basil (4th cen-
tury) made a statement against the use of such public 
penance that might suggest the specific sin, especially in 
the case of women who confessed to adultery as, if exposed, 
they would be subject to capital punishment under civil law 
(Kurtscheid, 1927). 
Greater awareness and concern about the effects of 
public penance on one's reputation, as well as potential 
punishment under civil law, seems to have arisen around 
this same time as others were demanding secret confession 
and penance and silence on the part of the confessor for 
secret sins so that people were not hated or exposed to 
contempt (Aphraates, 4th century, St. Ephraem, 4th century, 
as reviewed and discussed in Kurtscheid, 1927). Pope Leo 
I, in a protest against the public reading of each peni-
tent's list of sins in the year 459, demanded secret con-
fession and silence on the part of the confessor so that 
shame a~d fear of legal prosecution would not deter many 
from seeking absolution (Leo's Epistle 168, Denz 145, as 
discussed in Barton, 1961; Kurtscheid, 1927). Modern day 
psychotherapists also have an interest in seeing that 
clients are not deterred from seeking psychotherapy because 
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of the fear of being subject to public humiliation or legal 
problems. 
The above theologians recognized how social pres-
sure and fear of civil law could deter individuals from 
seeking absolution if confession were not private. Cul-
tural pressures for privacy, from the Celtic branch of the 
church, also influenced the practice of confession and 
penance. In the Irish and Anglo-Saxon churches, public 
penance had never been customary. This is attributed pri-
marily to two reasons. First, due to the nature of nation-
al customs and the character of the people, missionaries 
found it easier to convert the Anglo-Saxons if they did not 
insist on the humiliation of public penance. Second, the 
Celtic churches were isolated_and did not experience the 
same influences as the continental church (Barton, 1961). 
When the Anglo-Saxon branch of the church became stronger 
and sent its own missionaries back to the continent during 
the 6th century, they influenced the already growing trend 
toward a simple, less rigorous and private confession and 
penance. In addition, the Celtic church brought the prac-
tice of repeated confession and penance, possibly resulting 
from monastic influence, to the continent (Barton, 1961; 
Palmer, 1963). 
This trend toward privacy of confession continued 
until the Council of Douzy (874) which decreed that: 
Penitents, whether clerics or laymen or women, who con-
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fess their sins in secret to the priest are in no way 
to be betrayed. By no indication whatsoever are their 
sins to be revealed to anyone save God alone (as 
quoted in McCarthy, 1967, p. 135). 
At this period in time the details of the obligation of 
silence were not yet uniformly regulated and there con-
tinued to be discussions and controversies. The seal of 
confession received considerable attention at synods and 
numerous theologians addressed the various issues related 
to it. 
It was at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 that 
the obligation of the seal of confession was put into 
ecclesiastical law. In this ordinance there is " ... a 
strict command to the confessor not to betray the sinner in 
the least in whatever manner, either by word or sign or in 
any other way" (Kurtscheid, 1927, p. 116). The purpose of 
the seal was to safeguard the sacrament of penance and the 
obligation rested solely on the confessor. The Fourth 
Lateran Council allowed for a priest to consult with a 
superior concerning the confession of a penitent if the 
identity was not disclosed. It also specified that a 
confessor who broke the obligation of the seal of confes-
sion would be "deposed from his priestly office •.. [and] 
incarcerated in a monastery to discharge a penance all his 
life" (Denz 814 as quoted in McCarthy, 1967, p. 135) 
indicating the gravity of such an offense. 
However, questions about the seal of confession 
continued to be debated. What constituted a sacramental 
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confession? Were interpreters or persons who overheard a 
confession also bound by the seal? What if breaking the 
seal would be beneficial to the penitent? What if breaking 
the seal would prevent potential harm to the penitent or 
others? What does one do about information learned during 
the confession that does not pertain directly to the peni-
tent's sins? Can one use confessional information if the 
seal is not broken? In what ways? 
Similarities in the Discussions on Confidentiality 
and the Seal of Confession: It is at this point in the 
historical and theological discussions and writings on the 
seal of confession that there develops a remarkable simi-
larity to the present day debates on confidentiality in 
psychotherapy. Presently, psychologists have an ethical 
code, comparable to ecclesiastical law, that states: 
Safeguarding information about an individual that has 
been obtained by the psychologist in the course of 
teaching, practice or investigation is a primary obli-
gation of the psychologist. Such information is not 
communicated to others unless certain important condi-
tions are met (American Psychological Association, 
1979, p. 4). 
This allows for a breach of confidentiality under some cir-
cumstances, but is vague about what these circumstances 
might be. Many believed that the urdinance of the Fourth 
Lateran Council was also intended to allow for exceptions, 
a belief which was not absolutely refuted until the phrase 
"for any cause whatsoever" was added in 1917 when the obli-
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Before discussing how the early debates and writ-
ings regarding the possible exceptions to the seal compare 
to those regarding confidentiality in psychotherapy, it is 
necessary to understand the bases of the seal and the types 
of secrets defined by moral theologians. There are three 
levels on which the seal is justified and protected. The 
highest level of protection for the penitent is that of 
divine positive law. Divine positive law is based on the 
authority of God and is viewed as pertaining to the seal by 
interpreting Christ's statement, "if you forgive the sins 
of any, they are forgiven; if you retain the sins of any, 
they are re·tained" (John 20:23, RSV), as implicitly grant-
ing the right to have one's confession heard secretly. 
Otherwise, the faithful would be deterred from participat-
ing in the sacrament of penance and having their sins 
forgiven, something that the theologians believe that 
Christ would not have intended. "The obligation of the seal 
follows from the very nature of the Sacrament of Penance as 
instituted by Christ" (McCarthy, 1967, p. 134). St. Thomas 
Aquinas adds that a confessor cannot repeat a penitent's 
sins as he cannot "know" as a man those things that he has 
heard as God's minister (McCarthy, 1967). The discussions 
by the theologians of divine positive law will not be 
covered in any greater depth here as this level of justi-
fication of privacy does not have a parallel in psychother-
apy. Most would agree that there is no implied command of 
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God for believers to seek psychotherapy! 
The second level of protection provided to the 
penitent is that of natural law. Natural law is that which 
the average man, using observation and reason, would recog-
nize as a principle of God's will (Marshall, 1960). The 
utilization of natural law involves taking the principles 
of justice and charity and applying them in the circum-
stances of daily living. Confession would be governed 
under natural law as a natural secret. Regan (1941) 
states: 
This type of secret is designated natural because the 
obligation of secrecy which it imposes arises directly 
from the natural law; no contract, express or implied, 
is needed to make it binding (p. 5). 
Haring (1966) states that the revelation of a natural se-
cret "by the very nature of the case would here and now 
violate justice and charity" (p. 568). Duns Scotus (around 
1300 A.D.) states that there are three reasons for the 
natural obligation to keep the seal of confession: (1) it 
is best for the general welfare not to be deterred from 
seeking penance, (2) because of the lines in Matthew 7:12 
and Luke 6:31 that instruct people to do unto others as 
they would have done unto themselves, and (3) confession 
has the characteristics of a secretum commissum, which is 
covered by natural law (Kurtscheid, 1927). 
Secretum commissum, or committed secret (also 
called "entrusted secret"), is that knowledge "which is 
obtained under the explicit or implicit condition of se-
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crecy" (Haring, 1966, p. 569). Regan (1941) notes that 
"the distinguishing note of the entrusted secret is that 
I 
the agreement of maintaining secrecy is made anterior to, 
and is the sine qua non condition for, the disclosure" (p. 
7). This is in contrast to the "promised secret" in which 
a promise to keep the secret is made after obtaining the 
secret knowledge. The committed secret therefore carries a 
heavier burden of obligation and is a greater sin to vio-
late as the secret information may very well not have been 
revealed were it not for the prior understanding that it 
would not be disclosed. 
The mos~ common example of the committed secret is 
the professional secret, i.e., information told to a doc-
tor, lawyer or other professional with the understanding 
that it will be kept confidential. The professional secret 
may be explicit, as when a promise of secrecy is directly 
requested and given, or it may be implicit, as when no 
promise is asked for or received in so many words but the 
position or function of the person to hear the secret 
information clearly indicates that the secret will be 
vigorously protected, an assumption that is frequently made 
by persons seeking psychotherapy. The discussions of the 
theologians regarding how natural law, justice and charity, 
which obligate one to the professional secret, also obli-
gate one to the seal of confession are therefore very 
pertinent to confidentiality in psychotherapy. For a thor-
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ough discussion of the relationship between natural law and 
' confidentiality in psychotherapy, see Alves (1959). 
Ecclesiastical or church law is the third level of 
protection of the privacy of the penitent. The Code of 
Canon Law includes the obligation of absolute secrecy by a 
confessor. The law allows no exceptions and there are 
severe punishments for breaking it. If the seal is broken 
knowingly, under present day church law the confessor would 
be excommunicated immediately. If a disclosure is indirect 
and accidental, the punishments are less severe. 
This third level of protection is comparable to 
both the "laws" of a professional code of ethics and to 
civil law, although professional codes and civil laws do 
have exceptions, both specified and implied, in regard to 
confidentiality in psychotherapy. Also, punishments are 
not so severe as those specified in Canon Law, yet an 
intentional and unwarranted disclosure of confidential 
information by a psychologist can result in the psycholo-
gist receiving consequences from professional organizations 
and under civil law. Indirect and accidental disclosures 
would probably not result in any punishment unless the 
psychologist was grossly negligent. The discussions re-
garding the possible exceptions to ecclesiastical law, 
prior to 1917 when it was made clear that there were no 
exceptions, are comparable to present day discussions of 
possible exceptions to professional codes and/or laws 
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regarding confidentiality in psychotherapy. 
One of the major sources of conflict that arose re-
garding the seal of confession, and which has a direct 
~ 
parallel regarding confidentiality in psychotherapy, con-
cerned the issue of preventing the penitent from committing 
future sins and from harming others. Huguccio, writing 
shortly'before the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), proposed 
that if a person confessed a sin but refused to do penance 
or planned to commit another sin, persons who would be 
helpful in persuading the penitent to refrain from evil 
without causing harm to him could privately be told about 
the confession (Kurtscheid, 1927). He made it clear that 
past sins are covered by the seal of confession. Huguccio 
based his opinion on the thinking that a priest would 
essentially be an accomplice in sin if he silently stood by 
and allowed it to occur. Additionally, he stated that if 
the authorities are informed, this may cause great injury 
to the penitent and thereby by a sin against the natural 
law of charity. The solution is to tell someone in a 
position to prevent the sin without harming the penitent. 
This opinion is shared by many theologians in the 13th to 
15th centuries, some of whom further suggested that under 
some circumstances it would also be appropriate to warn a 
person whom the penitent has threatened to harm (without 
revealing the penitent's name) and advise this person to 
make amends with all enemies so that he/she does not get 
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hurt. William of Rennes (Apparatus, 1241, as reported in 
Kurtscheid, 1927) states that a priest has a duty to dis-
creetly inform potential victims when it can be done with-
out sin or scandal. Great emphasis is given by all writers 
to the point that this should be done without injury to the 
penitent. 
This exception to the seal of confession that 
Huguccio and other canonists suggested is indicative of the 
human emotion and conflict of the confessor. This same 
conflict occurs in psychotherapists when clients speak, 
while in psychotherapy, of harming someone. Psychothera-
pists may feel irresponsible or like accomplices if they do 
not make efforts to prevent clients from committing dan-
gerous acts. It may also subject clients to undue harass-
ment and punishment to report them to criminal authorities 
for acts that they have not actually committed. Psycho-
therapists, under current Illinois law, are permitted but 
net required to warn potential victims as was suggested by 
several theologians of the Middle Ages. They have the 
additional option of working with other mental health 
professionals and a noncriminal portion of the legal system 
to have people committed to psychiatric hospitals to pre-
vent harm to themselves or others. This latter option 
might be compared with disclosing to a person who can 
persuade a penitent to stop sinning, the solution suggested 
by Huguccio which would be in line with natural law. Other 
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states have not all given the psychotherapist as much dis-
cretion as Illinois (Tarasoff v. California Board of 
Regents). 
There is one very definite difference between 
present day discussions by psychotherapists about prevent-
ing clients from injuring themselves and/or others and 
discussions by theologians of the Middle Ages. This is the 
definition of what constitutes an act planned with suffi-
cient seriousness to warrant disclosure. Sins, such as not 
believing in the teaching of the Roman Catholic church 
(heresy) , were considered important enough to be reported 
to friends or relatives of the penitents who might be able 
to help them. Beavais in Speculum Historiale (1244, as 
reported in Kurtscheid, 1927) went as far as to say that 
the priest should warn others of heresy he has heard in 
confession so that they may avoid the heretic and not be 
perverted. The only situations that psychotherapists can 
report, according to the various ethical codes and to 
Illinois state statutes, pertain to physical danger to 
others or to the client and to abuse, physical or emo-
tional, and/or neglect to children. 
Another source of conflict discussed by theologians 
regarding the seal of confession and paralleled today in 
issues of confidentiality in psychotherapy concerns the 
attitude of the penitent. Attitude and intent of the peni-
tent is given much attention in the writings of the church 
41 
canonists in the sense of asking whether or not a confes-
sion is sacramental and subject to the seal if a person 
does not intend to try to stop sinning. The question 
arises as to whether or not a confession that is made 
without remorse, but as a routine because confession is 
required at least on an annual basis, should be given the 
same privilege and privacy as a sincere and contrite con-
fession. In the interest of encouraging the faithful to 
continue to participate in the sacraments, canon law does 
not allow for the confessor to make the above discrimina-
tion in regards to the seal although the priest is allowed 
to use judgment in so far as whether or not absolution is 
granted. 
This conflict regarding attitude and intent might 
be compared to that experienced by psychotherapists who 
have clients who are forced to participate in psychotherapy 
for any number of reasons (e.g., a condition of probation, 
in order to keep a job after some unusual behavior or to 
placate a spouse who is thinking about divorce) but do not 
make appropriate use of the therapy time because of such 
matters as missed appointments, arriving consistently late 
or refusing to talk. This is the kind of behavior that can 
make psychotherapists feel inadequate, frustrated and 
angry, feelings that may interfere with a clear perception 
of what is the most therapeutic and ethical response 
to the question of whether or not others should be informed 
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that the client is merely qoing through the motions of 
seeking mental health care. 
Even without these feelings a psychotherapist may 
question whether confidentiality in these types of cases is 
in the best interest of society or even in the best in-
terest of the individual. Obviously, professional codes of 
ethics and statutes in many states forbid such disclosures 
and serve to protect psychotherapists from their own feel-
ings and conflicts, just as the Code of Canon Law protects 
confessors from revealing information they have heard in 
confession. Just as granting privacy to all confessions, 
whether sincere or not, serves to encourage people to 
participate in the sacraments of the church, granting 
confidentiality to people who may fail to use or misuse 
psychotherapy, may benefit society and enhance the pro-
fession of psychotherapy by offering encouragement and a 
trusting environment for these same people to make better 
use of psychotherapy and by demonstrating to others that 
psychotherapists are serious when they say that psychother-
apy is confidential. 
Another issue of increasing concern is the client's 
right to infor~ed consent. In the case of psychotherapy, 
it has been suggested that informed consent includes being 
advised of the limits of confidentiality (Siegal, 1979). 
This means that, if clients do not have this information, 
they cannot validly consent to be patients in psychother-
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apy. A parallel proposal was made by William of Rennes 
(Apparatus, 1241, as reported in Kurtscheid, 1927) in a 
discussion of whether future sins are protected by the seal 
of confession. He states that when a confessor decides he 
has a duty to disclose information from confession, he also 
has a duty to inform the penitent that the confession is 
not protected by the seal. In the situation discussed by 
William of Rennes, the informing was done after a confes-
sion was found to be unreceivable. Under the present Code 
of Canon Law this would no longer be an issue as it allows 
for no exceptions to the seal. 
Some psychotherapists are currently proposing that 
a potential client be explicitly advised of the limits of 
confidentiality before therapy starts so that the client 
very clearly understands the relationship. Siegal states: 
"The initial interview should incorporate a straightforward 
sharing with a client of whatever limits may exist in the 
confidentiality of the material presented" (1979, p. 256). 
This concept of warning the client is gaining popularity. 
On the one hand it presents the psychotherapist-clie~t re-
lationship in a realistic and honest manner and assures 
that clients will not disclose informa~ion without know-
ledge of the possible ramifications. The clients will also 
not feel so deceived if the psychotherapist must later 
disclose information. On the other hand, this approach may 
sensitize clients to such an extent that they have greater 
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difficulty (both conscious and unconscious) exploring and 
relating their thoughts and feelings. 
The question of gaining client consent to disclose 
information also has parallels in the writings on the seal 
of confession. In a discussion of whether a confession can 
be revealed to prevent sins, Henry of Segusia (Summa, 1253, 
as reported in Kurtscheid, 1927) states that general warn-
ings can be given in order to prevent great crimes, but 
that the penitent must not be identified, no matter what 
misfortune may occur, unless the confessor has the permis-
sion of the penitent. The major ethical means that psy-
chotherapists have for disclosing information, should it be 
deemed necessary, is to obtain the permission of the 
client. This practice has since been changed as regards to 
confession as it was generally assumed, especially in cases 
regarding court testimony, that if penitents refused to 
grant permission to the confessor to disclose information, 
they were probably guilty or had something to hide. A 
priest can still disclose information, with consent, when a 
parishoner talks to him outside the confessional. 
It is frequently assumed that, if a client refuses 
to grant permission to a psychotherapist to disclose infor-
mation, the client is guilty or has something to hide. 
This is a major reason why some psychotherapists will not 
reveal any information, positive or negative, even with the 
consent of the client. The contention of these psychothera-
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pists is that any pertinent information could be obtained 
from another source where confidentiality was not assumed 
to be inherent in the relationship. For example, if a 
decision regarding the stability of a second marriage was 
needed in a child custody case, neighbors, co-workers, 
friends and relatives or the use of an expert witness who 
does an evaluation for the court with the consent and 
knowledge of those involved, could provide sufficient data 
upon which to make this decision. 
Political pressures also had an effect on the 
interpretation of the seal of confession. The Gallicans, 
an order which had declared independence from the authority 
of Rome were officially recognized as leaders of the French 
national church from the late Middle Ages to the French 
Revolution. With no separation of church and state, the 
Parlement (the highest legal court in the country) at that 
time reviewed all papal decrees and only accepted them if 
they were consistent with the teachings of the Gallican 
Church (Harney, 1941). 
In France, civil law required the public denuncia-
tion of any individual who expressed murderous intent 
against the King. This civil law was supported by the 
Gallicans but opposed by the Jesuits, who, as leaders in 
moral theology, used the strictest interpretation of the 
seal of confession. The Gallicans were bitterly opposed to 
the Jesuit attempts to establish colleges and universities 
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in France and used all their influence to limit and de-
nounce the Jesuits. They had even been successful in 
having the Society banished from France following an attempt 
on King Henry IV's life in 1595. The Jesuits were per-
mitted to return to France in 1603 and when they sought 
permission to open a college in 1611, the solicitor-general 
urged the Parlement to refuse permission on the grounds 
that the Jesuits did not follow certain laws and teachings, 
among them those concerning the seal of confession. It was 
demanded that the Jesuits subscribe to the rule regarding 
the safety of the monarchy. Although the Jesuits did not 
agree to divulge the name of any penitent, they did agree 
to report any murderous intention on the King they heard in 
confession, making an accommodation to civil law in order 
to receive permission and funding for their colleges in 
France (Kurtscheid, 1927). 
Political and financial pressures are present in 
the practice of psychotherapy as well, especially when a 
psychotherapist is working in an agency that receives 
public funding. These pressures are probably more acutely 
felt by those in the position of making administrative and 
policy decisions than by the individual psychotherapist. 
For example, although the State of Illinois does not re-
quest the names or identities of clients seeking only 
outpatient mental health care, it is required that state 
funded community mental health agencies release informa-
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tion, including identities and dates of visits, about 
clients who have received recent inpatient care in a state 
facility to the Department of Mental Health and Develop-
mental Disabilities (DMHDD). This information is required 
so that DMHDD can monitor the care that former inpatients 
receive with the hope that this will prevent their reentry 
into a state mental hospital. Refusal to comply with such 
a requirement by the department that recommends how much 
funding each agency receives could have negative ramifica-
tions. 
Financial pressures are present for the psycho-
therapist who receives reimbursements for services from 
health insurance companies. These companies require speci-
fic information, including diagnosis, before they will pay 
the psychotherapist. 
In summary, any time when there is a situation in 
which a psychotherapist receives funding from someone other 
than the client for providing services, there is the likeli-
hood of laws and/or accountability interfering with con-
fidentiality. 
One interesting aspect of the seal of confession is 
that all persons hearing the actual confession are bound by 
the seal just as much as the confessor. This might include 
anyone from an interpreter to other pentitents waiting 
their turns to see the confessor. In psychotherapay, there 
are parallels in terms of the clerical help who keep track 
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of billings and records as well as in a group therapy 
situation. In the case of clerical help, it has been held 
in the courts that secretaries are an extension of their 
professional employers and are bound by the same laws of 
privilege and privacy as those professionals. The Illinois 
Confidentiality Act also provides that clerical help are 
bound to confidentiality by law. 
Group therapy has been a source of problems for the 
mental health professional. Although the psychotherapist-
client relationship has held privileged status in some 
states, group therapy has allowed for loopholes as fellow 
group members have generally not been considered able to 
claim the privilege. Illinois law has attempted to remedy 
this problem by including the phrase "or in the presence of 
other persons" (Illinois Revised Statutes, 1979, p. 1489) 
in the definition of a "confidential communication" or 
"communication" and states that "All records and communi-
cations shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed 
except as provided in this Act" (Illinois Revised Statutes, 
1979, p. 1489), allowing clients to have only the same 
avenues of disclosure of information regarding other cli-
ents as do psychotherapists. 
In summary, many of the same problems and conflicts 
discussed by early theologians in regards to possible 
exceptions to the seal of confession, including the dilemma 
when a crime could be prevented, when the attitude of the 
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penitent is insincere, the issue of disclosure with con-
sent, political pressures and occasions when others over-
hear a confession, have parallels in modern day problems 
and conflicts in regard to confidentiality in psychother-
apy. Psychotherapists also have some of the same motiva-
tions in keeping the two acts, confession and psychother-
apy, confidential, i.e., the desire to not do anything 
that would deter people from seeking participation in these 
acts and a concern for the consequences of these people if 
information is revealed. The confessor and the psychothera-
pist are additionally both bound by natural law and eccle-
siastical or civil law. The seal of confession has the 
additional basis of divine law. In the opinion of this 
author, divine law removes any conflict or question and 
makes the moral responsibilities of the confessor clearer 
and easier to handle than those of the psychotherapist. 
Even though the psychotherapist may be said, as 
above, to be bound by natural law, this is not generally in 
the conscious awareness of psychotherapists who tend to 
look to their ethical codes and civil law in making deci-
sions regarding confidentiality. The approach to decision 
making used by moralists and the Roman Catholic church is 
to take the principles of natural law and apply them to the 
situation. As will be discussed in following sections, 
ethical codes and civil law, while having input from natu-
ral law, approach decision making in a different manner. 
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Confidentiality - ~ Psychotherapeutic Perspective 
The purpose of this section is to explore the judg-
ments of several major theorist-practitioners with refer-
ence to confidentiality in psychotherapy. It will also 
discuss the development of professional codes of ethics for 
psychotherapists, particularly psychologists. 
Major Theorists-Practitioners: Openness and trust 
in the treatment setting have been viewed as a necessity by 
early and modern theorists-practitioners (e.g., Cautela, 
1977; Freud, 1959; Jung, 1961; Maslow; 1954; Rogers, 1961). 
Many techniques have been developed to help the client be 
more open and self-disclosing, including Freud's "free 
association", Jung's "dream recall" and Adler's "earliest 
memory." It is generally assumed by those who study the 
major theorists that any information revealed by a pa-
tient/client to a therapist will be kept confidential; 
however, the specific concepts of privacy and confiden-
tiality are seldom mentioned. Privacy seems to have been 
automatically assumed as present and essential by theorists-
practitioners and has rarely been discussed as an issue. 
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), recognized by psycho-
therapists as developing the first comprehensive theory of 
personality and technique of psychotherapy, did not give 
confidentiality very much attention in his writings; how-
ever, the small amount of attention he did give is direct 
and to the point. For example, he stated " ... we [the 
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psychotherapist and the patient] make our pact, complete 
candor on one side and strict discretion on the other" 
(Freud, 1949, p. 31). A very brief explanation of a part 
of his theory will explain why Freud believed that this 
"candor and discretion" were essential elements for the 
process of psychotherapy. 
A major thesis of Freud's theory of psychopathology 
is that the ego, in an attempt to deal with the demands of 
reality, the id and the superego, and to preserve its own 
organization, will repress a great deal of its memory and 
experiences into the unconscious. This repression is done 
with the purpose of protecting the ego and alleviating 
stress, but it may backfire in that the ego may be altered 
or disorganized by the intrusion of these same repressed 
and unconscious elements. The psychoanalyst assists the 
patient by helping to discover conflicts and interpreting 
material that is influenced by the unconscious, thereby 
giving the ego greater awareness of the unconscious ele-
ments that may intrude. He provides knowledge to the 
patient so that his ego may gain control and organization 
over the parts of the psyche. 
Freud (1949) stated that the patient must agree "to 
put at our disposal all the material which its self-
perception yields it" (p. 30) and that "what we want to 
hear from our patient is not only what he knows and con-
ceals from other people; he is to tell us too what he does 
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not know" (p. 31) . 
He is to tell us not only what he can say intention-
ally and willingly, what will give him relief like a 
confession, but everything else as well that his self-
observation yields him, everything that comes into 
his head, even if it is disagreeable for him to say it, 
even if it seems to him unimportant or nonsensical 
(p. 31, Freud's emphasis). 
Because the ego has repressed experiences, thoughts 
and feelings that may be a source of anxiety, it is resis-
tant to the discovery of this material and the risk of 
stress it may cause. The ego is reluctant to let this 
material into the preconscious (available to the conscious) 
or the conscious awareness of the patient, and even more 
reluctant to make this material available to the awareness 
of the psychotherapist. Another source of interference 
with complete candor in psychotherapy is the fact that the 
unconscious does not operate by logical rules. Freud 
refers to the unconscious as the "realm of the illogical." 
Conflicting urges can independently exist side by side. 
The workings of the unconscious seem nonsensical at times. 
This lack of sense may be a source of embarrassment for the 
client - a deterring force to openness in the therapeutic 
setting. 
Freud repeatedly emphasized that the fundamental 
rule a patient must follow in psychoanalysis is complete 
candor. Freud also recognized that the rule is very diffi-
cult to follow and emphasized the necessity of strict 
discretion by the psychotherapist in order to make the 
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patient's task possible. Despite the fact that Freud's 
theory was in a continual state of growth and change while 
he was alive, the assumption of professional discretion is 
made throughout his writings. It is clear from his writ-
ings that the basic concept of confidentiality is essential 
to the therapeutic process. 
Although varying in theory and approach, other 
major theorist-practitioners have followed Freud's lead in 
finding an important place for confidentiality in psycho-
therapy. Alfred Adler (1870-1937), an associate of Freud's 
who later broke away from him viewed emotional problems in 
a social context and developed a cognitive and educational 
approach to psychotherapy. In discussing his approach to 
psychotherapy, Adler noted that the client must feel trust-
ing enough to divulge private thoughts and implied a need 
for confidentiality: 
All cases of failure which we have seen involve a lack 
of cooperation. Therefore cooperation between patient 
and consultant, as the first, serious scientifically 
conducted attempt to raise social interest, is of 
paramount importance, and from the start all measures 
should be taken to promote the cooperation of patients 
with the consultant. Obviously, this is only possible 
if the patient feels secure with the physician 
(Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956, p. 341). 
Adler ~lso demanded confidentiality directly, 
stating matter of factly and without further explanation 
that" .•. the physician must promise and keep strictest 
secrecy" (Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956, p. 345). His writings 
indicate an assumption of privacy without any discussion or 
54 
question that it will most certainly be present. Like 
Freud, Adler clearly stated a need for confidentiality for 
successful psychotherapy, but did not elaborate or discuss 
possible exceptions to the rule. 
Carl Jung (1875-1961), another early associate of 
Freud's who later came into some conflict with him, does 
not address confidentiality as directly as Freud or Adler, 
although his writings lea.ve the clear impression that he 
assumed confidentiality in psychotherapy to be necessary 
out of respect for the client and for the process to work. 
Jung repeatedly noted the role of the psychothera-
pist as a person whom the client/patient must trust in 
order for psychotherapy to work. He stated that the "per-
sonal contact is of prime importance, because it is the 
only safe basis from which to tackle the unconscious" 
(1970, p. 97). He believed that the recounting of a past 
traumatic event was helpful at least partially because the 
client/patient "does not stand alone with these elemental 
powers, but some one whom he trusts reaches out a hand, 
lending him moral strength to combat the tyranny of uncon-
trolled emotion" (1975, p. 132). In another discussion he 
stated, "The patient •.. can win his own inner security only 
from the security of his relationship to the doctor as a 
human being" (1975, p. 116). All of these statements point 
to a view of trust and safety being essential in the thera-
peutic setting and the fact that the psychotherapist must 
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set such an atmosphere. Despite this, in his discussions 
of theory and technique, Jung does not directly address the 
issue of confidentiality. 
Abraham Maslow (1908-1970), a theorist, teacher and 
practitioner, like Jung, did not directly address the issue 
of confidentiality in his writings on psychotherapy. 
Maslow is generally viewed as representing humanistic 
psychology. With a more optimistic attitude than Freud, 
Maslow viewed the basic inner nature of man as being good, 
or at worst neutral, rather than bad, and stated that 
people would profit from bringing this suppressed or 
repressed material out and nurturing it so that it would 
add to the happiness of their lives. 
Maslow went on to describe psychoanalysis as an 
"uncovering therapy" and noted that in psychotherapy, the 
patient will continue to try to avoid becoming conscious of 
painful truths and will actually " .•. fight the efforts of 
the therapist to help us see the truth" (1968, p. 60), the 
phenomena called resistance. Maslow stated that "All the 
techniques of the therapist are in one way or another truth 
revealing, or are ways of strengthening the patient so he 
can L2ar the truth" (1968, p. 60) and that "Self-knowledge 
seems to be the major path of self-improvement, though not 
the only one" (p. 165). 
Maslow recognized that the client needs to be able 
to speak frankly and openly in psychotherapy and that it is 
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the task of the therapist to help the client be more open, 
but he did not directly address confidentiality as a way of 
providing this help. 
Harry Stack Sullivan's (1892-1949) theoretical 
approach emphasized interpersonal relationships. Sullivan 
(1970) noted that the psychotherapist has a need for cer-
tain kinds of information about the client. He stated that 
the leaving out of thoughts or ideas by the client "may 
cause the therapeutic process to miscarry" (1970, p. 84). 
He added that the client wants to talk frankly, but has 
deeply ingrained cautions about doing so. He discusses an 
important aspect of the task of the psychotherapist as 
being that of understanding the dynamics of the psycho-
therapist-client relationship and acting in a way that uses 
this understanding to reduce anxiety (not suppress, repress 
or totally alleviate as mild to moderate anxiety can be 
educative) so that the client will be able to speak more 
candidly. 
Although Sullivan does not use Freud's concept of 
the unconscious in discussing his therapeutic approach, he 
is still very much aware of the fear, anxiety and sh~me 
that people may feel when discussing their behavior, thoughts 
and experiences and how these feelings may interfere with 
the process of psychotherapy. With this awareness, he 
addresses the concept of confidentiality in psychotherapy. 
A person who consults anyone with the idea of estab-
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lishing a frank relationship with him has already 
overcome some pretty heavy inhibitions laid down by 
the culture. If the interviewer then chooses to vio-
late the confidential relation, he must be very skill-
ful in doing it, and quite sure that he has adequate 
cause for so doing (1970, p. 66). 
As stated above, Sullivan believed confidentiality to be 
necessary for psychotherapy, but he explicitly added that 
the psychotherapist may come upon occasions when it is in 
the client's best interest to breach confidentiality. 
Carl Rogers (1902-19 ) , who originated the non-
directive or client-centered approach to psychotherapy, 
viewed the person-to-person relationship between the thera-
pist and client as the significant element in the psycho-
therapeutic process. He believed that a major task of the 
therapist is to set an atmosphere of trust, acceptance 
and unconditional positive regard. He did not directly 
address issues of confidentiality in his writings, but his 
emphasis on the trusting therapeutic environment implied 
a belief in discretion, except when the therapist has the 
client's permission to have students observe or to record 
psychotherapy sessions. Rogers (1951), like Jung (1961), 
seemed to assume that confidentiality was a part of the 
therapeutic relationship, but did not address it directly. 
The behaviorists have found confidentiality to be 
an important issue in treating clients as more concern is 
expressed about the privacy of a behavioral analysis. In 
describing his methods, Cautela (1977) states: 
The client is assured that the information will be 
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kept completely confidential and that even the secre-
tary does not look at the files ..• Additionally they 
are informed that six months following termination 
case records will be destroyed unless otherwise re-
quested (p. vii). 
Cautela goes on to explain that the procedure for destroy-
ing records is based upon the assumption that should new 
symptoms occur or old ones recur after successful therapy, 
then a new behavioral analysis is needed. 
This approach is used to help the client be more 
frank in disclosing information of which he is conscious, 
in contrast to the analytic rational of helping to explore 
unconscious material. Confidentiality is assumed by the 
behaviorists for practical, common sense reasons. 
Ellis (1973), the innovator of rational-emotive 
therapy, stated that people want to talk about themselves 
but are afraid to because of what others may think of them. 
He noted that psychotherapy progresses when a person can 
reveal "shameful" things to the therapist and believed 
further progress occurs when the client also self-discloses 
outside the therapy setting. This opinion regarding the 
importance of self-disclosure is similar to Jung's state-
ments regarding secrets. Like Jung, Ellis does not direct-
ly address confidentiality. 
The issue of confidentiality is not addressed as an 
important component of psychotherapy in the literature on 
the Gestalt oriented approach, but is viewed as a necessity 
during the initial stages of psychotherapy as many people 
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need, or at least want, the assurance of privacy (Polster & 
Polster, 1973). 
All of the major, traditional theorist-practitioners 
surveyed, with the exception of Maslow who does not even 
indirectly address the issue, suggest in their writings 
that confidentiality is necessary for successful psycho-
therapy in that it sets a trusting environment where the 
client can allow thoughts, images and feelings to emerge 
from the unconscious for exploration and understanding 
and/or where the client can freely explore the interper-
sonal relationship. 
As the behavioral, rational-emotive and Gestalt 
approaches of therapy all focus on conscious awareness and 
behavior rather than the unconscious, confidentiality is 
not viewed as so necessary for therapeutic reasons, but 
more for practical reasons, i.e., so that clients will seek 
therapy in the first place and so that they will be more 
honest in the therapeutic setting. 
Basic Texts and Manuals: Psychotherapists, in 
their training and practice, have traditionally assumed the 
concept that confidentiality is a necessary component of 
psychotherapy with little or no further discussion of the 
topic. This is demonstrated not only in the works of the 
major theorist-practitioners noted above, but also in basic 
texts and manuals on how to do psychotherapy. Even though 
a number of such works have been published since the in-
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crease in interest and legal intervention in confidenti-
ality in psychotherapy, very few go beyond a simple state-
ment regarding the importance of confidentiality. 
For example, Bruch (1974), in a basic text titled 
Learning Psychotherapy, stated: 
The patient, when agreeing to such a conference, should 
have the privilege of outlining which problems can be 
taken up with a relative and of deciding what he con-
siders definite "privileged communications" not to be 
divulged to others (p. 41). 
Bruch did not elaborate on any situations or laws that may 
lead a psychotherapist to question whether there might be 
an exception to absolute confidentiality. She emphasized 
that even the fact that a person is a client should not be 
divulged. 
Walberg (1977), in his extensive work, The Tech-
nique of Psychotherapy, stated: 
It is usually advisable to explain to the patient that 
any information revealed to the therapist is completely 
confidential and will, under no circumstances, be di-
vulged. This allays the patient's fear that the thera-
pist will discuss him with others. The same reassur-
ance may be given the patient about his case record, 
and he may be told that it will not be released, even 
to the patient's personal physician, without his per-
mission (p. 508). 
Walberg did not even refer to possible exceptions or legal 
conflicts regarding confidentiality in psychotherapy. 
Neuhaus and Astwood (1980) in a recent book on the 
basic techniques and practical issues of psychotherapy also 
emphasized the importance of confidentiality in the thera-
peutic relationship. They stated: 
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Maintaining and respecting confidentiality is nowhere 
more crucial and mandatory that in a therapeutic rela-
tionship. In our age where individual privacy is con-
stantly threatened, invaded, and infringed upon by 
society's mania for record keeping, psychotherapy 
stands as one of the few professions that must maintain 
the individual's confidences. For without trust be-
tween the therapist and patient little will be accom-
plished. The authors subscribe to the idea that no 
information, which the patient has provided the thera-
pist, can be divulged to anyone unless the patient 
gives permission ... Therapists must, at all costs, 
respect a person's confidences. To betray a confi-
dence is a violation of trust. And such violations 
will only impair the ability of the therapist to help 
a suffering human being (p. 29). 
Once again, no exceptions to absolute confidentiality but 
patient permission were discussed. Confidentiality was 
assumed without further elaboration. 
While most basic texts and manuals on psychotherapy 
either do not mention confidentiality at all or make a 
simple statement that it is necessary, a few texts mention 
situations under which confidentiality cannot be guaranteed. 
For example, Reid (1980), in a recent book on intensive 
psychotherapy, noted that in cases of clear danger to the 
client or others, it may be necessary to release informa-
tion to others. He added, "An understanding of the concept 
of confidentiality and the circumstances under which infer-
mation will be released should be reached during the first 
session" (p. 46). 
Parry (1975), in a guide to basic psychotherapy, 
listed several situations in which it may be necessary to 
disclose information. He stated that, although the thera-
pist should assure the client that information would be 
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disclosed only under exceptional circumstances, "absolute 
confidentiality cannot, and should not be guaranteed" (p. 
82) • 
As with the major theorist-practitioners, most 
basic texts and manuals on psychotherapy simply assume con-
fidentiality to be present and necessary for successful 
work to be accomplished. Many basic books address the 
issue directly, but do not discuss confidentiality or 
possible exceptions in any depth. 
Research Pertinent to Confidentiality: Just as the 
major theorist-practitioners seldom directly stated that 
privacy was essential in psychotherapy or discussed the 
concept of confidentiality, there is little or no research 
that directly assesses the effect of privacy or a lack of 
privacy on success in psychotherapy. However, just as the 
theorists implied a need for privacy in their therapeutic 
rationale and techniques, there is some significant re-
search that suggests that factors requiring an understand-
ing of privacy in psychotherapy are important. 
Recently, theorists and researchers have been 
investigating self-disclosure and some have proposed that 
self-disclosure is related to good mental health (Gorman, 
1973; Hyink, 1975; Jourard, 1959, 1963; Keller, 1976; Mayo, 
1968; Taylor, 1965). Other studies have suggested that 
self-disclosure is positively related to progress in psy-
chotherapy (Braaten, 1958, as reported in Truax, 1961; 
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Peres, 1947; Steele, 1948, as reported in Truax, 1961; 
Tomlinson, 1959, as reported in Truax, 1961). Some studies 
have not found a consistent relationship between self-
disclosure and adjustment (Himelstein & Lubin, 1966; 
Pedersen & Breglio, 1968; Stanley & Bownes, 1966), but 
each of these studies used a self-report questionnaire as 
the measure of self-disclosure. Other studies (Burhenne 
& Mirels, 1970; Himelstein & Kimbrough, 1963; Himelstein 
& Lubin, 1965; Hurley & Hurley, 1969) have found no signi-
ficant relationship between self-report questionnaires of 
self-disclosure and actual self-disclosure in a variety of 
settings. These latter studies suggest that self-disclosure 
questionnaires may not correlate with actual self-disclosure 
in psychotherapy or other situations and may be inadequate 
for exploring whether good adjustment is related to self-
disclosure. The research data on self-disclosure, adjust-
ment and success in psychotherapy suggests that, as postu-
lated by the major theorist-practitioners, self-disclosure 
is a necessary and beneficial part of the psychotherapeutic 
process. 
In addition, a number of situational factors or 
conditions, including the characteristics of the person to 
whom a self-disclosure is made (Hime~stein & Lubin, 1966; 
Jourard, 1959a; Jourard & Lasakow, 1958), reciprocity of 
self-disclosure (Chittick & Himelstein, 1967), perceived 
liking of and/or similarity to the target person (Cozby, 
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1972; Fitzgerald, 1963; Gitter & Black, 1976; Halverson & 
Shore, 1969; Jourard, 1959b; Jourard & Lasakow, 1958) and 
privacy (Derlega, Chaikin & Easterling, 1973, as reviewed 
in Strassburg, Roback, D'Antonio & Gabel, 1977; Holahan & 
Slaiken, 1977), all affect self-disclosure. These studies 
suggest that situational factors may be very influential in 
self-disclosure. 
Although the research on the relationship between 
privacy, self-disclosure and success in psychotherapy is 
sparse, it appears that greater self-disclosure takes place 
under conditions of greater privacy (e.g., Holahan & 
Slaiken, 1977). Confidentiality is a way of assuring 
greater privacy in psychotherapy. It logically follows 
that this should increase self-disclosure and frankness, 
leading to progress in psychotherapy. 
Codes of Ethics: In exploring the psychothera-
peutic perspective on confidentiality it is important to 
examine the standards or codes of ethics that psychothera-
pists have set for themselves. Psychiatrists find the 
origin of their code of ethics in the Oath of Hippocrates 
(about 400 B.C.) which stated, among other things: 
Whatsoever things I see or hear concerning the life of 
men, in my attendance on the sick or even apart there-
from which ought not to be noised abroad, I will keep 
silence thereon, counting such things to be sacred 
secrets (as quoted in DeWitt, 1958, p. 23). 
Social workers explored the concept of a code of 
ethics at their national meetings in the 1920's, but the 
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national association did not finally adopt a code of ethics 
until 1951. It stated, in part: 
The American Association of Social Workers believes 
that the social worker should: 
Respect and safeguard the rights of persons served to 
privacy in their contacts with the agency, and to con-
fidential and responsible use of the information they 
give (as quoted in Alves, 1959, p. 113). 
Psychologists adopted their first code of ethics, 
Ethical Standards of Psychologists, just one year after 
social workers, in 1952. The American Psychological Asso-
ciation (APA) had been formally working on the development 
of a code of· ethics since 1957 when the Committee for Ethi-
cal Standards for Psychologists was established. This com-
mittee elected to formulate a code of ethics based on the 
conflicts and difficulties that psychologists had actually 
experienced rather than based simply on what mature profes-
sionals believed a code of ethics should say. In accom-
plishing this task, the committee solicited the 7,500 mem-
bers of the APA and requested that they submit descriptions 
of actual ethical problem situations which they had en-
countered. Principles were drawn up to cover the actual 
incidents submitted and in 1950, a tentative code was pub-
lished. After review and revision, the final draft of the 
code was adopted in 1952. The first code was viewed as too 
complex and lengthy (171 pages, 106 general principles) and 
has had two major revisions so that it is presently re-
duced to nine general principles that are described in an 
eight page pamphlet. 
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Principle 5 addresses the issue of confidentiality 
and states: 
Safeguarding information about an individual that has 
been obtained by the psychologist in the course of his 
teaching, practice, or investigation is a primary obli-
gation of the psychologist. Such information is not 
communicated to others unless certain important con-
ditions are not [sic] met (American Psychological 
Association, 1979, p. 2). 
This is followed by further explanation which specifies 
that information is only revealed when there is a ffclear 
and imminent danger to an individual or to s01~iety, and 
then only to appropriate professional workers or public 
authorities" (p. 2). Under Principle 5, the code also 
addresses issues of the handling of professional and/or 
evaluative reports, disguising the identity of clients for 
the purpose of classroom teaching, the handling of communi-
cations from other professionals, the confidentiality of 
identities of research subjects and provisions for the 
ultimate disposition of confidential records. 
The approach of psychologists used in the develop-
ment of their code of ethics sharply contrasts with the 
approach of moral philosophers and theologians. Moralists 
take the principles of natural law and apply them to situa-
tions in coming to a decision as to what is proper or 
improper. Psychologists approached decision making in an 
almost opposite manner by using an empirical and inductive 
approach. Psychologists took actual incidents and situa-
tions, and formulated principles that would address these 
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situations and assist the individual psychologist in making 
a decision when similar situations were encountered. 
The Ethical Standards of Psychologists (1979) dif-
fers from recent laws regarding confidentiality as the former 
was written with the intention of allowing latitude for dif-
fering situations and professional judgment. It was intended 
to be specific enough to provide adequate and meaningful 
guidelines for psychologists, but general enough to avoid 
regimentation. Recent laws regarding confidentiality, as 
well can be seen in the following sections, attempt to 
address every situation possible and allow little room for 
professional judgment. 
Confidentiality - ~ Legal Perspective: Privacy 
The right to privacy is a relatively recent legal 
issue in the common law. An article by Warren and Brandeis 
titled "The Right to Privacy", published in 1890, is the 
first clear formulation of the subject and is considered a 
milestone in legal history. Warren and Brandeis stated 
that political, social and economic changes with the ad-
vancement of civilization have led to the recognition of 
new rights involving man's emotions, sensations and intel-
lect. They describe how the concept of "the right to 
life", once meaning only the protection of one's body, has 
grown to mean "the right to enjoy life, --the right to be 
let alone" (p. 289-90). This chapter reviews the legal 
highlights of the right to privacy as they relate to con-
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fidentiality in psychotherapy. 
In the last twenty years, the right to privacy has 
been a legal issue in a number of different types of cases 
including the use of contraceptives (Griswold~ Conn., 1965), 
abortion (People ~ Belous, 1969; Babbitz ~McCann, 1970), 
early Sunday morning investigations of beneficiaries receiv-
ing Aid to Dependent Children (Parrish v. Civil Service Com-
mission, 1967), publicity regarding debts (Tollefson ~Price, 
1967) and investigations of private citizens by corporations 
(Nader v. General Motors Corporation, 1969). 
The word "private" is derived from the Latin "pri-
vatus", meaning "belonging to oneself, not to the state" 
(Webster, 1970, p. 1131). This definition has generally 
held so that the "right to privacy", in the legal sense, is 
frequently used to refer to "a sphere of personal autonomy 
which is protected from governmental interference" (Morrow, 
1976, p. 1). It is also used to refer to aspects of per-
sonal autonomy not necessarily related to the state. 
Reubhausen and Brim (1965) stated: 
The essence of privacy is no more, and certainly no 
less, than the freedom of the individual to pick and 
choose for himself the time and circumstances under 
which, and most importantly, the extent to which, his 
attitudes, beliefs, behavior and opinions are to be 
shared with or withheld from others {p. 1189) . 
This definition is most appropriate when examining the 
issue of privacy as related to psychotherapy. 
Tort Law: Warren and Brandeis took the first step 
in legal history by proposing privacy as a right under 
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common law that serves to protect the individual. Prosser 
(1960), a highly esteemed professor of tort law, went a step 
further and divided privacy into four distinct and loosely 
related torts, i.e., he stated that there are four differ-
ent kinds of wrongful acts involving privacy, which are: 
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or soli-
tude, or into his private affairs. 
2. Public disclosure of embarassing private facts 
about the plaintiff. 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false 
light in the public eye. 
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, 
the plaintiff's name or likeness. 
(p. 389) 
The latter two torts are primarily concerned with issues 
related to slander, libel, defamation of character and ad-
vertising and are not relevant to the present discussion. 
Prosser's first privacy tort, hereafter referred to 
as the privacy-intrusion tort, is generally concerned with 
being searched and/or observed. The issues involved may 
range from the use of elaborate electronic surveillance to 
Peeping Toms and includes such acts as harassing a person 
who owes you money or simple eavesdropping. The privacy-
intrustion tort is pertinent in regards to the providing of 
mental health care in a number of regards, e.g., a health 
insurance company's request for more explicit information 
regarding a patient's treatment and illness, the observa-
tion of interviews and/or therapy sessions by students and 
the sharing of information involved in the team approach 
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may all be construed as an intrusion on one's privacy. 
Prosser's second privacy tort, referred to here as 
privacy-disclosure, is self explanatory and is probably the 
most pertinent tort regarding privacy in receiving mental 
health care. Prosser adds some criteria that must be met 
for there to be a privacy-disclosure tort, including: (1) 
the disclosure must be public and not private (therefore 
telling the details about a client's case at a small cock-
tail party would not be a tort), (2) the facts related must 
be private (therefore, the fact that a person has appoint-
ments at a mental health center, the dates of the appoint-
ments and the number of appointments would not be protected 
from disclosure as these occurrences would be considered 
public acts), and (3) the matter made public must be of a 
nature that would be "offensive and objectionable to a 
reasonable man" (p. 396). Obviously, these criteria, 
serving as a guide to issues of privacy, would not offer 
sufficient common law legal recourse to the patient who 
feels that confidentiality in the therapy setting has been 
betrayed. 
A secondary weakness involved in the common law 
tort approach to the right to privacy is that not all 
states have accepted the right to privacy as common law. 
At a time when many states had already established the 
right to privacy by statute, one case, Yoeckel ~ Samonig 
(1956), offers an example of the inconsistency of this 
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concept from state to state and the ludicrous results that 
can occur when the court decides to follow the letter of 
the law. In Yoeckel v. Samonig, a woman was photographed 
while using the ladies' room in a public tavern and the 
picture was openly shown to other customers. The Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin dismissed the woman's complaint as an 
earlier state Supreme Court ruling (Judewine ~ Benzies 
Montanye Fuel and Warehouse Company, 1936) stated that 
there was no common law right to privacy and that it was 
not the responsibility of the court, but of the legislature 
in the form of statutes, if it chose, to create a right to 
privacy. In the twenty years between these two decisions, 
bills proposing a right to privacy had been defeated in the 
Wisconsin legislature (Hofstaeder and Horowitz, 1964), 
giving the courts sufficient reason to uphold the earlier 
Judewine decision. 
Regardless of the correctness of the reasoning that 
the court used to arrive at their decision in Yoeckel v. 
Samonig, the defendant's behavior is clearly a violation of 
the privacy-intrusion tort and there was adequate basis, 
using the decisions of courts in other states, for arriving 
at the opposite conclusion. 
Constitutional Law: An alternative to the proposal 
of a common law basis for the right to privacy is the argu-
ment of a constitutional basis to this right. The right to 
privacy is not explicitly stated in the U.S. Constitution. 
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However, several amendments imply a right to privacy, and 
it is frequently claimed as a "constitutional right". 
The First Amendment right to free speech and assem-
bly has been interpreted to mean that a person has the 
right to "association privacy" (Morrow, 1976, p. 2) in that 
it has been found unconstitutional to require that private 
associations reveal names of their members (NAACP ~ Ala-
bama., 1958). It was thought that such forced revelations 
would indirectly infringe on free expression, especially 
when as association is advocating unpopular beliefs and 
that "privacy in one's associations is indispensable to 
freedom of association" (Morrow, 1976, p. 2). 
The Third Amendment provides a limited protection 
of the privacy of one's home by forbidding the quartering 
of soldiers in homes. The Fourth Amendment protect.s th1:= 
individual against unreasonable searches and seizures, but 
allows searches when there is a warrant, probable cause, or 
in the case of census questionnaires, when there is a 
reasonable relation to governmental purposes and functions. 
The Fifth Amendment protects disclosure-privacy in that 
individuals cannot be required to provide testimony for use 
in their own criminal prosecution; however, when informa-
tion is not incriminating, its disclosure is not protected. 
Written records kept by an individual, whether incriminat-
ing or not, are not subject to protection under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
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The Fourteenth Amendment is probably the most 
heavily relied upon in cases concerning the right to pri-
vacy. In Roe ~ Wade (1973) the Supreme Court found the 
right to privacy in certain areas to be implicit in the 
concept of personal liberty as guaranteed in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This case involved the desire of a pregnant, 
single woman to obtain an abortion at a time when Texas 
state statutes forbade such acts unless the life of the 
mother was in danger. The concept of personal liberty 
certainly seems involved in terms of the right to make this 
choice, but the concept of privacy seems to be thrown in as 
an attempt by the court to justify what was perhaps an 
unpopular decision. This impression is supported by the 
fact that the Supreme Court, in previous cases, had rebuked 
the too free and liberal use of the concept of personal 
liberty. 
As an additional argument that the right to privacy 
may be construed to be implied in the constitution, the 
Ninth Amendment states, "The enumeration in the constitu-
tion of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people." 
There are numerous cases cited in the legal litera-
ture claiming a right to privacy or having been decided on 
such a constitutional right (several making questionable 
judicious use of the concept of the right to privacy). 
This paper will focus on those cases most directly related 
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to medical and psychiatric care. 
One startling, because it occurred so recently, and 
oft cited case is Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) in which 
the Acting Director of a Planned Parenthood Center and a 
physician were found guilty, respectively, of giving advice 
to married women regarding methods of contraception and 
prescribing contraceptives. The state laws which the 
Acting Director and physician were to have broken were 
passed in 1879 and read as follows: 
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or 
instrument for the purpose of preventing conception 
shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or impris-
oned not less than sixty days nor more than one year 
or be both fined and imprisoned (sec. 53-32). 
Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires 
or commands another to commit any offense may be prose-
cuted and punished as if he were the principal offender 
(sec. 54-196, General Statutes of Conn., as reported in 
Mayer, 1972, p. 40). 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the guilty verdict of the 
Connecticut court in 1965 on the basis that such a law 
interfered with the privacy and sanctity of the marital 
relationship, and therefore personal liberty, of the indi-
vidual citizen. The right to privacy in this case is more 
obviously abused than in Roe ~ Wade, especially when one 
considers the intrusions of privacy that would be necessary 
to try to enforce a law against the use of contraceptives. 
In cases directly related to privacy of the physician-
patient relationship, the courts have included it as one of 
those areas of privacy implied in and protected by the 
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constitution, but only insofar as the government does not 
have sufficient justification to obtain information. In 
Doe ~ Bolton (1973), a case challenging the New York 
Controlled Substances Act which required that the names of 
patients prescribed certain drugs be given to the State 
Department of Public Health, it was found that the state 
did not show just cause for obtaining this information. 
However, in Schulman v. New York City Health and Hospitals 
Corporation (1975), the New York Court of Appeals ruled 
that the state had a compelling interest in obtaining the 
names and addresses of abortion patients so that adequate 
monitoring of city abortion facilities could be accomp-
lished, presumably through random inquiries of those who 
had used the services. In both cases, the court's "assumed 
that disclosure privacy has constitutional protection, but 
reached different results" (Morrow, 1976, p. 4). 
With respect to how these decisions affect confiden-
tiality in psychotherapy, one would assume that it would 
depend on how adequately the state was able to convince the 
judiciary as to its compelling interest in obtaining cer-
tain information. If the state convinced the judiciary 
that it had just cause to keep a listing of all persons 
seeking mental health care, their diagnosis and their 
personal problems, there would be no constitutional pro-
tection of privacy in this matter. It comes down to a 
definition of "just cause'', which depends upon statute, 
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legal precedent and the individual judge making the deci-
sion. Whereas the courts and legislatures may want to 
avoid too specific of a definition of what is and is not 
private so that unwise precedent is not set for future, 
unanticipated situations, the legislature, in the judgment 
of many, has the responsibility to establish some guide-
lines so that, as Morrow (1976) states, "decisions need not 
depend on the predilections of individual judges" (p. 6). 
Illinois Law: In the Constitution of the State of 
Illinois, effective July 1, 1971, the sixth section of the 
Bill of Rights briefly states the right against "invasions 
of privacy". The first statute related to the privacy of 
the psychotherapist-client relationship in Illinois was a 
general physician-surgeon statute enacted in 1959 which 
prohibited the disclosure of information learned in a 
professional capacity except in trials of homicide, mal-
practice suits, personal injury suits, civil suits involv-
ing insurance policies where physical or mental condition 
was in issue, will contests, trials of abortion, reports of 
child abuse or when the patient expressly consented to 
disclosure (Illinois Revised Statutes, 1977, ch. 51, sec. 
5.1; see Appendix A for a copy of this law). This law 
served to protect against a breach of confidentialtiy only 
in cases where the psychotherapist was a physician and did 
not include any consequences of such a breach, such as 
termination of license or possible criminal prosecution. 
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Additional legislation providing a psychiatrist-patient 
privilege, with three exceptions (a fourth exception was 
added in 1971), was enacted in 1963 (Illinois Revised 
Statutes, ch. 51, sec. 5.2; see Appendix A for a copy of 
this law) . 
Ths Psychologist Registration Act of 1963 included 
a provision that psychologists could not disclose informa-
tion learned in a professional capacity except in trials of 
homicide where disclosure related directly to the facts or 
circumstances, in proceedings to determine mental capacity 
or where a defense of mental incapacity was raised, in 
malpractice suits against the psychologist, in will con-
tests or when the client had expressly consented to the 
release of information (Illinois Revised Statutes, 1977, 
ch. 111, sec. 5306; formerly ch. 91 1/2, sec. 406; see 
Appendix A for a copy of this law) . The Abused and Neg-
lected Child Reporting Act of 1975 provided for an additional 
exception. The Psychologist Registration Act states that 
the ''violation of any provision of this Act" may be grounds 
to suspend or revoke any certificate of registration, 
adding a potential consequence for the breach of confiden-
~iality. 
The Social Worker's Registration Act of 1967 pro-
vides an even stronger consequence for a breach of confi-
dentiality (Illinois Revised Statutes, 1977, ch. 111, sec. 
6324; formerly ch. 23, sec. 5320; see Appendix A for a ccpy 
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of this law) . This act states that a social worker may not 
disclose information learned in a professional capacity 
except to his employer, in a criminal trial where dis-
closure relates directly to the facts or circumstances of 
the crime, in malpractice suits or with written consent of 
the client and adds that the violation of any of the pro-
visions of the Act constitutes a Class B misdemeanor. 
All of the above statutes regarding confidentiality 
with specific professions have been amended by the Illinois 
Mental Heath and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality 
Act which went into effect January 1, 1979 (Illinois Re-
vised Statutes, 1979, ch. 91 1/2, sec. 801). This act is 
reproduced in its entirety in Appendix A. This act defines 
"therapist" as: 
A psychiatrist, physician, psychologist, social 
worker, or nurse providing mental health or develop-
mental disabilities services or any other person not 
prohibited by law from providing such service or from 
holding himself out as a therapist if the recipient 
(of services] reasonably believes that such person is 
permitted to do so (Illinois Revised Statutes, 1979, 
p. 1489). 
Thus, although the individual professions may maintain an 
additional statement on confidentiality in their respective 
acts of registration, the Confidentiality Act is the authori-
tative law for all mental health professionals and, as 
such, provides guidelines and consequences that are the 
same for all psychotherapists. This consistency across 
professions aids in the understanding and implementation of 
the law. 
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The Illinois Confidentiality Act delineates numer-
ous exceptions to absolute confidentiality in psychother-
apy. The situations in which information may be disclosed 
according to the Act include: 
(1) an unlimited disclosure of "any and all confidential 
communications and records'' when there is a general 
consent for the release of information to insurance 
companies that are evaluating an application for a 
policy or a claim on a policy; 
(2) a limited disclosure to enable a person to apply for 
and receive benefits; 
(3) an examination of records, from which personally iden-
tifiable data have been removed, for the purposes of 
funding, accreditation, audit, licensure, statistical 
compilation, research, evaluation or similar purposes; 
(4} an investigation by a regional human rights authority 
of the Guardianship and Mental Health Advocacy Commis-
sion; 
(5) when the purpose of disclosure is for supervision, 
case consultation, peer review, clerical maintenance 
of the record, or therapist consultation of an attor-
ney; 
(6) when the client introduces, in civil or administrative 
proceeding, his/her mental condition or any aspe~t of 
the mental health care services received; 
(7) certain civil proceedings following a recipient's death; 
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(8) a malpractice suit; 
(9) a court ordered examination or treatment ordered to 
render a client fit to stand trial; 
(10) the determination of competency or need for guardian-
ship; 
(11) a civil or administrative proceeding involving the 
validity of insurance benefits; 
(12) when an action is brought to a matter under this Act; 
(13) child neglect or abuse; 
(14) in order to initiate or continue civil commitment pro-
ceedings; 
(15) in order to provide emergency medical care to a recip-
ient; 
(16) to protect the client or ther person against a clear, 
imminent risk of serious physical or mental injury or 
disease or death; 
(17) limited disclosure when the United States Secret Ser-
vice requests information about a specific client and 
it is determined that this information is necessary 
to protect the life of a person under Secret Service 
protection; 
(18) limited disclosure to the Department of Law Enforce-
ment as to whether applicants for a Firearm Owners 
Identification Card have had a psychiatric hospital-
ization in recent years; 
(19) when a recipient of mental health care or his/her 
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guardian gives written consent as specified in the 
Act. 
Throughout each exception of the Confidentiality 
Act, it is repeatedly emphasized that only that information 
which is directly relevant to the purpose for which it is 
disclosed should be released. Several of the disclosures 
limit the kind of information to be released to the fact 
that a person received mental health care, the type of 
treatment and the date of such treatment. In several 
places, especially when a civil or administrative pro-
ceeding is involved, the code suggests how confidential 
communications may be examined by the court in order to 
determine what is appropriate and relevant for disclosure. 
The Illinois Confidentiality Act states that "any 
person who knowingly and willfully violates any provision 
of this Act is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor", therefore 
adding some strength and motivation for following the law 
strictly. Under Illinois law, Class A is the most serious 
misdemeanor and is punishable by a prison sentence of up to 
one year and/or a fine not to exceed $1,000. 
Since the Illinois Confidentiality Act went into 
effect, there have been numerous attempts to modify and 
change it. One example of an amendment proposed in 1980 
(HB 2960) requires the disclosure of the location of a 
person receiving mental health care to any peace officer 
requesting the information if an arrest warrant has been 
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issued for that person. 
Another recently proposed amendment (SB 1453) 
requires that psychotherapists, who determine that a client 
is a probable danger to a third party, inform such third 
party of the danger and be civilly liable for any injuries 
incurred should they fail to do so. The Confidentiality 
Act currently allows psychotherapists to use professional 
judgment in this regard and states: 
Records and communications may be disclosed ... when, 
and to the extent, a therapist, in his sole discre-
tion, determines that such disclosure is necessary to 
initiate or continue commitment proceedings under the 
law of this State or to otherwise protect the recip-
ient or other person against a clear, imminent risk 
of serious physical or mental injury or disease or 
death (p. 1492). 
The proposed amendment would require such disclosure with-
out allowing for professional judgment and because of this 
rigidity is likely to die in the Senate Rules Committee. 
Tarasoff ~ The Regents of the University of 
California: The case that set a precedent for the above 
proposed amendment is that of Tarasoff ~ The Regents of 
the University of California (1976). In this case, a suit 
was brought against the university regents, psychothera-
pists and campus police for negligence that resulted in the 
murder of Tatiana Tarasoff by a psychiatric patient. 
Reportedly, two months prior to her murder, Prosengit 
Poddar had seen a psychologist employed by the University 
and informed him of his intent to kill Ms. Tarasoff when 
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she returned to he United States from a trip abroad. The 
psychologist took Poddar seriously enough to contact the 
campus police in order to initiate the psychiatric commit-
ment of Poddar. The police released Poddar after they 
concluded that he was adequately rational. The psycho-
logist's supervisor then stepped in and directed that no 
further action be taken and that records of the action that 
was taken thus far be destroyed. Neither Ms. Tarasoff nor 
her family were notified of Poddar's threat. 
Ms. Tarasoff's family sued after the murder on the 
basis that the University, the psychotherapist and the 
campus police were negligent in their duty to use reason-
able care to protect an intended victim against danger. 
The court found that no cause of action could be taken 
against the psychotherapist for failure to have Poddar 
committed as a state statute expressly protects public 
employees from liability for "any injury resulting from 
determining in accordance with any applicable enactment 
whether to confine a person for mental illness" (Government 
Code, sec. 856 as quoted in Tarasoff, 1976, p. 351). 
However, the majority opinion of the court was that 
the Tarasoff family did have a cause of action against the 
therapist as the therapist had found Poddar to be a danger 
to Ms. Tarasoff, but had "failed to exercise reasonable 
care to protect her from danger" (Tarasoff, 1976, p. 353) 
in that no warning of the potential danger to Ms. Tarasoff 
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was given to her or her family. 
The thinking of the court was based on earlier 
cases, not involving psychotherapists, that concluded that 
when a special relationship exists, there is a responsi-
bility to use ordinary care and skill in order to prevent 
the occurrence of foreseeable harm. These cases include 
situations in which a cause of action was upheld when 
parents failed to warn a babysitter of the violent pro-
clivities of their child, when the State failed to warn 
foster parents of the dangerous tendencies of their ward, 
and when a doctor, after diagnosing a contagious disease, 
failed to warn members of the patient's family. 
The court concluded: 
In our view, however, once a therapist does in fact 
determine, or under applicable professional standards 
reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses 
a serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty 
to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable 
victim of that danger (p. 345). 
The defense argued that communications between a 
potentially violent client and the therapist must be kept 
confidential if violent-prone persons are not to be deterred 
from seeking psychotherapy. The defense noted that the 
legislature had recognized that disclosing confidences 
impairs effective treatment of emotional disturbance, and 
thus is contrary to the best interest of society; theref-
ore, the legislature enacted statutes to protect the con-
fidentiality of psychotherapy. 
The court responded that one must weigh the public 
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interest of supporting effective treatment of emotional 
disturbance, protecting the rights of patients to privacy 
and the importance of safeguarding confidential communica-
tions against the public interest and safety from violent 
assaults. They stated: 
We conclude that the public policy favoring protection 
of the confidential character of the patient-psycho-
therapist communications must yield to the extent to 
which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. 
The protective privilege ends where the public peril 
begins (p. 347). 
The Tarasoff decision has resulted in proposals for 
new laws and additional court cases based on the same or a 
similar premise. A case in which an action was brought 
following Tarasoff involved parents suing a psychiatrist 
for negligence as he did not inform them that their daughter 
was suicidal and she ultimately killed herself (Bellah v. 
Greenson, 1977). The plaintiffs in this case cited Tara-
so££ in support of their cause of action; however the court 
noted that Tarasoff specifically addressed the issue of a 
duty when there is a danger to a third party and ruled that 
the psychotherapist does not have a similar duty, at least 
for which he can be held liable, when the person intends to 
injury him/ herself. The court held that in inflicting 
injury to oneself, society's interest in confidentiality in 
psychotherapy was not sufficiently counterbalanced so that 
there should be a breach of confidentiality. 
Confidentiality - Legal Cases: Most cases that 
have come before the court regarding confidentiality in 
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psychotherapy relate to the issue of whether psychotherapy 
communications are privileged, i.e., whether they can be 
used as evidence in a legal proceeding. Very few cases 
relate to the issue of privacy of psychotherapy outside of 
privileged communications or when the client is dangerous 
to himself or others. 
One that does is Doe ~Roe (1973). In this case, 
an action was filed by a client of a psychiatrist to pre-
vent publication of a book of her case history in which, 
although her name was disguised, information such as approx-
imate age, religious affiliation, schools attended, profes-
sion and interest were not changed. The client was a 
social worker by profession and felt that she would be 
readily identified. The psychiatrist claimed the client 
had given consent to the publication of the case history 
eleven years previous, when she was still in psychotherapy, 
and that the book would advance scientific knowledge. The 
court found this prior consent to be inadequate as the 
client was still in psychotherapy and therefore may have 
been subject to unspoken pressures, if in fact this consent 
did exist, and indicated that the psychiatrist's commercial 
advertising of the book contradicted her claims of advanc-
ing scientific knowledge. The Supreme Court of New York 
ruled that the plaintiff had sufficient cause for a pre-
liminary injunction to prevent publication and distribution 
of the book. The court stated that, although they were not 
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urging a common law right to privacy, every patient, and 
particularly those in psychotherapy, has the right to 
expect privacy (Stecher, 1977). 
Another mental health privacy case of a vastly 
different nature involves the monitoring of the quality of 
mental health care. In Carey v. Affiliated Mid-West Hos-
pital, Inc. (1977), a case originating in the circuit court 
of Cook County, Illinois, the State's Attorney's office 
sought access to the names and addresses of former patients 
at Chicago Lakeshore Hospital and insurance billings of 
these patients in order for the Grand Jury to investigate 
charges regarding the quality of care that patients re-
ceived and possible violations of the Insurance Code. The 
State's Attorney wanted the names and addresses of former 
patients so that they could be contacted and asked about 
the quality of care they received while in Chicago Lake-
shore Hospital. Records of insurance billings (which 
includes psychiatric diagnoses) would allow an evaluation 
of whether patients were hospitalized for inordinately long 
lengths of times for the purpose of "milking" the health 
insurance companies. 
Attorneys representing two former patients of 
Chicago Lakeshore Hospital and a psychiatrist who saw 
patients at the hospital filed a petition to quash a sub-
poena for the above information. They stated that the 
release of such information would be a gross violation of 
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the right to seek psychiatric care in private. John Doe, 
one of the patients, is quoted as saying, "When I went in 
[Chicago Lakeshore Hospital], I had two main concerns; One, 
naturally, was to get well. The other, and almost as 
important, was that no one find out that I was there" 
(Chicago Tribune, Oct. 2, 1977, p. 5). Several other 
former patients contacted the Chicago Tribune and stated 
that, if they had experienced any abuse by their doctors or 
the hospital, they were quite capable of reporting it 
themselves. 
The petitioners did not argue against the responsi-
bility of society to see that patient abuse and/or insur-
ance fraud do not occur and offered several alternative 
methods of conducting the investigation without infringing 
on the right to privacy in the psychiatrist-patient rela-
tionship, including, (1) having the hospital write all 
former patients, inform them of the investigation, and 
advise them to contact the State's Attorney's office if 
they wished, (2) interviewing past and present employees 
regarding hospital care and practices, and (3) conferring 
with investigators from the Department of Public Health and 
the Chicago Board of Health, two agencies already entrusted 
by the law to investigate patient abuse in mental health 
facilities. 
The Circuit Court of Cook County sustained the mo-
tion to quash the subpoena. The State's Attorney took the 
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case to the Illinois Appellate Court, First District. The 
Appellate Court dismissed the case, meaning that the State's 
Attorney's office was unable to gain access to the hospi-
tal records through a subpoena. 
This author was able to locate very few cases where 
either a client had sued for a breach of confidentiality or 
where confidentiality, rather than privileged communication 
was a significant issue. It should be noted that, in 
general, only cases that are appealed to a higher court are 
reported in the legal literature. Even those cases appealed 
may not be reported if they do not represent a new or 
different interpretation of the law or a reaffirmation of a 
rather significant point of law. For exw~ple, the informa-
tion on Carey ~Affiliated Hid-West Hospital, Inc. (1977) 
was obtained through a newspaper story and the Illinois 
Association of Community Mental Health Agencies. This 
-
author could find no summary or discussion of this case in 
the legal literature. 
One reason for the lack of cases regarding confi-
dentiality may be that, once'clients have informed their 
psychotherapists that they have learned of a breach of con-
fidentiality and that they are displeased with it, unless 
the psychotherapists persist in divulging information, the 
clients would probably draw more attention to those very 
facts or items that they want kept private by suing in a 
court of law than by remaining silent. 
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Summary: The law regarding the privacy of psycho-
therapy is still in the making. Recent trends by legis-
latures and the courts have been toward greater awareness 
of the role of confidentiality in the therapeutic relation-
ship, resulting in strict laws of confidentiality, but.with 
a large number of carefully delineated exceptions. With so 
many exceptions, one wonders whether or not the privacy of 
psychotherapy has any real protection under the law. The 
laws would appear to protect clients from the unscrupulous, 
gossiping psychotherapist, but in other situations the 
legislature has allowed much leeway for individual judges 
to make decisions regarding confidentiality. The legis-
lature has not allowed mental health professionals the same 
degree of professional judgment. 
There is continuous legislative and court activity 
as to the validity of the exceptions to absolute confiden-
tiality. It will take careful monitoring by mental health 
care professionals to see that the exceptions to confiden-
tiality are not increased, stretched or abused so as to 
make the concept legally meaningless and at the same time 
not make the laws of confidentiality so rigid as to not 
allow room for professional, moral and ethical judgment. 
Confidentiality - A Legal Perspective: Privileged Communi-
cation 
The previous section focused on the legal develop-
ment of the general concept of privacy in psychotherapy. 
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This section focuses on one specific aspect of privacy in 
psychotherapy, privileged communication. Privileged com-
munication refers to those communications that are pro-
tected from use as evidence in a legal proceeding. Priv-
ileged communication is put into a separate section from 
privacy in psychotherapy as it represents the area under 
which there is likely to be the most public attention and 
conflict between the right of the individual to confiden-
tiality in psychotherapy and the right or need for society 
to have certain information. It thus involves many issues 
in addition to the individual's everyday right to privacy. 
History of Privileged Communication: Privileged 
communication was not formulated as a concept under common 
law until the 16th century because prior to that time, no 
person could be required to testify in a court of law. 
Soon after the enactment of the law requiring all persons 
to testify as ordered by a court, the attorney-client 
privilege, the oldest of the privileged relationships, was 
accepted into common law. Cases in the latter part of the 
16th century prohibited an attorney from testifying as a 
witness, unless he had his client's consent. DeWitt (1958) 
notes that: 
The purpose of the privilege is to encourage the employ-
ment of professional advisors by persons in need of 
their services and to promote absolute freedom of con-
sultation by removing all fear on the part of the cli-
ent that his attorney may be compelled to disclose in 
court the communications made to, or the information 
acquired by, him in the course of his professional 
employment (p.7). 
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This attorney-client privilege is generally accepted as 
common law and is protected by statute, as well, in nearly 
every state. 
Confidential communications between a clergyman or 
priest and a parishioner are not considered privileged 
communications under common law and thus are only protected 
from disclosure in a legal proceeding by virtue of custom 
and/or statute. One reason offered to explain why communi-
cations in the attorney-client relationship were priv-
ileged, but not those in the clergyman-parishioner rela-
tionship, is that there was conflict between the Roman 
Catholic and the Anglican churches in England. The Roman 
Catholic church considered priest-penitent co~~unications 
to be absolutely confidential and priests frequently re-
fused to testify regarding their parishioners. The Angli-
can church was not so strict in this regard. It was gen-
erally considered that clergyman-parishioner privilege 
would show support for the Roman Catholic church and this 
was thus avoided. Roman Catholic priests still refused to 
testify or report what they heard in confession to authori-
ties. 
One of the first court cases involving the issue of 
privileged communication was the trial of Father Garnett, a 
Jesuit priest, who had been aware of a conspiracy known as 
the Gun Powder Plot, against King James and the members of 
Parliament in the early 1600's. He had learned of thj.s 
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plot when hearing the confession of one of the conspirators 
and had not reported it to the authorities, thereafter 
being implicated as being a party to the treasonous plans. 
His defense was that he was bound by moral law not to 
disclose what he had learned from a penitent in confession. 
The judges found the act of the crime so immoral that they 
refused to accept a defense based on morality and Father 
Garnett was hanged (Stern, 1959). 
Today the clergyman-parishioner relationship is 
generally accepted as privileged in the United States. 
Most of the states have statutes providing for this priv-
ilege. Those states that do not have such statutes have 
generally accepted the clergyman-parishioner privilege by 
custom. 
The physician-patient relationship, like that of 
the clergyman-parishioner relationship, is not accepted as 
privileged under common law. The first recorded court case 
in which the issue of privileged communication was raised 
in regard to the physician-patient relationship was the 
trial of the Duchess of Kingston in 1776. She had been 
placed on trial for bigamy and when her physician was 
quebtioned, he had replied, "I do not know how far anything 
that has come before me in confidential trust in my pro-
fession should be discussed consistent with my professional 
honor" (Stern, 1959, p. 1074). In response, the judge 
ruled that it was indeed indiscrete to disclose secrets 
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learned in a professional capacity in most circumstances, 
but not when called to do so in a court of justice. 
The question has frequently arisen as to why priv-
ilege is considered necessary for communications in the 
attorney-client relationship but not in the physician-
patient relationship. Some have pointed out that, after 
all, many legislators and most judges are trained as attor-
neys and they are the ones who make this decision. DeWitt 
(1958) cites other authors who point out that the attorney-
client privilege is intended to aid in the administration 
of justice, and that, although inviolable secrecy of com-
munications between physician and patient may be in the 
interest of good and reliable medical care, it is not 
necessary in the interest of justice. He notes that most 
statutes in court cases regarding the physician-patient 
privilege see its primary purpose as: 
To envoke and encourage the utmost confidence between 
the patient and his physician and to preserve invio-
late, so that the patient will freely and frankly re-
veal to his physician all the facts, circumstances, 
and symptoms of his malady or injury, or lay bear his 
body for examination, and thus enable his physician 
to make a correct diagnosis of his condition and treat 
him more safely and efficaciously (p. 27). 
There has been much controversy as to whether or 
not this is adequate cause for a physician-patient priv-
ilege. Wigmore, renowned for his monumental work on the 
laws of evidence, was strongly opposed to the physician-
patient privilege. He stated that the following funda-
mental conditions must be present before communication may 
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be considered to have privileged status: 
1) The communications must originate in a confidence 
that they will not be disclosed. 
2) The element of confidentiality must be essential 
to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the 
relation between the parties. 
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of 
the community ought to be sedulously fostered. 
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by 
the disclosure of the communications must be 
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the 
correct disposal of litigation. 
(1940, p. 527) 
Wigmore viewed the physician-patient relationship as meet-
ing only the criteria that the relationship should be 
encouraged. He noted that people have sought medical care 
for years without the privilege and he saw nothing to be 
gained and much to be lost, in terms of truth and justice, 
if a physician-patient privilege was established. 
During Wigmore's time privilege in psychotherapy 
was not examined as a legal issue distinct from the phy-
sician-patient relationship. He has been deceased for more 
than thirty years, and since his death, the practice of 
psychotherapy has grown and privilge in the psychother-
apeutic relationship has been presented as a separate legal 
isssue. Although Wigmore would not doubt still oppose a 
general physician-patient privilege, others have found the 
psychotherapist-patient relationship as meeting the criteria 
he set for privilege to exist. 
Numerous states have enacted statutes providing for 
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privilege in the physician-patient relationship. In 1828, 
New York became the first state to establish the physician-
patient privilege by statute. It stated simply that: 
No person duly authorized to practice physic or sur-
gery shall be allowed to disclose any information 
which he may have acquired in attending any patient, 
in a professional character, and which information 
was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such 
patients as a physician, or to do any act for him, 
as a surgeon (New York Revised Statutes, 1828, as 
quoted by DeWitt, 1958, p. 15-16). 
Most states have since enacted statutes granting the phy-
sician-patient privilege, but there is considerable varia-
tion between states. The statutes provide for a number of 
different kinds of exceptions, and each state varies in the 
particular exceptions that it provides. 
Lifschutz: A case which challenges these excep-
tions and raises several constitutional and therapeutic 
questions regarding confidentiality and privileged communi-
cation in psychotherapy is that of Lifschutz (1970) . In 
this case, a man sued for damages in compensation for 
physical injuries, pain and suffering, and severe emotional 
stress as a result of an alleged assault. The plaintiff 
stated that he had received psychiatric treatment from Dr. 
Lifschutz about ten years earlier. Lifschutz was called in 
for a deposition and refused to give any information, even 
refusing to state whether or not the plaintiff had been a 
former patient of his. Lifschutz claimed a constitutional 
right as a psychotherapist to refuse to divulge such infer-
mation. He was jailed for contempt of court. 
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Lifschutz then sued for a habeas corpus, i.e., a 
legal explanation of why he was jailed. The primary ques-
tion at issue was whether the legislature had surpassed 
their constitutional limits by requiring that the right to 
privilege in psychotherapy is waived, in relevant matters, 
when a plaintiff brings his mental condition as an issue in 
litigation. This patient-litigant exception was very clearly 
spelled out in California statutes at the time and the 
court elected to follow the statutes; however, Lifschutz's 
arguments and the court's responses command attention. 
One of the arguments of Dr. Lifschutz was that he 
was denied equal protection under the law as the legisla-
ture had allowed that clergymen were permitted to claim a 
privilege as above and he, as a psychiatrist, was not. He 
argued that given the purpose of clergyman-parishioner 
privilege, i.e., fostering a "sanctuary for the disclosure 
of emotional stress", that there was little real relevant 
ditinction between the two professions on which to base a 
distinction in the law. The court found this argument 
reflected an inadequate understanding of the foundation of 
the privilege and cited Wigmore in support of the denial of 
the privilege: 
Does the penitential relation deserve recognition and 
countenance? In a state where toleration of religion 
exists by law, where a substantial part of the commu-
nity professes a religion practicing a confessional 
system, this question must be answered in the affirm-
ative (1940, p. 878). 
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The court noted that a toleration of religious forms and 
practices is the foundation of this privilege. Obviously, 
the similar toleration for mental health care is not in the 
law. In addition, although psychotherapists may be strong-
ly committed to the ethics and tenets of their professions, 
the court stated that this is reasonably distinguishable 
from religious conviction on which the clergyman-parishioner 
privilege is based. 
Lifschutz also argued that, as a psychotherapist, 
he had a constitutional right to claim privilege based on 
the psychological needs and expectations of all patients, 
regardless of the wishes of a particular patient. He 
stated that he had the right to claim the privilege him-
self. The court noted that all prior cases dealing with 
physician-patient privilege have found that a constitu-
tional right to privacy exists for the patients, but not 
for the physicians. They add that it is the patient's 
intimate revelations, even though the treatments may in-
volve communication between the psychotherapist and the 
patient, that give rise to an interest in the privacy of 
the psychotherapeutic process. 
Lifschutz also argued that any requirement that he 
reveal confidential communications between himself and a 
patient unconstitutionally impaired the practice of his 
profession. He based this argument on two legal conten-
tions, (1) that the limitation on the capability to prac-
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tice psychotherapy would be so severe that it represented a 
"taking" of valuable property, i.e., the psychiatrist's 
practice of psychotherapy, and (2) that since being re-
quired to testify would severely limit psychotherapy, it 
unconstitutionally limited the availability of medical 
care. The court indicated that they found Lifschutz's 
arguments in this regard to be somewhat exaggerated. They 
doubted that the profession of psychotherapy would be 
significantly impaired by his being required to testify, 
especially as in this and similar cases involving the 
patient-litigant exception, the only times the privilege of 
psychotherapeutic communications would not be followed are 
when the patients themselves introduce the issue of emo-
tional distress and/or condition. The court added that 
"the practice of psychotherapy has grown, indeed flour-
ished, in an environment of a nonabsolute privilege" (p. 
11) • 
As to the statutes regarding the patient-litigant 
exception, the court upheld the statutes by requiring that 
Dr. Lifschutz testify regarding any communications relevant 
to the present suit. They found the statute to be a sound 
balance between the accepted need for confidentiality in 
the psychotherapeutic setting and the interest of the state 
to ascertain the truth in legal proceedings. The court 
noted that it is not fair to allow a plaintiff to make a 
claim, and then limit inquiry into the facts of the claim. 
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However, they very clearly asserted that all psychothera-
peutic communications are not required to be disclosed 
under the patient-litigant exception and that any communi-
cations not directly relevant to the suit are considered 
privileged. The court briefly mentioned methods of evalu-
ating the relevancy of confidential communications which 
would maintain respect for the plaintiff's privacy, includ-
ing reviewing such materials in the judge's chambers or 
obtaining protective orders during discovery. They also 
concurred with the United States Supreme Court opinion 
(Griswold ~ Connecticut, 1965) that the Constitution doe~, 
guarantee "zones of privacy" and that psychotherapy falls 
into one of these zones, but that this does not guarantee 
an absolute privilege which would allow for no exceptions. 
The court concluded that: 
Under a properly limited interpretation, the litigant-
patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient priv-
ilege, at issue in this case, does not unconstitu-
tionally infringe the constitutional rights of privacy 
of either psychotherapists or psychotherapeutic pa-
tients. As we point out, however, because of the 
potential of invasion of patients' constitutional 
interests, trial courts should properly and care-
fully control compelled disclosures in this area 
in light of accepted principles (p. 8). 
An ironic fact about Lifschutz's case is that when 
it was decided that the psychiatrist did have to testify, 
once he stated that he had indeed seen the plaintiff ten 
years earlier, he was excused from any further testimony on 
the basis that it was irrelevant as it had taken place so 
many years previous to the suit (Grossman, 1978}. 
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Illinois Law: In Illinois, the privilege of the 
psychotherapist-client relationship was apparently first 
recognized as based on common law in a trial court deci-
sion to excuse a psychiatrist from testifying (Binder v. 
Russell, 1952). This case involved an alienation of 
affections action by a husband whose wife was a client of 
the psychiatrist. The psychiatrist responded to questions 
with, "I can not reply in good conscience" (Northwestern 
University Law Review, 1952, p. 384). He was excused 
from testifying on the basis that psychiatrist-patient 
communications were privileged. 
Since then, in Illinois, privacy in psychoth~rapy 
and the right to claim the privilege for communications in 
psychotherapy have followed parallel paths in state stat-
utes. The general physician-surgeon statute enacted in 
1959 (Appendix A) does not expressly state a privilege, but 
imposes an obligation of privacy except in specified situa-
tions, none of which is a subpoena or court order to testify. 
The psychiatrist-patient statute of 1963 (Appendix 
A) expressly states a privilege in the psychiatrist-patient 
relationship, with three exceptions including relevant 
communications when, (1) a patient is determined to be in 
need of hospitalization, (2) there is a court ordered 
psychiatric examination, and (3) a patient or his/her heirs 
introduce the patient's mental condition as an element of 
claim or defense in a civil or administrative proceeding. 
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Cases of malpractice or when the patient is a complaining 
witness against a psychiatrist were added as a fourth 
exception in 1971. The wording of this statute would 
appear to grant the privilege to the psychiatrist as well 
as to the patient so that the psychiatrist could refuse to 
testify even if given permission or requested to do so by 
the patient. 
That same year the Psychologist Registration Act 
(1963; Appendix A), which included a section on the prohi-
bition and exceptions for disclosure of information by a 
psychologist, was passed. Although this act did not explic-
itly use the word "privilege" as did the act for the psy-
chiatrist-patient relationship, it did not include a sub-
poena or court order in the five conditions under which 
a psychologist could diclose information. This act thus 
served to provide a strong privi~ege in the psychologist-
client relationship. It stated as one of its exceptions 
that information may be disclosed with the express consent 
of the client and did not state that the psychologist may 
refuse to disclose when given this consent, so the priv-
ilege belonged strictly to the client and not to the psy-
chologist. This act did not allow psychologists to testify 
when clients introduced their mental condition as an ele-
ment of claim or defense in a civil suit unless the psy-
chologists had the express consent of the client, i.e., 
there was no patient-litigant exception for psychologists. 
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The Social Worker's Registration Act of 1967 pro-
vided for a different kind of privilege than the acts for 
psychiatrists and psychologists. It allowed no privilege 
when there was a criminal trial and disclosure of infor-
mation related directly to the facts or circumstances of 
the crime, but in civil cases it did not allow for a 
patient-litigant exception unless a client gave written 
consent to disclosure of information. 
The variations in the laws for the different mental 
health professions certainly presents a confused picture. 
If their psychotherapist was a psychiatrist, clients could 
apparently discuss criminal acts, even murder, without fear 
that their psychiatrist would be forced to testify regard-
ing these acts; however, a kleptomaniac could not seek 
help for habitual shoplifting from a psychotherapist who 
was a social worker without fear that the social worker may 
be required to testify to these discussions in the future. 
Regarding civil suits, clients whose psychotherapists were 
social workers or psychologists could merily sue and intro-
duce their mental condition as part of a claim without 
allowing their psychotherapists to testify while clients 
whose psychotherapists were psychiatrists would automati-
cally waive such a privilege. 
As discussed in the previous section, the Illinois 
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidenti-
ality Act (Illinois Revised Statutes, 1979; Appendix A), 
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which went into effect January 1, 1979, clears up a con-
siderable amount of confusion by setting forth the same 
laws for privacy and privilege for all mental health pro-
fessions. The Confidentiality Act provides for a large 
number of exceptions to the privilege of communications in 
the psychotherapist-client relationship. Upon close exami-
nation, one sees that each exception is very carefully 
delineated in order that communications may be kept as 
private as possible and so that the absence of the priv-
ilege is not abused by the client's adversary. 
For example, in the section dealing with the patient- ~ 
litigant exception, information may only be disclosed in a 
civil or administrative proceeding if the clients introduce -· 
their mental condition or any aspect of their mental health 
care as an element of their claim or defense. The Act adds 
that such disclosure may be made, 
If any only to the extent the court ... finds, after in 
camera [i.e., in the judge's chambers] examination of 
testimony or other evidence, that it is relevant, pro-
bative, not unduly prejudicial or inflammatory, or 
otherwise clearly admissable; that other satisfactory 
evidence is demonstrably unsatisfactory as evidence 
of the facts sought to be established by such evidence; 
and that disclosure is more important to the interest 
of substantial justice than protection from injury to 
the therapist-recipient [of mental health services] 
relationship or to the recipient or other whom dis-
closure is likely to harm (Illinois Revised Statutes 
1979, p. 1491). 
This section adds that no information other than the fact 
that a person received treatment, the cost of such treat-
ment and the diagnosis may be disclosed unless a compelling 
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need is established for further disclosure. This section 
further limits the patient-litigant exception by providing 
that in any action brought in a marriage dissolution pro-
ceeding or any other action in which pain and suffering is 
an element of the claim, mental condition is not to be 
considered to be introduced unless a client or a witness on 
his behalf first testifies about the client receiving 
mental health care. 
The above delineation of the patient-litigant 
exception prevents abuse of the privilege by allowing 
relevant information to be disclosed; however, it prevents 
abuse of the exception by limiting the information to be 
disclosed and defining the circumstances under which it may 
be disclosed. The other exceptions to the privilege, such 
as civil commitment, malpractice suits, or court ordered 
examinations are likewise very carefully explicated so that 
the interests of society can be served by allowing dis-
closure under specific conditions with minimal infringement 
on the privacy of the individual. 
Even with the seemingly very clearly formulated law 
of the Illinois Confidentiality Act, controversies and 
disagreements still occur. An example is the case of 
Laurent ~ Brelji (1979) in which the Illinois Department 
of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities sought to 
discharge an employee for allegedly abusing a patient. In 
the civil service administration hearing, the patient 
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testified against the employee. The employee then requested 
that the patient's records be subpoenaed for use in his 
defense. Dr. Brelji, speaking for the Department of Mental 
Health and Developmental Disabilities, appealed the court 
order to bring the patient's records for in camera inspec-
tion on the basis that the Illinois Confidentiality Act 
does not allow for the disclosure of confidential informa-
tion in an administrative hearing unless the recipient of 
mental health care introduces his mental condition or any 
aspect of his services received for such condition as an 
element of his claim or defense. Dr. Brelji noted that the 
patient was not making a claim, strictly defined as a cause 
of action, against the employee. If the employee was being 
sued on a personal injury action in the circuit court on 
the same charges, he could request an in camera investiga-
tion of the records for relevant information, but this was 
not the case. 
The court ruled that a "claim" could be more broad-
ly defined than as just a "cause of action." They stated 
that it was inconsistent that the records could be sub-
poenaed in a personal injury action, but not in an adminis-
trative procedure which was considering the same issueb and 
allegations. The court added that this was especially true 
in light of the fact that the potential loss of the employee 
from the administrative proceeding is possibly greater than 
that in a civil suit. 
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A sidelight of this case was the fact that the 
legal brief prepared by the Department of Mental Health and 
Developmental Disabilities, which sought to protect the 
confidentiality of the patient, contained the patient's 
name, while the legal brief prepared by the attorneys of 
the employee very carefully referred to him as "Patient X" 
throughout. 
Summary: The laws and practices regarding the 
privilege of communications between psychotherapists and 
clients vary from state to state. The current trend is 
toward increased acceptance by statute of such a privilege, 
but with carefully delineated exceptions. Even with these 
careful delineations, conflicts will arise. There are some 
who contend that there are so many exceptions as to make 
the privilege meaningless. Ohters contend that the amount 
of privilege granted by the statutes interferes with the 
administration of justice. 
In attempting to come to a determination that is 
just to both the individual and society, the legal approach 
to decision making uses the principles of natural law as 
embodied in the common law. In addition, the legal approach 
considers and accommodates to other views including the 
principles of the Constitution, what is reasonable for the 
purposes and functions of the government and the practical 
needs of society. The courts operate on a case-by-case 
basis that does not facilitate an orderly or scientific 
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development of principles similar to the approach of psy-
chologists. In the legal approach to decision making, the 
principles of moral absolutism are tempered by the mores of 
changing society. 
CHAPTER III 
INTEGRATION AND HYPOTHESES 
Thus far we have explored the rationale for confi-
dentiality in psychotherapy from a moral, theoretical and 
ethical perspective and the attempts of the legal system 
and the professions of psychotherapists to deal with this 
concept in ~n ordered society. As was discussed in the 
review of the literature, both theory and research regard-
ing the practice and dynamics of psychotherapy suggest a 
central role for confidentiality in psychotherapy. The 
section on historical and moral aspects of confidentiality 
explicates how the Roman Catholic church, over a period of 
several hundred years, grappled with the controversy of 
absolute privacy and came to the decision that absolute 
secrecy in the confessional was essential to the mainte-
nance of the sacrament of confession and therefore for the 
well-being of the church. The sections which discuss the 
laws and court rulings regarding privacy and privileged 
communication present sound social and legal arguments 
opposing absolute confidentiality and privileged communi-
cation in psychotherapy and serve at least partially to 
explain how the current laws came to be. This chapter is 
an effort to integrate these previous sections in a dis-
cussion o~he effects of legal intervention on the tradi-
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tional practice of psychotherapy. 
In order to explore the effects of legal interven-
tion on the practice of psychotherapy, one must look at a 
number of variables including, but not limited to, (1) the 
overall effect of laws on confidentiality on the attitude 
and/or approach of the psychotherapist, (2) the effect of 
specific laws on the attitude and/or approach of the psy-
chotherapist, (3) the effect of having revealed information 
on the subsequent attitude and approach of the psychother-
apist, (4) the overall effect of the laws on confidenti-
ality on the client's attitude and/or response in psycho-
therapy, (5) the effect of individual laws on the client's 
attitude and/or response in psychotherapy, and (6) the 
effects of having information revealed on the client's 
subsequent attitude and/or response in psychotherapy. The 
basic questions underlying each of the above variables 
involve: l) a determination of whether the legal attempts 
to resolve issues of confidentiality help or hinder the 
practice of psychotherapy; 2) a determination of whether 
any resultant hinderance is in the best interest of society. 
Psychotherapist Reaction 
Overall Effect of Laws: As a whole, the laws on 
confidentiality must cause a mixed reaction in psycho-
therapists. On the positive side, they often offer def-
inite, conerete guidelines for the psychotherapist to 
follow in deciding whether or not, and in what circum-
111 
stances, information should be released. Such guidelines 
can certainly be a relief amongst all the controversy and 
ambivalence that surround disclosures of information. 
Jagim, Whittman and Noll (1978) and Mariner (1967) point 
out that a therapist who does not disclose confidential 
information to colleagues or other agencies may be viewed 
as uncooperative. The possibility of appearing uncoopera-
tive may inappropriately influence a decision regarding the 
release of confidential information. 
The laws on confidentiality also serve to offer a 
means of protection, for both the client and the psycho-
therapists, from irresponsible or unreasonable requests for 
information. The psychotherapist in many cases now has the 
force of the laws to back up his ethical standards. 
Slovenko (1975) notes that "as in all areas of life, speci-
fic black letter rules [on confidentiality] are sought as 
though they were holy grail. They offer comfort and a sense 
of security" (p. 125). It is much easier to refuse to dis-
close information when the law states that you cannot. 
Then psychotherapists do not have to be concerned with the 
risks of appearing unreasonable or uncooperative as they 
are merely being good citizens and obeying the law. 
The laws of confidentiality also reduce the possi-
bility of misinterpretation when therapists refuse to 
release information. Mariner (1967) notes that many par-
ties will assume that psychotherapists have negative infor-
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mation if they refuse to disclose confidential communi-
cations. With strict laws on confidentiality such mis-
interpretation may be the exception rather than the rule. 
Laws regarding confidentiality, however, do not 
only make the psychotherapist's job easier; they also com-
plicate it. The laws very clearly spell out the fact that 
psychotherapy is not completely confidential, but the myth 
that it is still remains amongst both professionals and 
clients. Many psychotherapists wonder whether, in order to 
be totally ethical and responsible, they should give their 
clients Miranda type warnings at the onset of psychotherapy 
so that it is very clear to all parties what information 
will be confidential, and under what conditions, and what 
information will not be. Bersoff (1976) expresses concern 
that the failure of the therapist to fully inform a client 
of the limits of confidentiality, while the therapist has a 
duty to disclose certain kinds of information, may con-
stitute entrapment. Freedman (1959) refers to disclosure 
of information after the client has been assured that 
psychotherapy would be confidential as "psychic entrap-
ment." He states that a psychotherapist should either 
"warn his patient beforehand of the reservations he has 
concerning confidentiality or, having committed himself to 
secrecy he should maintain it" (p. 1080). Needless to say, 
to reques~~ull disclosure from clients on the one hand, 
and advise them that full disclosure may not be wise on the 
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other, must cause some discomfort in the psychotherapist. 
Another fact about laws on confidentiality that can 
complicate the job of the psychotherapist is that the laws 
increase the awareness of the legal environment, with its 
increasing number of malpractice suits, in the therapy 
setting. Psychotherapists may feel a need to inform 
clients about the limits of confidentiality in order to 
protect the clients; they may also feel the need to do so 
in order to protect themselves from future law suits. An 
atmosphere in which a client is viewed as a potential ad-
versary, which in these times may be the wisest approach 
for the legal protection of the psychotherapist, is prob-
ably not conducive to the most successful practice of 
psychotherapy. Roth and Meisel (1977) are concerned that 
an explanation to every patient of the limits of confidenti-
ality "might prevent meaningful psychotherapy or even deter 
patients from therapy" (p. 510). 
The laws very clearly define those conditions under 
which psychotherapists must release information, without 
any allowance for professional judgment, whether it is for 
the good of the individual and society or whether it 
actually serves no fruitful purpose. The psychotherapist, 
despite all his training, has lost the right to use profes-
sional expertise in deciding whether it is appropriate or 
in the in~est of anyone to release information. This 
power now lies with the legislature and the courts, bodies 
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that do not necessarily have an understanding of the impor-
tance of confidentiality to the process of psychotherapy. 
Putting the power of decision-making into the hands of the 
court changes the disclosure of information from a thera-
peutic to a legal decision. 
Many mental health professionals refuse to accept 
clients where it appears at all likely that the psycho-
therapist will be subpoened to testify in court. This is 
not merely a matter of time, convenience and money as 
those who testify as expert witnesses can generally charge 
and collect quite high fees for such testimony. Rather, it 
is a matter of being reluctant to enter a situation in 
which one is requested to offer professional judgment, but 
in the particular situation is limited in using profes-
sional judgment, i.e., in deciding what information is 
appropriate or not appropriate for disclosure, by the power 
of the court. 
Even the client, by providing consent for the 
release of information, may interfere with the psycho-
therapist's professional judgment. Mariner (1967) proposes 
that psychotherapists not release information, even with 
client consent, except under very well considered circum-
stances. He notes that the client may inadvertently or 
unconsciously sabotage the therapeutic situation by trying 
to controL/What the psychotherapist says and to whom he 
says it. He believes that conflict regarding who is in 
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control of the therapeutic information may lead psycho-
therapists to do things they would ordinarily not do. 
Mariner offers the example of the nondirective psychothera-
pist, who would generally not give direct advice in the 
therapeutic setting, giving opinions and recommendations in 
response to a request for information from another agency 
or other source, when the client has provided written 
consent for the disclosure of information. 
As a whole, the laws of confidentiality offer both 
relief and discomfort for psychotherapists as they provide 
clear guidelines, but may compel psychotherapists to act 
contrary to their professional and ethical training and 
judgment. Siegel (1979) notes that "It seems clear that 
in attempting to help people, psychotherapists have less 
difficulty with their principles, their patients, or their 
work than they do with the law" (p. 245). The laws thus, 
overall, may be viewed as both helping and hindering the 
practice of psychotherapy, depending on the particular law 
and the particular case. 
Effects of Specific Laws: Specific aspects of the 
laws on confidentiality have distinct ramifications on how 
the psychotherapist conducts his/her practice. One area of 
particular concern is written records. There are signifi-
cant questions, both legal and ethical, as to whether the 
record bel~gs to the client, the psychotherapist or the 
public. Several courts have ordered psychiatrists to bring 
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all records containing psychiatric history, as well as the 
thoughts, feelings, and fantasies of the client and the 
impressions and hypotheses of the psychotherapist, for in 
camera examination by the court (e.g., In re Lifschutz, 
1970; Roberts ~ Superior Court, 1973). 
Keeping total records in psychotherapy has definite 
advantages. A primary purpose is to follow the progress of 
the client. Most progress takes place over a period of 
time. If one is forced to rely on the therapist's or the 
client's memory alone in order to assess progress or note 
patterns associated with extra- or intra-therapeutic events, 
much may be forgotten and the therapeutic process may be 
delayed. It can be quite helpful for the understanding of 
the client for psychotherapists to keep detailed records of 
sessions as well as their interpretations and hypotheses 
regarding the client's psychotherapy. 
Complete records are also necessary when medication 
is used, when more than one professional at a clinic is 
involved with a client and for purposes of research. 
However, in keeping complete records one may also run the 
risk that such records will be subpoenaed for examination 
by a court or that clients or their guardians will demand 
to see the records. The Illinois Confidentiality Act, 
which is stricter than the statutes of most states, has 
several e~eptions under which an in camera review of 
records by the court may be required. The court may decide 
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that information which is found to be relevant and/or 
necessary as evidence must be disclosed. In addition, the 
Confidentiality Act requires that clients and/or their 
guardians have complete access ·to their mental health 
records. 
Client access to mental health records has been a 
significant issue in debates of the rights of mental health 
care recipients. It is discussed in the context of confi-
dentiality as it seems only just and fair, to many, that 
clients should have the right to review and be aware of all 
information about them which is kept in records to which 
other people may have access. Many psychotherapists believe 
that keeping records open to clients enhances the feeling 
of psychotherapy being a cooperative project where the 
clients have certain rights and responsibilities (e.g., 
Brodsky, 1972; Fischer, 1972). These psychotherapists be-
lieve that such an atmosphere is conducive to progress in 
psychotherapy. 
However, the fact that records may be subject to re-
view by a court or the client certainly affects how a psy-
chotherapist keeps records and what material is placed in 
these records. Freedman (1959) suggested that laws may be 
forcing psychotherapists "to keep scientifically inadequate 
records in order to be certain they will, under any circum-
stances, ~able to maintain the patient's trust" (p. 1079) . 
A negative impact of client access or public and/or 
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client ownership of records may be that therapists, for the 
benefit of the well-being of their clients, may greatly 
limit the information, hypotheses and thinking that they 
put in their notes. Aware that clients would be humil-
iated, embarassed or otherwise harmed if such hypotheses as 
they may be latent homosexuals or they have love-hate 
relationships with their mothers were mentioned in a court 
proceeding or read by clients before they had come to the 
point of exploring these concepts in their therapy, ethical 
therapists would be greatly reluctant to write such hypo-
theses in their notes. They would, in justness and fair-
ness, limit their notes to quotes or vague or benign com-
ments. This limiting of notes is viewed as a danger to the 
practice of traditional psychotherapy as when people are 
limited in what they write on a subject, the result may be 
a limiting of what is thought on the subject. 
The Illinois Confidentiality Act tries to surmount 
the problems which could lead to a psychotherapist having 
very sparse records, for example dates and appointments 
only, be defining records as excluding "the therapist's 
personal notes, if such notes are kept in the therapist's 
sole possession for his own personal use and are not dis-
closed to any other person, except the therapist's super-
visor, consulting therapist or attorney" (Illinois Revised 
Statutes, __ J-979, p. 1489). This solution may be sufficient 
for psychotherapists in private practice who do not provide 
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medication or have other people cover when they are unavail-
able. In such cases, "personal notes" could constitute the 
entire record of therapy sessions and would all be abso-
lutely confidential. When a record was needed for any 
reason, the psychotherapists could submit only the fiscal 
records (record of appointments, dates, and payments) or 
sift through their "personal notes" and establish an 
official record for that particular case. 
However, for psychotherapists who work in a mental 
health center or need to keep records to which other 
people have access, this calls for keeping two sets of 
records. One would be considered "personal notes" and 
could include conjecture, thoughts and hypotheses as well 
as facts about the client. The other official "record" 
would include appointments, diagnosis, medication, an any 
other information that another professional may need if the 
psychotherapist is not available. As most clinics, agen-
cies and psychotherapists also have a fiscal record, this 
really means that to totally protect the confidentiality 
and still be able to think through a client's conflicts on 
paper, one would actually be required to keep three records. 
Most psychotherapists would agree that the paperwork re-
quired for the fiscal and official record alone is over-
whelming, without the added burden of a third record. 
If~sychotherapists in a mental health clinic 
setting are constrained to keep more records that can be 
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viewed by a court or other party as allowed by law than a 
psychotherapist in a private practice, it would then appear 
that only the wealthy are in a position to receive psycho-
therapy in a truly private therapeutic relationship. It is 
not the intent of the law to allow for a different and 
possibly better kind of treatment for the wealthy than 
for the poor or middle class, but this certainly appears to 
be a possible result of recent laws on confidentiality. 
Records present many thorny issues. With the new 
laws governing public, court and client access to records, 
it is possible that the results will be poor records which 
may lead to a poorer quality of treatment. 
Another specific area of law on confidentiality 
that may have significant impact on the practice of psycho-
therapy is that addressed in Tarasoff ~ The Regents of the 
University of California (1976). In this case the court 
ruled that a psychotherapist has a duty to protect a poten-
tial victim from foreseeable danger from a client, even if 
such a duty would require a breach of confidentiality. The 
decision in this particular case sent shockwaves through 
the mental health community, particularly as many clients 
have, in a moment of anger or frustration, expressed the 
wish to harm another person. A number of questions have 
been raised including: How is the psychotherapist to 
differentiate between a wish or a plan of action? How is a 
psychotherapist to predict how dangerous a client is? If a 
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client is not sufficiently dangerous to warrant commit-
ment, how can a psychotherapist justify a breach of con-
fidentiality? 
As there are no clear answers to the above ques-
tions, Bersoff (1976) suggested that psychotherapists might 
feel compelled to avoid the risk of civil liability, i.e., 
being sued, by warning potential victims even when the 
likelihood of harm is negligible. If only the occasional 
psychotherapist responds in this way, the general public 
may still hear of the response. The knowledge that a 
person with whom one is upset may be told of angry feelings 
expressed to the therapist would certainly cause people to 
be reluctant to seek psychotherpay if they had any inter-
personal difficulties at all (and what client does not 
have some problems in relationships?) and definitely cause 
people to be reticent in discussing certain kinds of feel-
ings once in psychotherapy. 
Roth and Meisel (1977) express concern that requir-
ing the psychotherapist to give a warning may "lower the 
threshold of dangerousness that will evoke actions from 
therapists, thereby compromising the patient's confidenti-
ality and possibly his treatment" (p. 509). 
Another approach psychotherapists may take to 
protect themselves and the confidentiality of their clients 
would be to interrupt ar.d remind ~~e clients of the limits 
of confidentiality each time it sounds as if the clients 
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would be starting to say something very hostile or poten-
tially violent towards another person. Such behavior would 
most definitely interfere with a client's train of thought 
and could approach a level of absurdity with a client who 
verbally expresses a lot of angry feelings. 
Noll (1976) and Roth and Meisel (1977) raise a 
concern that a psychotherapist who breaches confidentiality 
by warning a potential victim of the threats or plans of a 
client may later be sued for invasion of privacy or defama-
tion of character. In those cases where the psychothera-
pist decides that a client is not sufficiently dangerous to 
warrant warning a potential victim, Roth and Meisel note 
that the psychotherapist may still successfully be sued for 
failing to warn. They state that: 
The vagueness of the standards determining when the psy-
chiatrist must warn, taken in combination with the un-
predictability of violence and the vagueness of the mean-
ing of the term "dangerousness", may make the psychia-
trist's decision appear questionable in retrospect no 
matter how he acts (p. 509). 
The primary accomplishment of the Tarasoff rule 
against confidentiality seems to have been to raise the 
anxiety level of psychotherapists. It is doubtful that 
such a rule will save lives. It seems much more likely 
that it will add a deterrent to psychotherapy for poten-
tially violent people, possibly resulting in greater loss 
of life. The only way the Tarasoff rule against confidenti-
ality could save lives is if it were worded so that psycho-
therapists were Eermitted, not required, to warn potential 
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victims if, in their professional judgment, such a warning 
was necessary, appropriate and therefore therapeutic. 
Another specific aspect of the Illinois Confidenti-
ality Act which may cause difficulties is the one concerned 
with the enforcement of the rules for obtaining a Firearm 
Owners Identification Card. The Confidentiality Act allows 
the Department of Mental Health to verify whether or not 
individuals applying for such an identification card have 
been hospitalized for psychiatric reasons within recent 
years. The application of a person who has had a psychi-
atric hospitalization may be refused. This exception 
appears to be quite logical and in the interest of safe 
society. However, a possible result of this exception may 
be that people who have the desire or need to carry a 
weapon may be deterred from seeking mental health services. 
Some psychotherapists who work in the area of law 
enforcement report great difficulty in providing adequate 
mental health care to police officers. A major source of 
this difficulty is found in the fear of the officers that 
psychotherapy or a psychiatric hospitalization could lead 
to the loss of their Firearm Owners Identification Card and 
therefore their job (Kelly, 1980). 
Anyone who owns a gun should receive all the mental 
health care they need rather than be deterred from such 
care. It seems that character references could serve a 
comparable purpose to finding whether a person has had a 
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psychiatric hospitalization without the consequence of 
deterring some persons from seeking mental health care. 
Another exception of the Illinois Confidentiality 
Act involves cases of child abuse or neglect. The law 
states that these must be reported to the Illinois Depart-
ment of Children and Family Services. The Child Abuse 
Reporting Act adds the loss of professicnal license and/or 
registration as a consequence of the failure to repor~ 
child abuse or neglect. Many mental health professionals 
have encountered the situation where a parent hit a child, 
realized the wrong and immediately sought help. Since the 
parent is already seeking help, embarassment, inconvenience 
and loss of trust in the psychotherapist would probably be 
the only results of a report. The therapists in such a 
situation are put in a quandary. They may: (1) risk legal 
prosecution for failure to report, (2) interrupt and warn 
clients if it sounds as if they are going to make state-
ments that would legally require a report, or (3) make the 
report and risk the therapeutic relationship. Once again, 
the law does not leave any room for professional judgment. 
It does not allow the psychotherapist to report only when 
it appears likely that more abuse and neglect will occur, 
but requires that the psychotherapist report all suspected 
abuse or neglect. 
Another specific exception to confidentiality 
allowed by Illinois law is when the client consents to 
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disclosure. The law does not grant psychotherapists the 
right to refuse to disclose information if they have the 
client's consent for disclosure (except in a court pro-
ceeding where psychotherapists may request that the judge 
hear their testimony in chambers even if the client has 
given consent for full disclosure in court) . This area 
presents some issues related to those of records insofar as 
the determination of who "owns" the psychotherapist's 
impressions and evaluations of the client. To many, it 
seems only fair and just that people be able to determine 
the events of their own lives, and therefore, have the 
power to determine who is given what information about 
them. An unfortunate fact is that many people do not 
exercise good judgment in deciding with whom they would 
like their psychotherapist to talk openly. It is not 
unusual for clients to request that confidential and sensi-
tive information be disclosed to such sources as employers 
and family members. 
The particular exception of disclosure with client 
consent is generally easier for therapists to deal with 
than situations where they are required to report informa-
tion to the court or a government agency. In the former 
case, there is the opportunity to discuss the wisdom of the 
consent to disclose with a client so that the consent may 
be either withdrawn or modified so that only limited infor-
mation may be disclosed. All the other specific exceptions 
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to confidentiality discussed above require that the psy-
chotherapist disclose information and do not allow for a 
compromise based upon professional judgment. 
The specific aspects of the law on confidentiality 
that do not allow room for professional judgment would seem 
to hinder the process of psychotherapy. Since there are 
alternative ways of dealing with the situations in most of 
the specific laws discussed above (the psychotherapist 
using professional judgment to decide what aspects of 
client records should be disclosed, character references 
for the Firearm Owners Identification Card, involuntary 
hospitalization with the option of warning potential vic-
tims in cases when the client may be dangerous to others, 
professional judgment in reporting suspected child abuse) , 
the specific laws that require the psychotherapist to 
disclose information appear not only to hinder psychother-
apy but, in fact, are against the best interests of society. 
Some ways that exceptions to the laws on confi-
dentiality may be against the best interest of society are 
defined by Noll (1976) in a discussion of the implication 
of such laws on the practice of psychotherapy. Noll states 
(1) Greater numbers of patients will incriminate them-
selves and be subject to legal action, (2) psychothera-
pists may well have to defend themselves in courts of 
law for making allegations about patients, (3) a basi-
cally antagonistic relationship may develop between 
the patient and the psychotherapist, (4) psychothera-
pists acting in accordance with the principal of full 
and informed consent will deter patients from seeking 
their help, and (5) ultimately, fewer and fewer people 
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will avail themselves of psychotherapeutic services 
because of the fear that they may talk about the 
"wrong'' things or express unacceptable feelings or 
desires (p. 1453). 
It should be added that there is a valid rationale 
for each exception to the laws on confidentiality; however, 
in most cases there appears to be an alternate solution to 
the one which involves a breach of confidentiality. 
Effects of Disclosing Information: A third con-
sideration in this discussion of the effects of legal 
intervention on the practice of psychotherapy is the effect 
of having disclosed information on the psychotherapist's 
subsequent approach and attitude. This, logically, is 
going to depend on the results of the disclosure. An 
unfortunate experience with disclosure, e.g., one in which 
the disclosed material is handled inappropriately by others, 
can result in all the various responses to the laws dis-
cussed above, i.e., Miranda type warnings to clients, 
overly sparse records and/or interruptions and reminders of 
the limits of confidentiality during the psychotherapy. 
The only positive outcome of an unfortunate disclosure of 
information would be that psychotherapists may become more 
aware of the limits of confidentiality, warn their clients, 
and therefore not inadvertently deceive them into thinking 
that psychotherapy is totally confidential when it is not. 
Psychotherapists who have had an unfortunate expe-
rience with disclosure of information may be more likely to 
refuse to see clients about whom it is probable that infor-
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mation will have to be disclosed legally. They may refuse 
to disclose information on some occasions in the future. 
Some psychotherapists are reluctant to disclose any infor-
mation to particular agencies and individuals, even with 
client consent, because of the lack of training of many 
workers regarding confidentiality of mental health records. 
The psychotherapist is in the very uncomfortable 
position of wanting to promise abolute confidentiality, but 
not being able to do so realistically. One would expect 
that the act of disclosing confidential communications 
would result in the psychotherapist becoming more aware of 
the legal limits of confidentiality and more sensitive to 
the privacy of the therape~tic situation. 
Most of the sources in the literature which address 
the issues of the psychotherapist's attitude regarding and 
reaction to laws on confidentiality are limited to specula-
tion rather than research. The present study explores the 
attitudes of psychologists regarding confidentiality in 
a number of situations. 
Client Reaction 
Overall Effect of Laws: The client is also going 
to have reactions to the fact that psychotherapy cannot be 
guaranteed to be absolutely confidential. Many psychother-
apists have noted that an increasing number of clients are 
asking questions about confidentiality and mental health 
records. Frequently, a client will say "I would like to 
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tell you something, but I don't want it to go into my 
record." Although there appears to be increased concern 
expressed by clients about confidentiality, there are very 
few studies directly surveying the client's feelings about 
confidentiality or the lack of confidentiality. Such 
studies would be helpful in establishing ethical guidelines 
as well as understanding the therapeutic process. Whether 
or not reassurances by the psycho~herapist and/or laws on 
confidentiality, including the exceptions to the law, 
affect the client's behavior in psychotherapy might be 
another area of research. 
Most clients who voluntarily seek mental health 
care are very eager to disclose private thoughts, feelings 
and behaviors in psychotherapy; this is generally their 
first relationship where confidentiality is a key component 
of the relationship and they are frequently ready to "tell 
all." Even with more questions about confidentiality, 
clients are generally ready to be open and frank in the 
therapy setting except when the client is a mental health 
professional or student (therefore very aware of just how 
unprivate records frequently are) or when the client anti-
cipates legal involvement, either criminal or civil. The 
apparent willingness of clients to disclose private infor-
mation has been noted in the literature by a number of 
mental health professionals (e.g., Jung, 1975; Mowrer, 
1961). 
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Despite this apparent willingness of clients to 
disclose private information in psychotherapy, there are 
studies which suggest that clients would prefer that such 
information not be disclosed beyond the therapist. Rosen 
(1976) divided clients at several different mental health 
clinics into two groups, the first of which was instructed 
to sign forms for the release of information to the state 
agency for mental health. The second group was addition-
ally given a clear explanation of the fact thay they would 
receive services whether or not they signed the form. In 
the first group, 100% of the clients signed the form. In 
the second group, between 20% and 41% of the clients signed 
the form, the amount varying among mental health clinics. 
This study concluded that many fewer clients would sign 
consent forms for the release of information if they clearly 
understood that it was not necessary to sign in order to 
receive services. 
Most other studies regarding the clients' attitudes 
about confidentiality have involved college students. 
Lewis and Warman (1964), in a survey of college students 
who had been divided into groups as to whether they had 
received vocational counseling, personal counseling or no 
counseling, found that only one of the 29 personal counsel-
ing subjects thought information should be shared with 
housemothers, department heads or employers without consent 
and none of the personal counseling subjects thought infer-
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mation should be shared without consent with .teachers or 
fraternities and sororities. Twenty-one percent of stu-
dents who had received personal counseling thought that 
information should be given to such sources as parents or 
advisors without the student's consent and only 34% of the 
students receiving personal counseling thought information 
should be shared with other counselors without the stu-
dent's consent. In an open-ended question inquiring about 
the specific circumstances under which it might be all 
right for a counselor to release a summary report of test-
ing and counseling, the personal counseling subjects place 
"considerable stress •.. on the importance of strict confi-
dentiality of information" (p. 10). 
Students were asked what sources they would consent 
to be given detailed information. The only sources that 
over half of the personal counseling students would allow 
to have information were the counselors seen (97%), other 
counselors (76%), advisors (62%), and parents (62%). Only 
17% of personal counseling subjects would consent to the 
counseling center releasing information to teachers and 28% 
would allow the release of information to employers. The 
personal counseling subjects as a whole were more concerned 
with confidentiality than the vocational counseling or no 
counseling subjects. 
In a follow-up study at a different university, 
Anderson and Sherr (1969) additionally inquired about the 
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release of specific kinds of information. They found that 
their sample of college students was more willing to re-
lease information than the students in Lewis and Warman's 
study. They noted that the students discriminated among 
the types of information which they would allow to be 
released. Students who had been in counseling did not wish 
information about personal problems to be released to 
employers without their consent (only 18% iadicated that 
this was acceptable), but had much less objection to the 
release of information regarding discipline/behavior (56% 
indicated this was acceptable) or grades (67%) to employers 
without their consent. 
Students who had been in counseling were more 
willing to have information released to their parents than 
to employers without their consent, but still discriminated 
between kinds of information. For example, 65% of counseled 
subjects indicated that it was acceptable to inform parents 
of a student's personal problems without consent, compared 
to 71% for discipline/behavior information and 89% for 
grades. 
Anderson and Sherr additionally note that students 
were reluctant to allow information to be shared with other 
counselors. For example only 23% of counseled subjects 
indicated that it was acceptable to release information on 
personal problems to other cou~selors without their con-
sent, apparently unaware of the amount of supervision and 
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consultation that takes place within a counseling center. 
Anderson and Sherr suggest that this indicates a marked 
difference between standard counseling practices and the 
expectations of college students. 
Simmons (1968) explored the approval that college 
students at a counseling center would give if certain kinds 
of information were released to certain people without 
their explicit consent. The material to be released in-
cluded vocational, personal adjustment and danger-to-self-
or-others information. The possible recipients of infor-
mation included parents, the dean's office, the student 
health service or other counselors. Simmons found that 
two-thirds of the responses were favorable to the release 
of information without explicit consent, many more than in 
the previous studies. However, Simmons did not report how 
many clients were seen for personal counseling versus 
vocational counseling. Simmons also found that the kinds 
of information as well as the potential recipient of 
information had a significant relationship to approval of 
its release without explicit consent. He noted that there 
was not an interaction between kind of information and 
recipient, suggesting that college student counselees were 
selective in both the kinds of information that they did 
not want released to anyone and the people that they did 
not want to receive any information about them. 
The above studies suggest that clients are inter-
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ested, in varying degrees, in the maintenance of confi-
dentiality in the therapeutic relationship. Clients, for 
the most part, experience relief from the laws in Illinois 
on confidentiality and psychotherapy. Most clients are 
reassured by the fact that a psychotherapist must obey laws 
regarding confidentiality and could be punished under the 
law for disclosing information to the client's friends, 
relatives or employers. 
Effects of Specific Laws: Clients, with some 
exceptions, appear to be content with the specific aspects 
of the law on confidentiality as well, primarily because 
they do not anticipate having occasion to fall under one of 
the exceptions to confidentiality. Noll (1974, 1976) has 
noted that even when clients are informed of the limits of 
confidentiality, they are not fully aware of the conse-
quences of the release of information. It is logical to 
assume that people who do fall under one of the exceptions 
would be more hesitant to seek mental health care and have 
greater difficulty being frank and open once in psycho-
therapy. 
This is aptly demonstrated by the difficulty a law 
eriforcement psychotherapist has in involving officers of 
the law in psychotherapy. The officers clearly state that 
they fear that if they follow through when referred, they 
could end up losing their guns and their jobs. This is 
true even when the referral for psychotherapy does not 
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reflect on the officer's ability. For example, if officers 
kill a person in the line of duty, they may be referred for 
psychotherapy so that they do not overreact, hold their 
fire too long in a subsequent situation and end up getting 
themselves killed (Kelly, 1980). 
As discussed previously, the Tarasoff rule which 
would require a psychotherapist to warn a potential victim 
of possible danger may deter potentially dangerous people 
from seeking mental health care to learn to deal with their 
feelings and impulses. Bersoff (1976) discusses this 
concern and adds that such a law may result in mental 
health professionals becoming more identified with law 
enforcement, therefore discouraging even clients who would 
not be potentially dangerous from seeking professional 
help. 
There is the same concern that people may be dis-
couraged from seeking mental health care in regard to the 
exception to confidentiality that requires psychotherapists 
to report all cases of suspected child abuse or neglect to 
a state agency, regardless of the potential likelihood of 
continued abuse or neglect. Parents who abuse their child-
ren often view themselves very negatively. The anticipa-
tion of telling the psychotherapist of these negative 
qualities may already deter many from seeking help. The 
knowledge that a psychotherapist may then have to report 
them seems likely to be an even greater deterrent to seek-
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ing professional help. Some clients who are not very 
likely to continue abusing or neglecting their children 
have a psychological need to be reported so that they can 
be "punished," cleanse themselves of past wrongs and start 
a new life in terms of their identity as parents. In such 
cases, it is generally most therapeutic if the clients call 
the state agency and report themselves rather than be 
reported by the therapist. The reporting then becomes a 
constructive, responsible act that the client has taken on 
the way to "good" parenting. 
Clients are generally quite pleased to learn that 
they have the right to examine their records. However, 
clients generally are not interested in actually reviewing 
the record, but wish to maintain the right to do so. 
It appears that the specific aspects of the laws on 
confidentiality do not hinder the average person from 
seeking psychotherapy; however, they do hinder those that 
fall under the exceptions. These people falling under the 
exceptions would include those who have a need or desire to 
carry a gun, people who have concerns about violent impulses 
against others and parents who are concerned about how they 
handle their children. These are obviously three groups of 
people that society would not want to deter from seeking 
psychotherapy. It seems that it is not in the best interest 
of society to have specific exceptions in the laws on con-
fidentiality that would add such a deterrent. 
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Effect of Having Information Disclosed: The final 
point for consideration in examining the effect of legal 
intervention on confidentiality is the effect of having 
information revealed on the client's subsequent attitude 
and/or response in psychotherapy. Bersoff (1976), Noll, 
(1976) and Roth and Meisel (1977) express concern that 
statutory requirements that the psychotherapist disclose 
certain kinds of information in certain circumstances will 
not only deter people from seeking psychotherapy, but 
create an antagonistic relationship between the client and 
the psychotherapist. 
One would expect that clients would feel betrayed 
and angry about an unconsented disclosure, especially if 
they were not informed that the release of information 
would occur. Although feelings of anger and betrayal can 
be worked through by the psychotherapists, and this work-
ing through could even enhance the therapy, it seems likely 
that such feelings would more often result in the client 
becoming reluctant to be frank and open and/or dropping out 
of therapy. 
Clients generally are pleased when the psychother-
apist refuses to disclose information without consent. 
This seems to be especially true for low-income clients who 
are involved in a number of other types of social service 
agencies and who have come to accept the fact that informa-
tion is often informally shared among these agencies with-
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out the client's consent. These people frequently experi-
ence a lack of respect for their privacy and are pleased to 
learn that the psychotherapist will not divulge confidential 
information without consent. The psychotherapist's refusal 
to disclose information without consent for such clients 
can be a real turning point in the therapeutic process in 
that the clients may recognize new areas of responsibility 
and control over their own lives. This prospect of growth 
when the psychotherapist refuses to disclose information is 
also present for clients who have been overprotected by 
others, such as family or friends, and the psychotherapist 
is the first person to refuse to disclose confidential 
information to the overprotectors. 
It is recommended that the client's attitude and 
response to psychotherapy following a disclosure of infor-
mation be further explored in surveys of clients or surveys 
of the experiences of psychotherapists. 
Hypotheses 
There has been minimal research in regards to psy-
chotherapists' attitudes on confidentiality. Jagim, Whitt-
man and Noll (1978) surveyed mental health professionals in 
North Dakota. They reported that 98% of those responding 
to the survey indicated that they viewed confidentiality as 
"essential to maintaining a positive therapeutic relation-
ship." When given explicit situations, the therapists 
departed from the ideal of a~solute confidentiality, i.e., 
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only 20% responded that they would emphasize confidenti-
ality in respect to state laws such as those requiring the 
reporting of child abuse, only 14% responded that they 
would emphasize confidentiality over the safety of a threat-
ened third-party as in Tarasoff ~ Regents of the University 
of California, and only 59% responded that they would risk a 
citation for contempt of court before disclosing confiden-
tial information. This survey only presented situations 
involving potential danger or a contempt of court citation. 
It does not address day-to-day situations such as those in 
which an employer, family member or third-party payer re-
quests the release of confidential information. 
In addition to there being very few studies explor-
ing the attitudes of psychotherapists regarding confidenti-
ality, there are few studies exploring actual psychothera-
pists' practices in disclosing information. Those studies 
available explore the practices of school counselors (e.g., 
Boyd, Tennyson & Erickson, 1973, 1974) and therapists in 
a college counseling center setting (e.g., Nugent & Pareis, 
1968; Sherwood, 1974). Nugent and Pareis found that about 
40% of the 461 responding college counseling center direc-
tors (67% return rate) reported releasing information about 
counselees without the student's permission. Sherwood 
found that only 76% of 4-year college counselors and 63% 
of 2-year college counselors always obtained the student's 
permission before releasing information. Because of the 
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college counseling center setting and the fact that these 
results may reflect release of vocational and academic in-
formation as well as personal problem information, these 
results cannot be generalized to other mental health pro-
fessionals. 
The present study is intended to fill in some of 
the gaps in information noted above regarding client and 
therapist attitudes about confidentiality in psychotherapy. 
It surveyed opinions regarding the release of information 
by psychotherapists when they do not have the permission of 
the client in greater depth than previous studies by ex-
plicitly presenting the subjects with concrete situations 
that do not involve a client who is an immediate danger 
to self or others. AdditionallyJ this study attempted to 
replicate the findings of Jagim et al. (1978), using six 
of their eleven questionnaire items. This survey was given 
to mental health professionals, mental health care recipi-
ents and Illinois State•s Attorneys. Illinois State~s At-
torneys were included in this study as they are in the 
unique position of trying to discover and present the truth 
in a court of law and at the same time must prosecute for 
any breach of the Illinois Confidentiality Act. 
Although this study is primarily exploratory in 
nature, several hypotheses based on past experience and the 
literature are offered. A high Opinion Index on 35 Likert-
type questions will suggest disapproval of the release of 
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information by a psychotherapist without the client's clear 
consent. A low Opinion Index will indicate approval of the 
disclosure of information without the client's clear con-
sent. 
1} It is hypothesized that all three subject groups 
agree with statements regarding the importance of confiden-
tiality in psychotherapy and a therapist's professional/ 
ethical obligation regarding confidentiality. 
2) It is hypothesized that fewer psychotherapists 
(than in the first hypothesis) actually disapprove of the 
release or approve of the nonrelease of information when 
confronted with concrete situations, whether or not the 
client is potentially dangerous. This prediction is based 
on the awareness that even in day-to-day decisions regard-
ing confidentiality in psychotherapy, there does not always 
appear to be a clear choice between right and wrong. 
3) It is hypothesized that there is a significant 
difference in the Opinion Index dependent on the type of 
information to be disclosed. Specifically, it is hypothe-
sized that disclosure of information directly related to 
psychotherapy is most strongly disapproved by all subject 
groups, i.e., personal problems and psychiatric diagnos~s 
have a significantly higher Opinion Index than the other 
three types of information. 
4) As educational and vocational information are 
generally viewed as nonsecret, it is hypothesized that it 
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has the lowest Opinion Index of all types of information. 
5) It is hypothesized that there is a significant 
difference in the Opinion Index dependent on the recipient 
of information. Specifically, based on studies in college 
counseling centers, it is hypothesized that the release of 
information to employers has a siginificantly higher Opin-
ion Index than other possible recipients of information. 
6) It is hypothesized that physicians have the 
lowest Opinion Index of any of the possible recipients of 
information. 
7) It is hypothesized that in regard to confiden-
tiality the mental health professional is more concerned 
with ethical standards than the client, i.e., that the men-
tal health professional has a significantly higher Opinion 
Index than the mental health care recipient. This hypo-
thesis is based on a study concerned with ethical standards 
in research when using human subjects which indicated that 
the research psychologist is generally far more concerned 
with the protection and nondeception of the experimental 
subjects than are the subjects themselves (Sullivan & 
Deiker, 1973). 
CHAPTER IV 
METHODS 
Subjects 
The subjects were drawn from three populations, (1) 
mental health clients at the Springfield Mental Health 
Center, Springfield, Illinois, (2) registered psychologists 
in central and southern Illinois, and (3) Illinois St~te's 
Attorneys. 
Surveys were sent to the State's Attorneys in each 
county in Illinois {N=l02). Forty-two (41%) surveys were 
returned by State's Attorneys. Eight of these were not 
used in the statistical analysis as they were not complete 
(N=34; 33%). Responding State's Attorneys ranged in age 
from 25 to 70 years, with a mean age of 34.8 years and a 
standard deviation of 9.33 years. One State's Attorney was 
female, 28 were male and five did not indicate their sex. 
Registered psychologists with zip codes in central 
and southern Illinois were randomly selected from a listing 
provided by the Illinois Department of Registration and 
Education (N=l02). A total of 68 (67%) surveys were re-
turned, one indicating that the psychologist was deceased. 
Two psychologists did not fill out the survey as they were 
retired and no longer practicing. Two other surveys were 
not usable as they were incomplete, leaving a total of 63 
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(62%) surveys for the statistical analysis. Responding 
psychologists ranged in age from 27 to 64 years with a mean 
age of 43.6 years and a standard deviation of 12.53 years. 
Fourteen responding psychologists were female, 45 were male 
and four did not indicate their sex. 
The first 102 mental health clients 18 years of age 
or older keeping appointments at the Springfield Mental 
Health Center during the week of October 22, 1979, were 
selected as subjects. Many clients request that mail from 
the mental health center not be sent to their homes because 
they do not wish others to know they are coming to the 
mental health center. Therefore, in the interest of pri-
vacy, the additional criterion of having previously been 
sent a bill for services was used in selecting clients. 
This may have eliminated some subjects who pay their bills 
at each appointment and those who, due to poor financial 
circumstances, are not charged a fee. Fifty-one (50%) 
clients returned surveys. One was incomplete, leaving 50 
(49%) surveys for statistical analysis. Responding clients 
ranged from 18 to 59 years of age, with a mean age of 33.8 
years and a standard deviation of 8.63 years. Thirty-three 
responding clients were female, 11 were male and six did 
not indicate their sex. 
All responding subjects indicated that their race 
was Caucasian. Subjects were promised a copy of the results 
if they indicated the desire for such on a separate card. 
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Design Overview 
The design for the analysis of the Survey of Opin-
ion was a 3 x 5 x 7 (Subjects x Information x Recipients) 
analysis of variance with repeated measures on the last two 
factors. The three subject groups were psychologists, 
State's Attorneys and mental health clients. The five 
types of information were educational/vocational informa-
tion, the fact that a person is a client, psychiatric 
diagnosis, personal problems and financial information. 
The seven recipients of information were the client's 
physician, the Department of Mental Health, legal authori-
ties, the client's relatives, the client's insurance com-
pany, the client's employer and the client's friends. The 
dependent variable was the Opinion Index, a measure of the 
approval of the disclosure of information by a psychothera-
pist without client consent. 
Materials 
The primary source of data was the Survey of Opin-
ion consisting of 35 Likert-type items designed to assess 
attitudes about psychotherapists disclosing or not dis-
closing specific kinds of information to specific sources 
about clients who are not an immediate danger to themselves 
or others (see Appendix R). The five kinds of specific 
information addressed in the survey are educational/voca-
tional, the fact that a person is a client, psychiatric 
diagnosis, a client's personal problems and financial 
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information. Educational/vocational information was se-
lected as a variable as it is generally considered public 
information that people disclose readily (Jourard, 19 ) . 
Financial information was selected as a variable as such 
information is usually not readily disclosed (Jourard, 
19 ) , but it is not directly related to psychotherapy. 
The fact that a person is a client was selected as a type 
of information because being a client is an open and public 
act, but many people may still want such information kept 
private. Personal problems and psychiatric diagnosis were 
selected for the survey as they are two kinds of sensitive 
information directly related to psychotherapy. 
The seven possible recipients of information on the 
survey are the client's physician, the Department of Mental 
Health, legal authorities, the client's relatives, the 
client's insurance company, the client's employer and the 
client's friends. The Department of Mental Health was 
selected as a variable as, in Illinois, a diagnosis and 
demographic information must be submitted to the Department 
for each client by agencies receiving Department of Mental 
Health funding (it should be noted that no identifying 
information, such as name or social security number is 
required). The client's insurance company was selected to 
represent the category of third-party payers who require a 
client's psychiatric diagnosis before paying for mental 
health care services. The other five possible recipients 
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of information are included in the survey as they fre-
quently request information about clients, with intentions 
that may or may not be beneficial to the client. 
Two forms of the survey were developed in order to 
avoid response bias. The like numbered items on each form 
address the same combination of kind of information and 
recipient of information, but on one form the item is 
worded negatively and on the other it is worded positively, 
i.e., on one form the item asks about a "psychotherapist 
disclosing information without a client's clear consent" 
and on the other form the item asks about a "psychothera-
pist not disclosing information because he does not have 
a client's clear consent to disclose." Form A was structured 
by first pairing the kind of information and recipient in 
random order and then flipping a coin to decide if each 
item, 1 through 18, would be worded the positive or negative 
way. Items 19 through 35 were worded the opposite way of 
items 1 through 17, respectively, so that each form is 
balanced for the number of items worded each way. The 
items on Form B are in the same order as Form A but worded 
in the opposite manner. 
A value was assigned to each of the five points of 
the 35 Likert-type questions so that a score of 1 indicates 
that the subject strongly approves of the psychotherapist 
releasing information without the client's clear consent 
and/or strongly disapproves of the psychotherapist not 
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releasing information because the client has not given 
clear consent. The value increases by one at each point 
until at the other end of the continuum of opinion, a value 
of 5 indicates that the subject strongly diapproves of the 
psychotherapist releasing information without the client's 
clear consent and/or strongly approves of the psychothera-
pist not releasing information because a client has not 
given clear consent. 
A total Opinion Index was tabulated for each sub-
ject by averaging the value of the responses indicated on 
each of the 35 items. A high Opinion Index indicates that 
the subject disapproves of a psychotherapist releasing 
information without the client's clear consent and a low 
Opinion Index indicates that the subject approves of a 
psychotherapist releasing information without the client's 
clear consent. An Information Opinion Index was tabulated 
for each type of information by averaging the value of the 
responses on items regarding the release of each respective 
type of information. The Information Opinion Index was 
tabulated for all subject combined, for each group of 
subjects and for each possible recipient of information. A 
high Information Opinion Index indicates that subjects 
disapprove of the release of the particular type of infor-
mation without the client's clear consent and a low Infor-
mation Opinion Index indicates that subjects approve of the 
release of the particular type of information without the 
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client's clear consent. A Recipient Opinion Index was 
tabulated for each recipient of information by averaging 
the value of the responses on items regarding the release 
of information to each respective recipient. The Recipient 
Opinion Index was tabulated for all subjects combined, for 
each subject group and for each type of information. A 
high Recipient Opinion Index indicates that subjects dis-
approve of the release of information to the particular 
recipient without the client's clear consent and a low 
Recipient Opinion Index indicates that subjects approve of 
the release of information to the particular recipient 
without the client's clear consent. 
The Survey of Opinion was followed by a form request-
ing demographic information including age, sex, race, reli-
gion, education and occupation. This form included six 
Likert-type questions used by Jagim et al. (1978) in a 
survey of the attitudes of mental health professionals 
regarding confidentiality and four additional questions 
regarding the subject's personal experience with psycho-
therapy and regarding confidentiality. A sample question-
naire is included in Appendix B. 
Procedures 
All subjects were sent the same letter of explana-
tion, Survey of Opinion, form requesting demographic infor-
mation and additional questions (see Appendix B). A stamped, 
self-addressed envelope was enclosed for returning the 
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survey. A stamped, self-addressed postcard was included so 
that subjects could indicate the fact that they had com-
pleted the survey as well as their desire for a copy of the 
results. 
On the Survey of Opinion subjects were requested to 
mark the space on a five point Likert-type scale from 
"Approve" to "Disapprove" that best reflected their opinion 
about the situations presented in the survey items. 
In order that subjects could be assured anonymity 
and their surveys could be divided readily into the three 
groups, State's Attorneys were sent surveys printed on blue 
paper, clients on yellow paper and psychologists on white 
paper. The surveys were mailed out in early November of 
1979. A reminder letter with an additional survey was sent 
out in February of 1980 to those who had not returned a 
postcard following the first mailing. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Manipulation Check 
A simple t-test indicates no significant difference 
between the Opinion Indices of subjects completing Form A 
and the Opinion Indices of subjects completing Form B, t 
(144) = 1.00, E > .30. This resul~ suggests that both 
forms measure the same variable and that wording half of 
the questions positively and half negatively effectively 
eliminated bias due to response style. 
Evaluation of Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis is that a majority of all 
three groups of subjects agree with statements regarding 
client's expectations of confidentiality in psychotherapy, 
the therapist's professional/ethical obligation regarding 
confidentiality and the importance of confidentiality in 
psychotherapy (see Appendix B, items A, B, C). This pre-
diction is supported by data. As the three statements ad-
dress general issues of confidentiality, they are combined 
for statistical analysis. The three general statements re-
garding confidentiality are supported by an average of 96.8% 
of the psychologists, 95.8% of the clients and 75.6% of the 
State's Attorneys. A one-way analysis of variance indicates 
a significant difference between subject groups, F (2,144) = 
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9.870, E < .001. Due to an unequal number of subjects in 
the thre~ groups, t-tests are used for further analysis. 
The t-test for differences between independent means indi-
cates that psychologists supported the statements signifi-
cantly more than State's Attorneys, ! (89) = 4.090, E < 
.001 and that clients supported the statements significantly 
more than State's Attorneys, ! (76) = 3.676, E < .001. 
There was no significant difference between psychologists 
and clients, ! (107) = .204, E >.50. 
The second hypothesis is that fewer psychothera-
pists (than in the first hypothesis) actually disapprove of 
the release or approve of the nonrelease of information 
when confronted with concrete situations, whether or not 
the client is potentially dangerous. The data support this 
hypothesis in situations where there is a legal requirement 
to disclose information (28.1%) endorsed confidentiality), 
where the client is potentially dangerous to others (15.8% 
endorsed confidentiality) and where the psychotherapist is 
in risk of receiving a contempt of court citation (49.1% 
endorsed confidentiality; see Appendix C, items, G, H, I). 
A simple sign test indicates that the endorsement of confi-
dentiality was significantly stronger for the three general 
statements regarding confidentiality than for the three con-
crete situations named above, ~ = 6.930, E < .0001. 
The second hypothesis is not supported by the data 
in day-to-day situations in which the client is not an 
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immediate danger to himself or others. An average of 96.8% 
of the psychologists endorsed each of the general state-
ments while an average of 93.2% of the psychologists sup-
ported confidentiality in each of the concrete situations. 
A test for the significance between two proportions indi-
cates that this difference is not significant, z = 1.305, 
E_>.OS. 
All main effects and interactions in the analysis 
of variance are significant (see Table 1) . All simple 
effects analyzed are signifcant as well as most t-test 
comparisons of means. A close look at the data indicates 
that very small differences are significant. This is 
attributed to an unusually high number of degrees of free-
dom and to the fact that the results are highly skewed. 
For example, on a five-point scale, the average total 
Opinion Index of the psychologists for the individual ques-
tions on the survey was 4.71. 
The skewed distribution and high number of degrees 
of freedom result in data that are numerically almost iden-
tical being statistically highly significantly different. 
In order to limit the discussion to results that may be psy-
chologically meaningful and significant as well as statis-
tically significant, only those data which show a difference 
of at least .5 (on the five-point scale) and are also sta-
tistically significant in their difference will be discussed. 
The first part of the third hypothesis is that there 
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Table 1 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for 
Type of Information and 
Recipient of Information for 
Psychologists, Clients and State's Attorneys 
Source df MS F 
Between Subjects 
A 2 398.60 30.29** 
S (A) 144 13.16 
Within Subjects 
B 4 27.08 27.22** 
AB 8 6.26 6.29** 
S(A)B 576 1. 00 
c 6 126.73 66.44** 
AC 12 28.36 14.87** 
S(A)C 864 1. 91 
BC 24 2.71 4.51** 
ABC 48 1. OS 1. 74* 
S(A)BC 3456 .60 
Note. Factor A refers to subjects, B to type of informa-
tion, C to recipient of information and S to error . 
* p 
** p 
. 005 
.0001 
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is a significant difference in the Information Opinion 
Index dependent upon the type of information to be dis-
closed. This hypothesis is supported by the data. An 
analysis of variance indicates that the type of informa-
tion to be disclosed has a highly significant effect on 
whether or not the subjects approve of the disclosure, F 
(4,576) = 27.22, E < .0001. 
However, despite the high level of significance, an 
examination of the data in graphical form indicates negli-
gible differences for all subjects combined dependent upon 
the type of information to be disclosed (see Figure 1) . 
The biggest difference, between educational/vocational 
information and financial information is less than .3. 
This suggests that, for all subjects combined, the type of 
information to be disclosed, while having some effect, does 
not have a meaningful part in determining whether the 
disclosure will be approved. All subjects combined tend to 
disapprove of disclosing and approve of not disclosing all 
information regardless of the type of information. The 
first part of the third hypothesis is supported statisti-
cally, but not when the criterion of psychological signifi-
cance is applied. 
The second part of the third hypothesis is that the 
disclosure of information directly related to psychotherapy 
is most strongly disapproved in all subject groups, i.e, 
it is hypothesized that personal problems and psychiatric 
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CillcP----~~ Psychologists (N=6 3) 
•·············· ·• Clients (N=SO) 
-------- .. State's Attorneys (N=34) 
Ed/Voc 
All Subjects Combined (N=l47) 
................. 
............ 
....... 
Client Diagnosis Personal Financial 
Problems 
Type of Information 
Figure 1. Mean Information Opinion Indices for each type 
of information for each subject group and all 
subjects combined. 
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diagnosis have a significantly higher Information Opinion 
Index than the other three types of information. The data 
do not support this prediction using either statistical or 
psychological criteria. A planned comparison of the means 
of the Information Opinion Indices of personal problems and 
psychiatric diagnosis versus the means of the Information 
Opinion Indices of information that a person is a client, 
financial information, and educational/vocational informa-
tion does not even approach significance, F (1,576) = .003, 
E > . 20. 
A post hoc comparison of means indicates that sub-
jects approve of the disclosure of financial information 
significantly less than the other four types of informa-
tion, ~ (4,576) = 2.37, E < .05, but, as can be seen in 
Figure 1, for all subjects combined financial information 
differed from the other types of information by less than 
.3. All subjects combined did not discriminate between 
financial information and the other four types of informa-
tion to a meaningful degree. 
The fourth hypothesis is that educational/vocational 
information is generally viewed as nonsecret, i.e., it is 
hypothesized that educational/vocational information has 
the lowest Information Opinion Index of all types of infor-
mation. The data support this hypothesis statistically. A 
planned comparison of the mean Opinion Index of educational/ 
vocational information versus the mean Opinion Indices of 
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the other four types of information indicates that subjects 
approve of the discloure of educational/vocational infor-
mation significantly more than other types of information, 
~ (1,576) = 4.851, E <.OS. However, the negligible differ-
ence in Figure 1 suggests that this is not a meaningful 
difference. Apparently, all subjects combined did not 
discriminate between educational/vocational information and 
other types of information in deciding whether or not to 
approve the disclosure of information. The fourth hypo-
thesis is supported statistically, but not when the cri-
terion of psychological significance is applied. 
The first part of the fifth hypothesis is that there 
is a significant difference in the Recipient Opinion Index 
dependent upon the recipient of information. This hypo-
thesis is supported by the data. An analysis of variance 
indicates that the recipient of information has a highly 
significant effect on whether or not subjects approve of 
the disclosure of information, F (6,864) = 66.44, E < .0001. 
An examination of the data in graphical form suggests that 
the result is meaningful as well as statistically signifi-
cant (see Figure 2). The mean Recipient Opinion Index for 
all subjects combined ranges from 3.81 when the recipient 
is the client's physician to 4.78 when the recipient is a 
friend of the client. The order of the Recipient's Opinion 
Index for all subjects combined ranging from lowest to high-
est is the client's physician (3.81), the Department of 
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Mental Health (4.04), legal authorities (4.19), the client's 
relatives (4.42), the client's insurance company (4.61), the 
client's employer (4.69) and the client's friends (4.78). 
The first part of the fifth hypothesis is supported when 
applying both statistical and psychological criteria. 
The second part of the fifth hypothesis is that 
subjects approve the least of releasing information to 
employers, i.e., it is hypothesized that employers have a 
significantly higher Recipient Opinion Index than other 
possible recipients of information. This hypothesis is 
supported by the data. A planned comparison of the mean 
Recipient Opinion Index for employers versus the Mean 
Recipient Indices of the other six recipients of informa-
tion indicates that subjects approve of the disclosure 
of information to employers significantly less than the 
disclosure of information to the other six recipients, ~ 
(1,864) = 13.270, E < .001. Subjects approve the disclosure 
of information to friends less than to employers, although 
not meaningfully less. As can be seen in Figure 2, employ-
ers as recipients differ from the client's friends, insur-
ance company and relatives by less than .5, but differ from 
legal authorities, the Department of Mental Health and the 
client's physician by more than .5. This suggests that 
subjects approve of the disclosure of information to employ-
ers to a meaningfully lesser degree than to the client's phy-
sician, the Department of Mental Health and legal authorities. 
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The sixth hypothesis is that subjects approve the 
most of releasing information to physicians, i.e., it is 
hypothesized that physicians have a significantly lower 
Recipient Opinion Index than other possible recipients of 
information. This hypothesis is supported by the data. A 
planned comparison of the mean Recipient Opinion Index for 
physicians versus the mean Recipient Opinion Indices of the 
other six recipients of information indicates that subjects 
approve of the disclosure of information to physicians 
significantly more than to the other six recipients, ~ 
(1,874) = 45.270, E < .001. As can be seen in Figure 2, 
for all subjects combined, physicians as recipients differ 
from the Department of Mental Health and legal authorities 
by less than .5, but differ from the other four possible 
recipients of information by more than .5. This suggests 
that subjects are willing to have information disclosed to 
physicians to a meaningfully greater degree than to a 
client's relatives, insurance company, employer or friends. 
The final hypothesis is that psychologists are more 
concerned with confidentiality than clients, i.e., it is 
hypothesized that psychologists have a significantly higher 
Opinion Index than clients. This hypothesis is supported 
by the data. The analysis of variance indicates a highly 
significant difference between subject groups, ~ (2,144) = 
30.29, E < .0001. A Newman-Keuls test of the difference 
between all pairs of means indicates that psychologists 
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approve of the disclosure of information significantly less 
than clients. The critical expected value at the .01 level 
of significance is .329 and the observed value is .338, £< 
.01. The Newman-Keuls test additionally indicates that psy-
chologists approve of the disclosure of information signifi-
cantly less than State's Attorneys. The critical expected 
value at the .01 level of significance is .373 and the 
observed value is .677, E < .01. Clients also approve of 
the disclosure of information significantly less than 
State's Attorneys. The critical expected value at the .01 
level of significance is .373 and the observed value is 
1.015, E < .01. 
As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, the Opinion 
Index of psychologists is consistently higher than that of 
clients, although generally less than .5 different. The 
only variable on which the Opinion Index of psychologists 
is more than .5 greater than the Opinion Index of clients 
is when the recipient of information is a physician. 
Clients approve of the disclosure of information to phy-
sicians without client consent to a meaningfully greater 
degree than psychologists. 
Despite the fact that the Opinion Index of psy-
chologists is less than .5 higher than the Opinion Index of 
clients, the fact that the Opinion Index of psychologists 
was consistently higher than the Opinion Index of clients, 
regardless of recipient or type of information, is regarded 
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as a meaningfully significant result. This finding adds to 
previous research that suggests that psychologists are more 
concerned than are clients or subjects in assuring that 
clients or subjects are treated humanely and ethically. 
The Opinion Index of psychologists is more than .5 
higher than the Opinion Index of State's Attorneys for 
all five types of information and for five out of the seven 
recipients (client's physician, the Department of Mental 
Health, legal authorities, relatives and the client's 
employer) . The Opinion Index of psychologists is less than 
.5 higher than the Opinion Index of State's Attorneys when 
the recipient is the client's insurance company or friends. 
This result suggests that State's Attorneys are signifi-
cantly more approving than psychologists of the disclosure 
of information without client's consent except when the 
recipient of information is the client's insurance company 
or friends. This finding suggests that in day-to-day 
situations, State's Attorneys find more reason for infor-
mation about psychotherapy to be disclosed without client 
consent than do psychologists. 
The Opinion Index of clients is more than .5 
greater than the Opinion Index of State's Attorneys for all 
types of information except financial (Figure 1) and for 
all recipients except the client's insurance company and 
friends (Figure 2). This indicates that, as a whole, 
clients approve of disclosing information to a meaningfully 
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less degree than do State's Attorneys. Clients and State's 
Attorneys are not meaningfully different when the infor-
mation is financial or the recipient is the client's insur-
ance company or friends, primarily because in these three 
situations State's Attorneys are more disapproving of 
disclosing information than in other situations, so their 
Opinion Indices are closer to the Opinion Indices of clients. 
Other Findings of Interest 
A 3 x 7 x 5 (Subjects x Information x Recipients) 
analysis of variance with repeated measures on the last two 
factors indicates that all main effects are highly signifi-
cant (see Table 1). Again, the three subject groups are 
psychologists, State's Attorneys and mental health clients. 
The five types of information are educational/vocational in-
formation, the fact that a person is a client, psychiatric 
diagnosis, personal problems and financial information. 
The seven recipients of information are the client's phy-
sician, the Department of Mental Helath, legal authorities, 
the client's relatives, the client's insurance company, the 
client's employer and the client's friends. 
The analysis of variance indicates that there is a 
Subjects x Information interac~ion, ~ (8,576) = 6.29, ~ < 
.0001, a significant Subjects x Recipient interaction, F 
(12,874) = 14.87, ~ < .0001, a significant Information x 
Recipient interaction, ~ (24,3456) = 4.51, ~ < .0001, and a 
significant Subjects x Information x Recipient interaction, 
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~ (48,3456) = 1.74, E < .005. As all main effects and 
interactions are significant, simple effects were explored. 
Only those simple effects and differences between means 
that meet the criteria of both statistical and psychologi-
cal significance are reported below. 
All simple effects related to the Subjects x·Infor-
mation interaction are statistically significant. Within 
each group of subjects, there is a statistically and psycho-
logically significant effect on the approval of disclosure 
of information dependent upon the type of information to be 
disclosed only for State's Attorneys, ~ (4,132) = 161.66, 
E < .0001. For each type of information there is a statis-
tically and psychologically significant effect on the ap-
proval of disclosure depending upon the subject group; 
educational/vocational, ~ (2,144) = 125.33, E < .0001; fact 
that a client, ~ (2,144) = 228.80, E < .0001; diagnosis, 
~ (2,144) = 258.17, E < .0001; personal problems, F 
(2,144) = 196.15, E < .0001; financial, F (2,144) = 
56.675, E < .0001. 
The t-test was used to compare differences between 
each subject group for each type of information. Each 
subject group is significantly different from both other 
subject groups on each type of information. The data is 
presented in graphical form in Figure 1. 
For educational/vocational information, psycholo-
gists have a significantly higher Information Opinion Index 
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than State's Attorneys, ! (144) = -5.06, E < .0001, and 
clients have a significantly higher Information Opinion 
Index than State's Attorneys, t (144) = -3.07, E < .005. 
For the fact that a person is a client psychologists have 
a significantly higher Information Opinion Index than 
State's Attorneys, ! (144) = -8.26, E ~ .0001, and clients 
have a significantly higher Information Opinion Index than 
State's Attorneys, ! (144) = -5.54, E < .0001. For a 
person's diagnosis, psychologists have a significantly 
higher Information Opinion Index than State's Attorneys, 
! (144) = -8.53, E < .0001, and clients have a significantly 
higher Information Opinion Index than State's Attorneys, ! 
(144) = -5.78, E < .0001. For information about personal 
problems, psychologists have a significantly higher Infor-
mation Opinion Index than State's Attorneys, t (144) = 
-8.44, E < .0001, and clients have a significantly higher 
Information Opinion Index than State's Attorneys, ! (144) = 
-5.45, E < .0001. For financial information, psychologists 
have a significantly higher Information Opinion Index than 
State's Attorneys, ! (144) = -4.33, E < .0001. 
In Figure 1, the curves for psychologists and 
clients parallel the curve of all subjects combined and, 
despite statistical significance, do not show a meaningful 
difference in approval of disclosure dependent on type of 
information. For both psychologists and clients the 
biggest difference is between educational/vocational infor-
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mation and financial information. This difference is less 
than .4 for both groups. This indicates that psychologists 
and clients endorse confidentiality in psychotherapy with-
out regard to the type of information that may be dis-
closed. This also suggests that psychologists and clients 
expect a certain degree of privacy, clients expecting 
somewhat less privacy than psychologists, of all communi-
cations in the psychotherapeutic relationship. 
State's Attorneys have a meaningful difference in 
approval of disclosure dependent upon the type of informa-
tion, but only for financial information (see Figure 1). 
State's Attorneys do not have a meaningful difference in 
approval of disclosure among educational/vocational infor-
mation, information ,that a person is a client, diagnosis 
and personal problems. State's Attorneys approve of not 
disclosing and disapprove of disclosing financial infor-
mation more than any other of the other four types of 
information. 
The analysis of variance indicates that there is a 
highly significant Subjects x Recipients interaction, F 
(12,864) = 14.87, E < .0001, and the simple effects of this 
interaction were explored. Within each group of subjects, 
there is a statistically significant effect on the approval 
of disclosure of information dependent upon the recipient 
of the information, but this effect is psychologically 
significant only for clients, F (6,294) = 82.27, E < .0001, 
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and State's Attorneys, ~ (6,198) = 300.98, E < .0001. 
An analysis of variance on simple effects shows a statis-
tically and psychologically significant effect on the 
approval of disclosure of information for five of the seven 
recipients of information dependent upon the subject group; 
physician, ~ (2,144) = 272.57, E < .0001; Department of 
Mental Health, ~ (2,144) = 196.95, E < .0001; legal author-
ities, F (2,144) = 221.74, E < .0001; relatives, F (2,144) 
= 75,30, E < .0001; employer, F (2,144) = 32.36, E < 
.0001. 
The t-test was used to compare differences between 
each subject group for each recipient of information. The 
data is presented in graphical form in Figure 2. 
When a physician is the recipient of information, 
psychologists have a significantly higher Recipient Opinion 
Index than clients, t (144) = -3.66, E < .0005, and State's 
Attorneys, t (144) = -8.20, E < .0001, and clients have a 
significantly higher Recipient Opinion Index than State's 
Attorneys,! (144) = -4.73, E < .0001. When the Department 
of Mental Health is the recipient of information, psycholo-
gists have a significantly higher Recipient Opinion Index 
than State's Attorneys, ! (144) = -6.79, E < .0001, and 
clients have a significantly higher Recipient Opinion 
Index than State's Attorneys, ! (144) = -4.63, E < .0001. 
When legal authorities are the recipients of information, 
psychologists have a significantly higher Recipient 
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Opinion Index than State's Attorneys, ! (144) = -7.92, 
E < .0001, and clients have a significantly higher Re-
cipient Opinion Index than State's Attorneys, ~ (144) = 
-5.58, E < .0001. When relatives are the recipients of 
information, psychologists have a significantly higher 
Recipient Opinion Index than State's Attorneys, t (144) = 
-5.61, E < .0001, and clients have a significantly higher 
Recipient Opinion Index than State's Attorneys, ! (144) = 
-4.07, E < .0005. When an employer is the recipient of 
information, psychologists have a significantly higher 
Recipient Opinion Index than State's Attorneys, t (144) = 
-5.24, p < .0001, and clients have a significantly higher 
Recipient Opinion Index than State's Attorneys, t (144) = 
4.09, E < .ooo5. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, psychologists were con-
sistent in tending to disapprove the disclosure of infor-
mation without consent regardless of the recipient. The 
biggest difference, between the physician and friends of 
the client, was less than ;4, and did not meet the criteria 
for psychological significance. 
In Figure 2, the curve for clients closely paral-
lels the curve for all subjects combined. For clients, 
physicians as recipients differ only from the Department of 
Mental Health by less than .5, and differ from the other 
five recipients of information by more than .5. This 
result suggests that clients approve of the disclosure of 
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information to physicians to a meaningfully g~eater degree 
than to legal authorities, relatives, the client's insur-
ance company, the client's employer and the client's 
friends. 
State's Attorneys have the greatest variation in 
response due to recipient of information. The Recipient 
Opinion Index ranges from a low of 2.64 for physicians as 
recipients to a high of 4.74 for friends. For State's 
Attorneys, the Recipient Opinion Indices for physicians, 
the Department of Mental Health and legal authorities are 
less than .5 from each other, but more than .5 lower than 
the other four recipients. This result suggests that 
State's Attorneys approve of the disclosure of information 
to physicians, the Department of Mental Health and legal 
authorities to a meaningfully greater degree than to the 
client's relatives, insurance company, employer or friends. 
For State's Attorneys, relatives are in the middle as 
recipients of information, being more than .5 different 
from all other recipients. The client's insurance company, 
employer and friends are over .5 higher than the other four 
recipients of information indicating that State's Attorneys 
approve of the disclosure of information to these three 
recipients to a meaningfully less degree than to relatives, 
legal authorities, the Department of Mental Health and the 
client's physician. 
The analysis of variance indicates that there is a 
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significant Information x Recipient interaction, F 
(24,3456) = 4.51, E < .0001, and the simple effects of this 
interaction were explored. For each type of information 
there is a statistically and psychologically significant 
difference in approval of disclosure of information depend-
ent upon the recipient of information; educational/vocational, 
F (6,876) = 22.39, E ~ .0001; fact that a client, F (6,876) 
= 30.95, E ~ .0001; diagnosis, ~ (6,876) = 31.36, E < 
.0001; personal problems, ~ (6,876) = 28.11, p < .0001; 
financial, ~ (6,876) = 8.689, E < .0001. For each recip-
ient of information there is a statistically and psycholo-
gically significant difference in approval of disclosure 
of information dependent on the type of information only 
when the recipient is the client's physician, F (4,584) = 
24.42, E < .0001. 
Despite these levels of statistical significance, 
an examination of the data in graphical form suggests 
little meaningful interaction (see Figure 3). Except for 
when the recipient is the client's physician, the five 
types of information differ by less than .5 for each re-
cipient. When the recipient is the client's physician, 
financial information has an Opinion Index'over .5 higher 
than the other four types of information. This result 
indicates that all subjects combined disapprove of dis-
closing financial information more than any of the other 
four types of information to physicians. 
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The analysis of variance indicates that there is a 
significant Subjects x Information x Recipients inter-
action, ~ (48,3456) = 1.74, ~ < .005. This interaction is 
not considered meaningfully significant and will not be 
discussed. The F-value for this interaction was only 
statistically significant because of the high number of 
degrees of freedom in both the numerator and denominator of 
the F ratio. 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
This survey demonstrates that psychologists, mental 
health clients and, to a lesser degree, State's Attorneys 
all support the basic concept of confidentiality being an 
important component of the psychotherapeutic relationship. 
In addition, all three groups agree that a client has 
expectations of confidentiality and that a psychotherapist 
has a professional and ethical obligation regarding con-
fidentiality in psychotherapy. This finding is in accord 
with the moral obligation of natural law not to reveal a 
committed secret, the emphasis put on confidentiality in 
the psychological literature and the statements of the 
courts regarding the importance of confidentiality in psy-
chotherapy, whether or not the particular court ultimately 
decided to allow absolute confidentiality. 
Psychologists 
When concrete situations involving a legal require-
ment to disclose information or the psychotherapist being 
in risk of receiving a contempt of court citation are 
introduced to psychologists, support for confidentiality 
drops significantly. This is viewed as representing a 
conflict between the psychotherapeutic principle or ideal 
of absolute confidentiality and the pressures of the out-
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side world or society. Natural law and the Ethical Standards 
of Psychologists suggest that absolute confidentiality in 
the psychotherapeutic relationship must be maintained 
unless there is a risk of danger to others. The situation 
in which the psychologist risks receiving a contempt of 
court citation if he does not divulge confidential communi-
cation is generally not one in which there is a risk of 
harm to others, yet only lt9.l% of the psychologists endorse 
confidentiality in this situation. 
The reasons for the apparent conflict between the 
principle of confidentiality and the pressures of society 
are numerous. In situations where there is a risk of 
danger to an individual or society, a psychologist may feel 
morally bound by natural law to reveal information and 
prevent harm. In situations where there is not a risk of 
danger to others, the response of divulging information may 
indicate a lack of training in ethical practices and in the 
importance of confidentiality in psychotherapy. In situa-
tions where there is not a risk of danger to others the 
psychologists may not view ethical principles as emanating 
from natural law, but rather as basic rules of thumb from 
which to operate, a breach of such rules being a "decision" 
rather than an "immoral act." It may be that some psychol-
ogists would choose to violate the confidence of a client 
rather than suffer the consequences of society's reaction 
by refusing to do so. 
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It is most probable that many psychologists have 
not adequately thought through the implications of divulg-
ing information, even under court order, on the practice of 
psychotherapy and the profession as a whole. Without a 
thorough understanding of the importance of confidentiality 
for psychotherapy and an incorporation of the natural law 
that would require confidentiality into one's value system, 
it would be expected that psychologists would follow the 
will of the society of which they are members. 
Psychologists additionally show less support for 
confidentiality when the client is potentially dangerous to 
others. Although this decreased support may contradict the 
ideal of absolute confidentiality, it is in accordance with 
both the Ethical Standards for Psychologists and the teach-
ings of natural law. 
One must comment on the average of 3.2% of the 
psychologists who did not endorse statements regarding the 
importance of confidentiality in psychotherapy. The fact 
that any psychologist does not support confidentiality in 
general should be of great concern to the profession as such 
an opinion is a direct affront to the Ethical Standards of 
Psychologists. This 3.2% represents two out of the 63 
psychologist subjects. This small percentage and number 
could hopefully be the result of misreading the question or 
mismarking the item. It may also be that all psychologists 
do not accept all the principles of the Ethical Standards 
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for Psychologists. 
In situations that did not involve a legal require-
ment to disclose information, a contempt of court citation 
or a potentially dangerous client, psychologists approve 
quite strongly of not disclosing information or disapprove 
quite strongly of disclosing information without the 
client's clear consent. This finding is interpreted as 
indicating that psychologists agree with the principles of 
their ethical code and natural law. A number of the situa-
tions involved the disclosure of what might appear to be 
harmless information to persons who were often likely to be 
already in possession of such information. Regardless of 
the type of information or the recipient of the informa-
tion, the psychologists strongly endorse confidentiality. 
This is readily apparent in the graphs of Figures 1 and 2. 
This endorsement of confidentiality in day-to-day 
situations is much stronger than expected. This finding 
suggests that psychologists, contrary to what was pre-
viously suggested, have been well trained in ethical prac-
tices and/or follow the principles of natural law. It also 
suggests that psychologists have learned through training 
and experience that confidentiality in psychotherapy, as 
well as other ethical considerations, is important for the 
profession and practice of psychotherapy. 
A clue to a reason for the stronger than expected 
endorsement of confidentiality may be found in the candid 
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conunent of one psychologist subject who wrot·e, 
I must respond in regard to my belief that information 
should not be disclosed--my rating[s] respond to this 
belief. If you had asked if I had ever broken confi-
dence [in these situations] my responses would have 
been very different. 
It is reconunended that future studies explore both opinions 
and actual practices regarding confidentiality. 
Type of Information 
The results indicate that for psychologists, clients 
and all subjects combined there is no meaningful difference 
in approval of the disclosure of information dependent upon 
the type of information. Subjects as a whole simply did 
not discriminate among types of information in deciding 
what could be disclosed without consent and what could not. 
This result suggests that psychologists, clients and all 
subjects combined have a high regard for the confidenti-
ality of all information in psychotherapy. 
State's Attorneys had a significantly lower regard 
for confidentiality in psychotherapy than all subjects 
combined for all types of information except financial. 
State's Attorneys endorsed the confidentiality of financial 
information to a significantly greater degree than the 
other four types of information. There are several pos-
sible reasons as to why State's Attorneys apparently regard 
financial information as more private than other types of 
information. Educational/vocational information is com-
monly regarded as nonprivate (Jourard, 1971). Information 
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related to mental health care, i.e., the fact that a person 
is a mental health client, the person's diagnosis and 
information on personal problems may provide important 
facts for the State's Attorney to use in prosecuting a 
criminal case and recommending a sentence. A person's 
financial status should have no effect on a criminal trial. 
Another reason that State's Attorneys may disapprove of the 
disclosure of financial information more than information 
related to mental health care may be that attorneys, in 
their schooling and practice, have more experience with 
confidential financial information and understand the 
reasons why a person would want to keep such information 
private. Although many attorneys are also engaged in 
advocacy, the average attorney may not have such frequent 
occasion to be aware of the reasons for confidentiality of 
information related to psychotherapy. 
Psychologists and clients also endorsed the con-
fidentiality of financial information more strongly than 
the other four types of information, but not to a signifi-
cantly greater degree. Although financial information was 
intentionally included in the survey as it is considered 
private, but not related to mental health, this finding was 
unexpected. A possible reason for the strong endorsement 
is apparent in the graph of the Information x Recipient 
interaction (Figure 3). This graph suggests that several 
of the recipients, for example, physicians and the Depart-
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ment of Mental Health, may have been deemed appropriate to 
receive mental health information but not financial infor-
mation, and there were not comparable recipients, such as 
lending institutions, to be appropriate recipients of 
financial information. 
Recipient of Information 
All subjects combined approve of the disclosure of 
information to physicians to a meaningfully greater degree 
than to the client's relatives, insurance company, employer 
or friends. There are several possible reasons for this 
finding. The fact that a person is a client, the psychi-
atric diagnosis and personal problems are an aspect of a 
patient's health. Physicians generally want and/or need to 
be aware of all health problems of their patients. Many 
clients discuss their problems with their physicians first 
and then are referred for mental health care. In addition, 
physicians are expected to uphold a certain degree of 
confidentiality and may therefore be considered trustworthy 
recipients of information. 
The Department of Mental Health ranks second to 
physicians in receiving approval as recipients for confi-
dential information. This finding is probably due to sub-
jects viewing such an agency as the appropriate keeper of 
records of mental health information. It may also be due 
to the fact that it is standard practice for agencies 
receiving funding from the Illinois Department of Mental 
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Health to submit the diagnosis, financial in.formation and 
other information (without identifying information) of each 
client to the Illinois Department of Mental Health. The 
Illinois Department of Mental Health also keeps a central 
record, with names and diagnoses, of all patients hospi-
talized in Department of Mental Health facilities and all 
persons hospitalized in private facilities but for whom the 
Illinois Department of Mental Health pays the hospital 
bill. These record keeping practices appear to meet with 
the approval of most subjects in this survey. 
The finding that all subjects combined approve the 
disclosure of information to employers less than to physi~ 
cians, the Department of Mental Health and legal authori-
ties suggest that these latter three recipients are viewed 
more as having good reason to need and/or want information 
about a mental health client than are employers. Physi-
cians may need information to provide adequate medical 
care, the Department of Mental Health is the primary keeper 
of mental health records and legal authorities may want 
information to provide better protection to society. It is 
also possible that subjects fear repercussions from employers 
more than from the other three named recipients. 
Subjects least approve of the disclosure of infor-
mation to friends. This result is not a surprise as 
friends would have less reason than any other recipient to 
have access to confidential information. Friends may 
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request such information in an effort to help, but are 
generally not in a situation to be making decisions regard-
ing the client or the client's future, other than whether 
or not they want to remain a friend. 
The degree to which psychologists, clients and 
State's Attorneys all disapprove of the disclosure of 
information to the client's insurance company without clear 
consent is of significance. This is especially true when 
one considers the fact that, according to the Illinois 
Confidentiality Act, insurance companies are the only 
sources who can legally obtain complete psychiatric records 
with a general consent form. With a general consent for 
access to a client's medical records, insurance companies 
have unlimited access to psychiatric records. It is 
obvious that the psychologists, mental health clients and 
State's Attorneys in the present study disapprove of this 
exception. The degree of disapproval demonstrated in this 
study may suggest the recommendation that the legislature 
review the exception to confidentiality that allows insur-
ance companies such relatively easy access to records. 
Psychologists do not show a meaningful difference 
in approval of disclosure of information dependent upon the 
recipient of information. Reasons for this finding may be 
that psychologists have received thorough training in 
ethics and the importance of confidentiality in psycho-
therapy and expect a certain degree of confidentiality in 
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psychotherapy regardless of who may request .information. 
Clients show a meaningfully greater degree of 
approval of disclosure of information to physicians than to 
legal authorities, the client's relatives, the client's 
insurance company, the client's employer or the client's 
friends. A reason for this result is that clients may 
regard their physicians as safe and trustworthy recipients 
of information. Clients may also view physicians as work-
ing collaborately with the mental health professional for 
the client's best health or view the psychotherapist as a 
specialist, not unlike the cardiologist, who routinely 
sends reports to the primary physician. It may be that the 
concepts of physician and psychotherapist are not distinct 
and separate categories in the minds of the clients. 
Clients also show a significantly greater degree of 
approval of disclosure of information when the recipeint of 
information is the Department of Mental Health than when 
the recipient is the client's friends or employer. This 
finding is probably due to clients viewing the Department 
of Mental Health as the appropriate keeper of mental health 
records, as discussed above. 
State's Attorneys have the greatest variation in 
response due to recipient of information. State's Attor-
neys approve of the disclosure of information to physicians, 
the Department of Mental Health and legal authorities to a 
significantly greater degree than to the other four recip-
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ients of information. There is probably greater approval 
of the disclosure of information to physicians and the 
Department of Mental Health for the same reasons as clients 
and all subjects combined, discussed above. However, the 
relatively high approval of the disclosure of information 
to legal authorities may reflect State's Attorneys' own 
interest in obtaining psychiatric records to aid in their 
work. 
While psychologists appear consistently to follow 
their ethical standards and the tradition of privacy in 
confidentiality by not having a meaningful difference in 
approval of disclosure of information dependent upon re-
cipient, State's Attorneys appear to evaluate the appro-
priateness of each recipient separately. The approach of 
the State's Attorneys is viewed as reflecting the approach 
of the legal system which, while setting laws to govern 
behavior generally, in theory evaluates each situation 
individually, based on its merits, regardless of ethical 
codes or principles of natural law. This approach also 
does not try to establish scientific principles across a 
number of situations as does that of the psychologist. 
Subjects 
The present study demonstrates that psychologists 
consistently show more regard for confidentiality in psy-
chotherapy than clients. Although this finding os con-
sistent, and is therefore considered meaningful, the only 
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condition in which the Opinion Index of psychologists was 
more than .5 higher than clients was when the recipient of 
information was the client's physician. 
A reason for the finding that the Opinion Indices 
of psychologists show less than .5 more support for con-
fidentiality than the Opinion Indices of clients may be re-
lated to the subject pool from which clients were drawn. 
Only those clients who had received a bill for services at 
the Mental Health Center through the mail were sent a 
survey. This procedure eliminated client subjects whose 
fees are paid by such sources as Public Aid and subjects 
who, because of poor financial circumstances, are not 
assessed a fee. Assuming that income is correlated with 
education, one might deduce that the client subjects were 
more knowledgeable of the importance of confidentiality in 
psychotherapy and sophisticated insofar as how confidential 
information can be used and/or misused than an average 
group of clients. This deduction is supported by the fact 
that the mean years of education for client subjects was 
13.79, nearly two years beyond high school. 
The fact that psychologists consistently support 
confidentiality more than clients may be due to their 
training in ethical principles and the experiences of the 
psychologists that reinforce the importance of the concept 
of confidentiality. It may also be due to the psychologists' 
awareness of state laws and the legal penalties they may 
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incur by breaking the laws. 
This study demonstrates that psychologists con-
sistently show more regard for confidentiality in psy-
chotherapy than State's Attorneys. Reasons for the dif-
ference between psychologists and State's Attorneys may be 
that the training and experience of psychologists have 
given them a better understanding of the importance of 
confidentiality in psychotherapy; psychologists may view 
themselves as serving the individual client while State's 
Attorneys may view mental health care as a service to 
society, in which case State's Attorneys would see the 
disclosure of information as benefiting society in many 
circumstances; and psychologists and State's Attorneys may 
have used a different approach in answering the survey 
questions, psychologists asking themselves which response 
best reflects their ethical principles and State's Attor-
neys asking which response is most helpful and fair for all 
parties involved. 
This study demonstrates that clients show more 
regard for confidentiality in psychotherapy than do State's 
Attorneys. This finding makes sense in that clients have a 
perso1:al stake in keeping information confidential which 
State's Attorneys, except for those who have been clients, 
do not have. It is likely that in most circumstances, 
clients are responding to items in terms of what is accept-
able in their individual case while State's Attorneys are 
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responding in terms of what would be most helpful and fair 
to society as a whole. This reflects a personal interest 
in confidentiality on the part of the clients. 
The finding that psychologists, of the three sub-
ject groups, show the highest regard for confidentiality in 
psychotherapy indicates a high degree of awareness of the 
importance of confidentiality and a knowledge of general 
ethical principles and/or of the laws of Illinois regarding 
confidentiality. This finding also may reflect a vested 
interest that psychotherapists have in maintaining con-
fidentiality in psychotherapy, i.e., if psychologists are 
not able to maintain confidentiality, they will probably 
not be able to continue to practice psychotherpay in the 
traditional manner and their livelihood may suffer. Psy-
chologists have a personal interest in conducting them-
selves in a manner that benefits the profession as a whole. 
The finding that clients strongly supported con-
fidentiality, although to a lesser extent than the psy-
chologists, suggests a strong desire for privacy in the 
psychotherapeutic setting. This finding adds support to 
previous studies, all conducted using college student 
counselees as subjects, which indicate that clients expect 
confidentiality in psychotherapy. 
The finding that State's Attorneys have the least 
regard, of the three subject groups, for confidentiality in 
psychotherapy indicates a lack of understanding of the 
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essential role of privacy in the therapeutic setting. This 
conclusion is of utmost concern as State's Attorneys are 
elected officials who have contacts and influence with 
toher elected officials, e.g., legislators, who formulate 
the laws. State's Attorneys also frequently become judges 
later in their careers, thereby being in a position to 
interpret the law. 
The responses of the State's Attorneys in the 
present study also suggests either a lack of knowledge of 
current Illinois law regarding confidentiality in psycho-
therapy or disagreement with the law. Under current 
Illinois law, releasing information in all 35 of the situa-
tions posed in the Survey of Opinion is illegal (except for 
insurance companies when only a general consent to medical 
records is required) . The sutdy specifically surveyed 
"opinion" and not knowledge. However, one can not deduce 
whether State's Attorneys answered in terms of opinion or 
according to their knowledge of the law. With either 
approach to responding to the survey, the results are 
disturbing. State 1 s Attorneys, who have the responsibility 
of determining whether or not there is adequate evidence 
for prosecuting someone who has committed a criminal act, 
such as divulging confidential communications, do not 
strongly endorse confidentiality in psychotherapy. They 
are either not familiar with the law on confidentiality in 
psychotherapy or disagree with it. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
Recent Illinois legislation, designed to extend the 
protection of confidentiality in psychotherapy, has at 
least 19 separate exceptions and actually results in making 
it more difficult for psychotherapists to assure confi-
dentiality to their clients. Psychotherapists have, in 
nearly all cases, been stripped of the opportunity to use 
professional judgment in deciding whether or not confi-
dential information should be disclosed. The results of 
the Survey of Opinion indicate that, when allowed to sue 
professional judgment, psychologists strongly favor re-
fusing to disclose information without client consent 
unless the client is a danger to himself or others. How-
ever, nearly one-half of the psychologists indicated they 
would disclose confidential information if there was a risk 
of a contempt of court citation; such a citation would be 
possible in most of the 19 exceptions to confidentiality. 
One must conclude that the new Confidentiality Act will 
result in more situations where confidential communications 
will be disclosed. 
One area of the law of particular concern is that 
which allows insurance companies to use a general consent 
form, which any person applying for a policy or making a 
claim is required to sign, to obtain access to ''any and 
all" psychiatric records. The results of the Survey of 
Opinion indicate that all subjects would be opposed to such 
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a law. It is recommended that further research explore 
this particular exception to confidentiality. 
Other areas of concern in the law are those which 
require a disclosure of confidential information with no 
allowance for professional judgment when there is no dan-
ger to the client or others, especially when other sources 
are available for obtaining information. The results of 
the Survey of Opinion suggests that there is sufficient 
opposition to the disclosure of information without client 
consent when the client is not dangerous to self or others 
to consider a reexamination of the exceptions to confidenti-
ality. For example, it is recommended that there be re-
search to explore the feasibility of the Department of Law 
Enforcement requiring character references before issuing 
Firearm Owner's Identification Cards rather than requiring 
the Department of Mental Health to report whether indi-
viduals applying for identification cards have had a 
psychiatric hospitalization. It is recommended that stud-
ies examine methods that would allow the psychotherapist, 
rather than a judge, to decide what confidential informa-
• 
tion, if any, is relevant and necessary for disclosure in a 
court of law. It is recommended that the entire Confiden-
tiality Act be reevaluated so that decisions on confiden-
tiality can be made in a therapeutic rather than legal 
manner. 
When there is the possibility of a client being 
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dangerous to self or tohers, it is recommended that re-
search investigate approaches that would permit the psy-
chotherapist to use professional judgment in deciding how 
to approach the problem. This recommendation is made 
with the philosophical and moral attitude that it is in the 
therapeutic interest of clients to do whatever is neces-
sary, but only what is necessary, to-keep them from hurting 
themselves or others. For example, when a client threatens 
a third party, the psychotherapist should be permitted to 
use professional judgment, 1) to decide if the threat is 
likely to be carried out, and 2) to decide how to respond 
to a serious threat. Ennis and Litwack (1974) point out 
that the psychiatric literature indicates that mental 
health professionals are very poor predictors of danger-
ousness. They cite numerous studies suggesting that mental 
health professionals over-predict dangerousness, leading 
one to conclude that, if permitted to use professional 
judgment, psychotherapists would tned to err in the inter-
est of society. When making a decision as to how to re-
spond to a serious threat, psychotherapists need to be able 
to sue alternatives that best fit the situations. In some 
cases, seeing a client for more frequent appointments will 
be helpful. In others, the psychotherapist may determine 
that hospitalization is necessary. Only in cases where the 
law interferes with psychotherapists' efforts to do what is 
best for their clients, e.g., Tarasoff would it be neces-
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sary to disclose information to a threatened third party. 
It is recommended that studies explore the feasi-
bility of psychotherapists being permitted to use profes-
sional judgment in reporting child abuse so that only cases 
where there is ongoing abuse or a risk of danger to the 
child would be required to be reported. Reporting child 
abuse can drastically disrupt the therapeutic relationship, 
especially if such a report is not necessary. 
It is recommended that further research be accom-
plished regarding ethical issues, specifically confidenti-
ality. Lewis and Warman noted in 1964 that, "a search of 
the literature reveals few, if any attempts to clarify the 
issues pertaining to the problem of confidentiality through 
research rather than speculation" (p. 7). This statement 
is still true today. 
It is specifically recommended that there be re-
search exploring both the opinions and actual behavior of 
psychologists in regard to confidentiality. Such research 
could provide helpful information for use in planning 
training programs in ethics for psychologists, for enumerat-
ing and clarifying ethical issues and for reaching a better 
understanding of the concept of confidentiality in psycho-
therapy. Some more careful exploration of the variety of 
situations and pressures that are brought on psychologists 
to disclose information would provide data that could aid 
in the above as well. In addition to assessing attitudes, 
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it would be useful to do more assessment of psychologists' 
knowledge of ethical codes and laws regarding confidenti-
ality. This information would be most helpful for training 
and continuing education purposes. 
It is recommended that there be more research 
exploring client attitudes regarding confidentiality. This 
information would be useful in pinpointing areas of poten-
tial conflict, confusion or friction. For example, the 
results that clients strongly disapprove of the disclosure 
of information to insurance companies without clear consent 
provides information and data that may be useful in facili-
tating a modification of the general consent insurance 
companies are not able to use. A replication of these 
results would provide reliability for the present data. 
It is recommended that psychologists continue their 
education and training in ethics and confidentiality in 
psychotherapy. It is also recommended that psychothera-
pists attempt to provide more and better training for 
laymen regarding ethics and confidentiality in psycho-
therapy. In view of the survey results, it is especially 
recommended that psychotherapists attempt to educate attor-
neys and legal authorities regarding the role of confi-
dentiality in the traditional practice of psychotherapy and 
the importance of confidentiality in the psychotherapeutic 
relationship. 
SUMMARY 
This dissertation explores the issue of confidenti-
ality in psychotherapy from a moral and historical, psycho-
therapeutic and legal perspective. The moral and histori-
cal section discusses the similarities between current 
debates on confidentiality and the writings on the Seal of 
Confession of 13th through 17th century Roman Catholic 
theologians. The works of major theorists-practitioners, 
basic texts and manuals on psychotherapy, psychological 
research and codes of ethics are discussed as they pertain 
to confidentiality. The legal section examines privacy in 
terms of tort and constitutional law, current Illinois law 
and recent legal cases regarding privileged communication 
and confidentiality in psychotherapy. 
The moral, scientific and legal approaches to the 
resolution of conflicts are contrasted throughout the 
dissertation. The impact of legal intervention regarding 
confidentiality on the traditional practice of psycho-
therapy is discussed in terms of possible psychotherapist 
and client reactions to specific laws on confidentiality 
and to the disclosure of confidential information. 
The present study surveyed the opinions of psycho-
logists, mental health clients and State's Attorneys on 
psychotherapists disclosing specific kinds of information 
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to specific sources about clients who are not an immediate 
danger to themselves or others. The five kinds of informa-
tion addressed in the survey are educational/ vocational, 
the fact that a person is a client, psychiatric diagnosis, 
a client's personal problems and financial information. 
The seven possible recipients of information on the survey 
are the client's physician, the Department of Mental 
Health, legal authorities, the client's relatives, the 
client's insurance company, the client's employer and the 
client's friends. 
The results indicate the psychologists, clients 
and all subjects combined have no significant difference 
in approval of disclosure of information dependent upon 
type of information. State's Attorneys have a higher 
regard for financial information than for all other types 
of information. Psychologists show no significant differ-
ence in approval of disclosure of information dependent on 
recipient of information. Clients, State's Attorneys and 
all subjects combined show a significant degree of differ-
ence in approval of disclosure dependent on recipient of 
information. The results demonstrate that psychologists 
consistently show more regard for confidentiality than 
clients or State's Attorneys. State's Attorneys show the 
least regard for confidentiality in psychotherapy. 
Further research is recommended regarding ethical 
issues, specifically confidentiality. 
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5.1 Physician-patient relationship.] § 5.1. No 
physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any 
information he may have acquired in attending any patient 
in a professional character necessary to enable him profes-
sionally to serve such patient, except only (1) in trials 
for homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the 
fact or immediate circumstances of the homicide, (2) in 
actions, civil or criminal, against the physician for 
malpractice, (3) with the expressed consent of the pat-
ient, or in case of his death or disability, of his per-
sonal representative or other person authorized to sue for 
personal injury or of the beneficiary of an insurance 
policy on his life, health, or physical condition, (4) in 
all civil suits brought by or against the patient, his 
personal representative, a beneficiary under a policy of 
insurance, or the executor or administrator of his estate 
wherein the patient's physical or mental condition is an 
issue, (5) upon an issue as to the validity of a document 
as a will of the patient, (6) in any criminal action where 
the charge is either murder by abortion, attempted abor-
tion or abortion or (7) in actions, civil or criminal, 
arising from the filing of a report in compliance with the 
"Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act", enacted by the 
79th General Assembly. 
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5.2 Psychiatrist-patient relationship.] § 5.2. 
In civil and criminal cases, in proceedings preliminary 
thereto, and in legislative and administrative proceed-
ings, a patient or his authorized representative and a 
psychiatrist or his authorized representative have the 
privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness 
from disclosing, communications relating to diagnosis or 
treatment of the patient's mental condition between pat-
ient and psychiatrist, or between members of the patient's 
family and the psychiatrist, or between any of the fore-
going and such persons under the supervision of a psychi-
atrist in the accomplishment of the objectives of diag-
nosis or treatment. 
There is no privilege under this Section for any 
relevant communications 
(a) when a psychiatrist, in the course of diag-
nosis or treatment of the patient, determines that the 
patient is in need of hospitalization, provided that such 
communications shall be admissible only with respect to 
issues relating to the need for such hospitalization; 
(b) if the judge finds that the patient, after 
having been informed that the communications would not be 
privileged, has made communications to a psychiatrist in 
the course of a psychiatric examination ordered by the 
court, provided that such communications shall be admis-
sible only with respect to issues involving the patient's 
mental condition; 
(c) in a civil or administrative proceeding in 
which the patient introduced his mental condition as an 
element of his claim or defense or, after the patient's 
death, when his mental condition is introduced by any 
party claiming or defending through or as a beneficiary of 
the patient; the provisions of this paragrpah (c) shall 
not apply to preclude the assertion of the privilege in 
any action brought or defended under the "Illinois Mar-
riage and Dissolution of Marriage Act", as now or here-
after amended, unless the patient or the psychiatrist on 
behlaf of the patient first testifies as to such communi-
cations; 
(d) in any proceeding brought by the patient 
against his psychiatrist, including but not limited to any 
malpractive proceeding, and in any criminal or license 
revocation proceeding in which the patient is a complain-
ing• witness and in which disclosure is relevant to the 
claim or defense of the psychiatrist. 
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5306. Disclosure of information ey psychologist 
--Prohibition--Exceptions.] § 6. No psychologist shall 
disclose any information he may have acquired from persons 
consulting him in his professional capacity, necessary to 
enable him to render services in his professional capa-
city, to such persons except only: (1) in trials for 
homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the fact 
or immediate circumstances of the homicide, (2) in all 
proceedings the purpose of which is to determine mental 
competency, or in which a defense of mental incapacity is 
raised, (3) in actions, civil or criminal, against the 
psychologist for malpractice, (4) with the expressed 
consent of the client, or in the case of his death or 
disability, of his personal representative or other person 
authorized to sue or of the beneficiary of an insurance 
policy on his life, health or physical condition, or (5) 
upon an issue as to the validity of a document as a will 
of a client. 
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6324. Disclosures--Prohibition--Exceptions.] 
§ 20. No social worker may d~sclose any information he 
may have acquired from persons consulting him in his 
professional capacity which was necessary to enable him to 
render services in his professional capacity of those 
persons except: (1) to his employer, (2) in a criminal 
trial when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or 
immediate circumstances of the crime, (3) in actions, 
civil or criminal, against the social worker for malprac-
tice, or (4) with the written consent of the client, or in 
the case of his death or disability, of his personal 
representative or other person authorized to sue or of the 
beneficiary of an insurance policy on his life, health, or 
physical condition. 
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MENTAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 
CONFIDENTIALITY ACT 
AN ACf to protect the confidentiality of records and communications of 
recipients of mental health or developmental disability services, and to 
amend and repeal certain Acts and Sections herein named in connection 
therewith. 
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the 
General Assembly: 
ARTICLE I 
Section 1. This Act shall be known and may be cited as the "Mental 
Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act". 
Section 2. The terms used in this Act, unless the context requires 
otherwise, have the meanings ascribed to them in this Section. 
(I) "Confidential communicarion" or "communication" means any 
communication made by a recipient or other person to a therapist or to or in the 
presence of other persons during or in connection with providing mental health 
or developmental disability services to a recipient. Communication includes 
information which .indicates that a person is a recipient. 
(2) "Guardian·· means a legally appointed guardian or conservator of 
the person. 
(3) "Mental health or developmental disabilities services" or "'ser-
vices" includes but is not limited to examination, diagnosis, evaluation. 
treatment, trainmg, pharmaceuticals, aftercare, habilitation or rehabilitation. 
(4) "Personal notes" means: 
(i) information disclosed to the therapist in confidence by other persons 
on condition that such information would never be disclosed to the recipient or 
other persons; 
(ii) information disclosed to the therapist by the recipient which would 
be injurious to the recipient's relationships to other persons, and 
(iii) the therapist's speculations, impressions, hunches, and reminders. 
( 5) "Pa::ent" means a parent or, in the absence of a parent or guardian, a 
person in loco parentis. 
(6) "Recipient" means a person who is receiving or has received mental 
health or developmental disabilities services. 
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(7) "Record" means any record kept by a therapist or by an agency in 
the course of providing mental health or developmental disabilities service to a 
recipient concerning the recipient and the services provided. Record does not 
include the therapist's personal notes, if such notes are kept in the therapist's 
sole possession for his own personal use and are not disclosed to any other 
person, except the therapist's supervisor, consulting therapist or attorney. If at 
any time such notes are disclosed, they shall be considered part of the 
recipient'& record for purposes of this Act. Record does not include testing 
material used in the course of providing services if the di&elosure of such 
material would compromise the objectivity or fairness of the testing process. 
(8) "Record custodian" means a person responsible for maintaining a 
recipient's record. 
(9J "Therapist" means a psychiatrist, physician, psychologist, social 
worker, or nurse providing mental health or developmental disabilities services 
or any other person not prohibited by law from providing such services or from 
holding himself out as a therapist if the recipient reasonably believes that such 
person is permitted to do so. Therapist includes any successor of the therapist. 
Section 3. (a) AI1 records and communications shall be confidential and 
shall not be disclosed except as provided in thh Act. 
(b) A therapist is not required to but may, to the extent he determines it 
necessary and appropriate, keep personal notes regarding a recipient. Such 
· personal notes are the work product and personal property of the therapist and 
shall not be subject to discovery in any judicial, administrative or legislative 
proceeding or any proceeding preliminary thereto. 
Section 4. (a) The following persons shal1 be entitled, upon request, to 
inspect and copy a recipient's record or any part thereof: 
0) the parent or guardian of a recipient who is under 12 years of age; 
(2) the recipient if he is 12 years of age or older; 
(3) another person on such recipient's behalf if the recipient so author-
iz.es in writing; 
(4) the parent or guardian of a recipient who is at least 12 but under 18 
years, if the recipient is informed and does not object or if the therapist does not 
find that there are compelling reasons for denying such access. The parent or 
guardian who is denied access by either the recipient or the therapist may 
petition a court for access to the record; or 
(5) the guardian of a recipient who is 18 years or older. 
(b) Assistance in interpreting the record may be provided without charge 
and shal1 be provided if the person inspecting the record is under 18 years of 
age. However, access may in no way be denied or limited if the person 
inspecting the record refuses such assistance. A reasonable fee may be charged 
for duplication of a record. 
(c) Any person entitled to access to a record under this Section may 
214 
submit a written statement concerning any disputed or new information, which 
statement shall be entered into the record. Whenever any disputed part of a 
record is disclosed, any submitted statement relating thereto shall accompany 
the disclosed part. Additionally, any person entitled to access may request 
modification of any part of the record which he believes is incorrect or 
misleading. If such request is refused, the person may seek a court order to 
compel modification. 
(d) Whenever access or modification is requested, the request and any 
action taken thereon shall be noted in the recipient's record. 
Section 5. (a) Except as provided in Sections 6 through 11 of this Act, 
records and communications may be disclosed only with the written consent of: 
(1) the parent or guardian of a recipient who is under 12 years; 
(2) both the parent or guardian of a recipient who is at least 12 but under 
18 years and the recipient. If only the recipient refuses to consent there shall be 
no disclosure unless the therapist finds that such disclosure is in the best 
interests of such recipient. If the parent or guardian refuses to consent, 
disclosure shall not be made; or 
(3) the recipient if he is 18 years or older or his guardian if he has been 
adjudicated incompetent. 
ing: 
(b) Every consent form shall be in writing and shall specify the follow-
( 1) the person or agency to whom disclosure is to be made; 
(2) the purpose for which disclosure is to be made; 
(3) the nature of the information to be disclosed; 
(4) the right to inspect and copy the information to be disclosed; 
(5) the consequences of a refusal to consent, if any; and 
(6) the fixed period of time for which the consent is valid; and 
(7) the right to revoke the consent at any time. 
The consent form shall be signed by the person entitled to give consent and 
the signature shall be witnessed by a person who can attest to the identity of the 
person so entitled. A copy of the consent and a notation as to any action taken 
thereon shall be entered in the recipient's record. 
(c) Only information relevant to the purpose for which disclosure is 
sought may be disclosed. Blanket consent to the disclosure of unspecified 
information shall not be valid. Advance consent may be valid only if the nature 
of the information to be disclosed is specified in detail and the duration of the 
consent is indicated. Consent may be revoked in writing at any time; any such 
revocation shall have no effect on disclosures made prior thereto. 
(d) No person or agency to whom any information is disclosed under this 
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Section may redisclose such information unless the person who consented to 
the disclosure specifically consents to such redisclosure. 
(e) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, records and communica-
tions shall remain confidential after the death of a recipient and shall not be 
disclosed unless the recipient's representative, as defined in the Probate Act of 
1975, approved August 7, 1975, as now or hereafter amended, and the therapist 
consent to such disclosure or unless disclosure is authorized by court order after 
in camera examination and upon good cause shown. 
(f) Paragraphs (a) through (e) of this Section shall not apply to and shall 
not be construed to limit insurance companies writing Life, Accident or Health 
insurance as defined in Section 4 of the Illinois Insurance Code, as now or 
hereafter amended, and Non-Profit Health Care Service Plan Corporations, 
writing Health Care Service contracts, under The Non-profit Health Care 
Service Plan Act, as now or hereafter amended, in obtaining general consents 
for the release to them or their designated representatives of any and all 
confidential communications and records kept by agencies. hospitals. therapists 
or record custodians. and utilizing such information in connection with the 
underwriting of applications for covemge for such policies or contracts, or in 
connection with evaluating claims or liability under such policies or contracts, 
or coordinating benefits pursuant to policy or contract provisions. 
Section 6. Such information from a recipient's record as is necessary to 
enable him to apply for or receive benefits may be disclosed with consent 
obtained pursuant to Section ) ot this Act. Disclosure may be made without 
consent when despite every reasonable effort it is not possible to obtain consent 
because the person entitled to give consent is not capnble of consenting or is not 
available to do so. The recipient shall be intormed of any disclosure madt 
without consent. The information disclosed without consent under this Section 
may include only the identity of the recipient and therapist and a description of 
the nature, purpose, quantity, and date of the services provided. Any request 
for additional information shall state with particularity what further information 
is needed and the reasons therefor. Refusal to consent to the disclosure of more 
information than is necessary to apply for or receive direct benefits shall not be 
grounds for in any way denying, limiting, or cancelling such benefits or 
refusing to accept an application or renew such benefits. Such information shall 
not be redisclosed except with the consent of the person entitled to give 
consent. 
Section 7. When a therapist or agency which provides services is being 
reviewed for purposes of funding, accreditation, audit, licensure, statisti<.;:-tl 
compilation, research, evaluation, or other similar purpose, a recipient's record 
may be used by the person conducting the review to the extent that this is 
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the review, provided that personally 
identifiable data is removed from the record prior to the use. Personally 
identifiable data may be disclosed only with the consent obtained pursuant to 
Section 5 of this Act. Funding, accreditation, licensure, and the like may not be 
withheld or withdrawn for failure to disclose personally identifiable data if 
consent is not obtained. 
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Section 8. In the course of an investigation, a regional human rights 
authority of the Guardianship and Mental Health Advocacy Commission 
created by the Guardianship and Mental Health Advocacy Act enacted by the 
80th General Assembly may inspect and copy any recipient's records in the 
possession of a therapist or agency which provides services. However, a 
regional authority may not inspect or copy records containing personally 
identifiable data which cannot be removed without imposing an unreasonable 
burden on the therapist or agency which provides services, except as provided 
herein. The regional authority shall give written notice to the person entitled to 
give consent for the identifiable recipient of services under Section 4 that it is 
conducting an investigation and indicating the nature and purpose of the 
investigation and the need to inspect and copy the recipient's record. If the 
person notified objects in writing to such inspection and copying, the regional 
authority may not inspect or copy the record. The therapist or agency which 
provides services may not object on behalf of a recipient. 
Section 9. (a) In the course of providing services, a therapist may 
disclose a record or communications without consent to: 
(I) the therapist's supervisor, a consulting therapist, members o(a staff 
team participating in the provision of services, a record custodian, or a person 
acting under the supervision and control of the therapist; 
(2) persons conducting a peer review of the services being provided; and 
(3) an attorney or advocate consulted by a therapist or agency which 
provides services concerning the therapist's or agency's legal rights or duties in 
relation to the recipient and the services being provided. 
Information may be disclosed under this Section only to the extent that 
knowledge of the record or communications is essential to the purpose for 
which disclosure is made and only after the recipient is informed that such 
disclosure mav be made. A pc;:rson 10 wnom disclosure is maae under this 
Section shall not redisclose any information except as provided in this Act. 
Section IO. (a) Except as provided herein, in any civil, criminal, 
administrative, or legislative proceeding, or in any proceeding preliminary 
thereto, a recipient, and a therapist on behalf and in the interest of a recipient, 
has the privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent the disclosure of the 
recipient's record or communications. 
(1) Records and communications may be disclosed in a civil or admin-
istrative proceeding in which the recipient introduces his mental condition or 
any aspect of his services received for such condition as an element of his claim 
or defense, if and only to the extent the court in which the proceedings have 
been brought, or, in the case of an administrative proceeding, the court to 
which an appeal or other action for review of an administrative determination 
may be taken, finds, after in camera examination of testimony or other 
evidence, that it is relevant, probative, not unduly prejudicial or inflammatory, 
or otherwise clearly admissible; that other satisfactory evidence is demonstra-
bly unsatisfactory as evidence of the facts sought to be established by such 
evidence; and that disclosure is more important to the interests of substantial 
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justice than protection from injury to the therapist-recipient relationship or to 
the recipient or other whom disclosure is likely to harm. No record or 
communication between a therapist and a recipient shall be deemed relevant for 
purposes of this subsection, except the fact of treatment, the cost of services 
and the ultimate diagnosis unless the party seeking disclosure of the commun-
ication clearly establishes in the trial court a compelling need for its production. 
However, for purposes of this Act, in any action brought or defended under the 
''Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act", approved September 22, 
1977, as now or hereafter amended, or in any action in which pain and 
suffering is an element of the claim, mental condition shall not be deemed to be 
introduced merely by making such claim and shall be deemed to be introduced 
only if the recipient or a witness on his behalf first testifies concerning the 
record or communication. 
(2) Records or communications may be disclosed in a civil proceeding 
after the recipient's death when the recipient's physical or mental condition has 
been introduced as an element of a claim or defense by any party claiming or 
defending through or as a beneficiary of the recipient, provided the court finds. 
after in camera examination of the evidence, that it is relevant, probative, and 
otherwise clearly admissible; that other satisfactory evidence is not available 
regarding the facts sought to be established by such evidence: and that 
disclosure is more important to the interests of substantial justice than protec-
tion from any injury which disclosure is likely to cause. 
(3) In the event of a claim made or an action filed by a recip-
ient, or, following the recipient's death, by any party claiming as a beneficiary 
of the recipient for injury caused in the course of providing services to such 
recipient, the therapist and other persons whose actions are alleged to have been 
the cause of injury may disclose pertinent records and communications to an 
attorney or attorneys engaged to render advice about and to provide represen-
tation in connection with such matter and to persons working under the 
supervision of such attorney or attorneys, and may testify as to such records or 
communication in any administrative, judicial or discovery proceeding for the 
purpose of preparing and presenting a defense against such claim or action. 
(4) Records and communications made to or by a therapist in the course 
of examination ordered by a court for good cause shown may, if otherwise 
relevant and admissible, be disclosed in a judicial or administrative proceeding 
in which the recipient is a party or in appropriate pretrial proceedings, provided 
such court has found that the recipient has been as adequately and as effectively 
as possible informed before submitting to such examination that such records 
and communications would not be considered confidential or privileged. Such 
records and communications shall be admissible only as to issues involving the 
recipient's physical or mental condition and only to the extent that these are 
germane to such proceedings. 
(5) Records and communications may be disclosed in a proceeding 
under the Probate Act of 1975, approved August 7, 1975, as now or hereafter 
amended, to determine a recipient's competency or need for guardianship, 
provided that the disclosure is made only with respect to that issue. 
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(6) Records and communications may be disclosed when such are made 
during treatment which the recipient is ordered to undergo to render him fit to 
stand trial on a criminal charge, provided that the disclosure is made only with 
respect to the issue of fitness to stand trial. 
(7) Records and communications of the recipient may be disclosed in 
any civil or administrative proceeding involving the validity of or benefits under 
a life, accident, health or disability insurance policy or certificate, or Health 
Care Service Plan Contract, insuring the recipient, but only if and to the extent 
that the recipient's mental condition, or treatment or services in connection 
therewith, is a material element of any claim or defense of any party, provided 
that information sought or disclosed shall not be redisclosed except in connec-
tion with the proceeding in which disclosure is made. 
(8) Records or communications may be disclosed when such are relevant 
to a matter in issue in any action brought under this Act and proceedings 
preliminary thereto, provided that any information so disclosed shall not be 
utilized for any other purpose nor be redisclosed except in connection with such 
action or preliminary proceedings. 
(b) Before a disclosure is made under this Section, any party to the 
proceeding or any other interested person may request an in camera review of 
the record or communications to be disclosed. The court or agency conducting 
the proceeding may hold an in camera review on its own motion. When, 
contrary to the express wish of the recipient, the therapist asserts a privilege on 
behalf and in the interest of a recipient, the court may require that the therapist, 
in an in camera hearing, establish that disclosure is not in the best interest of the 
recipient. The court or agency may prevent disclosure or limit disclosure to the 
extent that other admissible evidence is sufficient to establish the facts in issue. 
The court or agency may enter such orders as may be necessary in order to 
protect the confidentiality, privacy, and safety of the recipient or of other 
persons. Any order to (iisclose or to not disclose shall be considered a final 
order for purposes of appeal and shall be subject to interlocutory appeal. 
Section 11. Records and communications may be disclosed, (i) in 
accordance with the provisions of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting 
Act, approved June 26, 1975, as now or hereafter amended; (ii), when, and to 
the extent, a therapist, in his sole discretion, determines that such disclosure is 
necessary to initiate or continue civil commitment proceedings under the laws 
of this State or to otherwise protect the recipient or other person against a clear, 
imminent risk of serious physical or mental injury or disease or death being 
inflicted upon the recipient, or by the recipient on himself or another; (iii) when 
and to the extent such is, in the sole discretion of the therapist, necessary to the 
provision of emergency medical care to a recipient who is unable to assert or 
waive his rights hereunder and there is no relative or other third party available 
to give consent; and (iv) in commitment proceedings under the "Mental Health 
and Developmental Disabilities Code'', enacted by the 80th General Assembly, 
and proceedings and investigations preliminary thereto, to the State's Attorney 
for the county of residence of a person for whom involuntary or judicial 
admission is sought, or in which such person is found, or in which the facility is 
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located, provided that the information so disclosed shall not be utilized for any 
other purpose nor be redisclosed except in connection with such proceedings or 
investigations. Any person, institution, or agency, under this Act, participating 
in good faith in the making of a report under the Abused and Neglected Child 
Reporting Act, approved June 26, 1975, as now or hereafter amended, or in the 
disclosure of records and communications otherwise in accordance with this 
provision, shall have immunity from any liability, civil, criminal or otherwise. 
that might result by reason of such action. For the purpose of any proceeding, 
civil or criminal, arising out of a report or disclosure in accordance with this 
provision, the good faith of any person. institution. or agency so reporting or 
disclosing shall be presumed. 
Section 12. (a) If the United States Secret Service requests information 
from the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities relating 
to a specific recipient and the Director of the Department determines that 
disclosure of such information may be necessary to protect the life of a person 
under the protection of the Secret Service, only the following information may 
be disclosed: the recipient's name, address, and age and the date of any 
admission to or discharge from a Department facility. 
(b) The Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities 
and all private hospitals are required, as hereafter described in this subsection, 
to furnish the Department of Law Enforcement only such information as m::~y 
be required for the sole purpose of determining whether an individual who may 
be or may have been a patient is disqualified because of that status from 
receiving or retaining a Fire::~rm Owner's Identification Card under subsection 
(e) of Section 8 of "An Act relating to the acquisition, possession and transfer 
of firearms and firearm ammunition", approved August 3, 1967, as amended. 
Any such information disclosed under this subsection shall remain privileged 
and confidential, and shall not be redisclosed nor utilized for any other purpose. 
The method of requiring the providing of such information shall guarantee that 
no information is released beyond what is necessary for this purpose. One 
acceptable method is that of periodically providing lists to the Department of 
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities or any private hospital of 
Firearm Owner's Identification Card applicants on which the Department or 
hospital shall indicate the identities of those individuals who are to its 
knowledge disqualified from having a Firearm Owner's Identification Card for 
reasons described herein. The Department may provide for a centralized source 
of information for the State on this subject under its jurisdiction. 
For purposes of this subsection (b) only. the following terms shall have the 
meaning prescribed: 
( l) ·'Hospital" means only that type of institution which is providing 
full-time residential facilities and treatment for in-patients and excludes insti-
tutions. such as community clinics, which only provide treatment to out-pa-
tients. 
(2) "Patient" shall mean only a person who is an in-patient or resident 
of any hospital. not an out-patient or client seen solely for periodic consulta-
tion. 
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Section 13. Whenever disclosure of a record or communication is made 
without consent pursuant to this Act or whenever a record is used pursuant to 
Sections 7 and 8 of this Act. a notation of the information disclosed and the 
purpose of such disclosure or use shall be noted in the recipient's record 
together with the date and the name of the person to whom disclosure was made 
or by whom the record was used. 
Section 14. Any agreement purporting to waive any of the provisions of 
this Act is void. 
Section 15. Any person aggrieved by a violation of this Act may sue for 
damages, an injunction, or other appropriate relief. Reasonable attorney's fees 
and costs may be awarded to the successful plaintiff in any action under this 
Act. 
Section 16. Any person who knowingly and wilfully violates any pro-
vision of this Act is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. 
Section 17. The Director of the Department of Mental Health and 
Developmental Disabilities shall adopt rules and regulations to implement this 
Act. 
This Act takes effect January I , ! 979. 
This Act amends the following: 
Chapter 51, Evidence. par. 5 .I 
Chapter 23. Charities and Public Welfare, "Social Workers Registration 
Act", par. 5320 (Note: Transferred to Ch. Ill, Professions and 
Occupations). 
Chapter 911/2. :'v1ental Health. ··Psychologists Registration Act". par. 
406 (Note: Transferred to Ch. Ill, Professions and Occupations). 
This Act repeals par. 5.2 of Chapter 51, Evidence. 
APPENDIX B 
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MENTAL HEALTH CENTffi s 
E SANGAMON MENARD 
Sangarnon - Menard Office 
707 North Rutledge 
Springfield, illinois 62702 
R 
v LOGAN MASON 
I COUNTIES 
Fred A. Ludwig, A.C.S.W. 
N 
G C. :-1. Johnston, Jr. A.C.S.W. Executive Director (217) 525-l 064 
A Umted Way Agency 
Dear Madam or Sir: 
Enclosed please find a survey and questionnaire regarding 
confidentiality in psychotherapy. The Mental Health Center 
of Sangamon-Menard Counties is sponsoring this research in 
an effort to provide data that will be helpful in determining 
policy and to lawmakers. In addition, I will be using the 
results in a Doctoral Dissertation for the fulfillment of 
the Ph.D. requirements at Loyola University of Chicago. 
All responses to the survey and questionnaire will be kept 
confidential. It is not necessary to put your name on the 
survey or questionnaire. If there are any questions which 
you feel may identify you, please feel free to skip them. 
Please fill out the enclosed postcard when you return the 
questionnaire. This will enable me to send reminder letters 
only to those who have not returned the postcard. 
If you wish to receive a summary of the results and conclu-
sions, please indicate this on the postcard. 
Thank you in advance for your time and consideration. They 
are very much appreciated. 
Helen P. Appleton, M.A. 
Clinicai Director 
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SURVEY CF OPINION Form A 
Directions: Please mark the space that best reflects your opinion of each of the 
following situations. Asslli~e that the client is not an immediate danger 
to himself or others. 
1. A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's education and vocation 
t.o the Department of M:=ntal Heal t:• 
because he does not have the client's 
~lear con.sa;1t:. to disclose. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
2. A psychotherapist disclosing 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
a client's financial situation 
to the client's employer 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
a client's psychiatric diagnosis 
to the client's physician 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
that a person is a client 
to the client's insurance comp;;.ny 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
that a person is a client 
to the client's friends 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve ______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's financial situation 
to legal authorities 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve ____________ Disapprove 
A 9sychotherapist disclosing 
a client's education and vocation 
to the client's physician 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve ___________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not jisclosing 
a client's personal problems 
to the Department of Mental Health 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
that a person is a client 
to the client's employer 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
10. A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's psychiatric diagnosis 
to the client's insurance company 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve _____________ Disapprove 
11. A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's personal problems 
to the client's relatives 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
13. 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's education and vocation 
to the client's friends 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve ____________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's financial situation 
to the client's relatives 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve __________ ---· Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
that a person is a client 
to the Department 0f Hental Health 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's financial situation 
co the client's insurance company 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve ____________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
a client's personal problems 
to the client's physician 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
that a person is a client 
to legal authorities 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve ______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
a client's psychiatric diagnosis 
to the client's employer 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve Disapprove 
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19. A psychotherapis~ disclosing 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
a client's education and vocation 
to th~ client's insurance company 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve :lis approve 
A psychotherapis~ not disclosing 
a client's financial situation 
to the Department of Mental Health 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A :;;sycho therapist not disclosing 
a client's Fersonal problems 
to the client's insurance company 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's education and vocation 
to the client's employer 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
a client's personal problems 
to legal authorities 
without the client's clear cons~nt. 
Approve ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Disapprove 
A psycho~~erapist disclosing 
a client's ?ersonal problems 
to the client's friends 
without the client's clear consen~. 
Approve ____________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
that a person i.s a client 
to the client's physician 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve Disapp.rove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
a client's psychiatric diagnosis 
to legal authorities 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
27. A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's personal problems 
to the client's employer 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve Disapprove 
28. A psychotherapist disclosing 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
a client's education and vocation 
to the client's relatives 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve ____________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
that a person is a client 
to the client's relatives 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve ____________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
a client's psychiatric diagnosis 
to the Department of Mental Health 
without the client's clear consent. 
Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
a client's psyc~iatric diagnosis 
to the client's friends 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve ____________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's education and vocation 
to legal authorities 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve ______ ------ ___ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
a client's psychiatric diagnosis 
to the client's relatives 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve ________________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's financial s~tuation 
to the client's friends 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
a client's financial situation 
to the client's physician 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
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~ Q! OPINION Form B 
Directions: Please mark the space that best reflects your opinion of each of the 
following situations. Assume that the client is not an immediate danger 
to himself or others. 
l. A psychotherapist disclosing 
2. 
3. 
4. 
s. 
6. 
7. 
a. 
9. 
a client's education and vocation 
to the Departmen~ of Mental health 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's financial situation 
to the client's employer 
because he does not have ~~e client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a cl~ent's psychiatric diagnosis 
to the client's physician 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
that a person is a client 
to the client's insurance company 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
App:cove _______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
that a person is a client 
to the client's friends 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
a client's financial situation 
to legal authorities 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve ____________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist no~ disclosing 
a client's education and vocation 
to the client's physician 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist ~isclosing 
a client's personal problems 
to the Department of Mental Health 
wi~~out the client's clear consent. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist no~ disclosing 
that a person is a client 
to the client's employer 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
10. A psychotherapist disclosing 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
a client's psychiatric diagnosis 
to the client's insurance company 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve ____________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
a client's personal problems 
to the client's relatives 
without ~~e client's clear consent. 
Approve ___ , _______ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
a client's education and vocation 
to the client's friends 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve ____________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
a client's financial situation 
to the client's relatives 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve ______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
that a person is a client 
to the Department of Mental Health 
becauae he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve- __________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
a client's financial situation 
to the client's insuranca company 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve· ______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's personal problems 
to the client's physician 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve _____________ Disappro·re 
A psychoti1erapist disclosing 
that a person is a client 
to legal authorities 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve __________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's psychiatric diagnosis 
to the client's employer 
because he does not nave ~~e client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve Disapprove 
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:9. A psychotherapist ~ot disclosing 
20. 
21. 
22 .. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
~., 
.... 
a client's education and vocation 
to ~~e client's insurance company 
because he does ~ot have the ~lient's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
a client's financial s~tuation 
to the ~epar~~ent of Mental Health 
witbout the client's clear consent. 
Approve ____________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
a client's personal problems 
to the client's insurance company 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
a client's education and vocation 
to the client's employer 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve ____________ ~isapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's personal problems 
to legal authorities 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's personal problems 
to the client's friends 
because he does not have ~~e client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
that a person is a client 
to the client's physician 
without the client's clear consent. 
."-pprove ____________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's psychiatric diagnosis 
to legal authorities 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosing 
a client's personal problems 
to the client's employer 
wi~~out the client's clear consent. 
Approve Disapprove 
28. A psychotherapist not disclosing 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
a client's education and vocation 
to the client's relatives 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
that a person is a client 
to the client's relatives 
because he does not have the client's 
clear cosent to disclose. 
Approve ____ __ Disapprove 
A ?sychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's psychiatric diagnosis 
to the Department of ).!ental P.:ealth 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A ?Sychotherapist ~ot disclosing 
a client's psychiatric diagnosis 
to the cliant's friends 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A psych0therapist disclosing 
a client's education and vocation 
to legal authorities 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A psychot:herapist not disclosing 
a client's psychiatric diagnosis 
to the cl~ent's relatives 
because he does not have ~~e client's 
clear consent to di3close. 
Approve :::isapprove 
A psychotherapist disclosinq 
a cl~ent's financial situation 
to the client's friends 
without the client's clear consent. 
Approve _______________ Disapprove 
A psychotherapist not disclosing 
a client's financial situation 
to the client's physician 
because he does not have the client's 
clear consent to disclose. 
Approve Disapprove 
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?lease :lo~e: Al~~ough the following demographic ~nformat1on is requested, if you 
believe that ~t may identify you, it is not necessary for completion 
of ~~e survey. 
Age Sex Race Religion 
Education (last year completed) 
-------------------- Occuoation 
Directions: The follow1ng questions are separate from the previous Survey Of 0pinion. 
Please make an effort to consider them individuallv and not in relation 
to the previous questions. · 
A. ~ost patients/clients expect that communications with mental health profess1onals 
will remain confidential. 
Agree Disagree 
a. A therapist has a professional/eth1cal obligation to keep information concerning 
a client/patient confidential. 
Agree Disagree 
c. How 1mportant is confidentiality 1n maintaining a positive therapeutic relat1onship? 
Essent1al Nonessential 
D. Have you ever consulted a mental health professional? 
If yes, for what length of time? 
-· Have you ever hesitated to consult a mental health professional because you were 
not certain that 1t would remain confidential? 
F. Have you ever had confidentiali~f broken by ~psychotherapist? 
If yes, please explain. 
Directions: The following questions should only be completed by mental health 
professionals. 
G. In certain cases, there is a legal requirement to disclose information to a third 
party (e.g., reports of child abuse). In making a decision, should the emphasis be 
placed on confidentiality or the legal requirements? 
Confidentiality _____________________ Legal requirement 
H. !n a recent California case (Tarasoffl, the California Suoreme Court =uled that the 
psychologist was responsible for warning a threatened third party. In your opin1on, 
which would you emphasize in making a decision - confidentiality or safety of third 
party? 
Confidentiality _____________________ Third party 
I. If a court made a ruling to the effect th~t you would receive a contemot-of-cour~ 
citation if you did not disclose confidential information, which would you choose -
contempt citation or disclosure? 
Contempt citation Disclosure 
J. Please list or brieflv describe situations in which confidentiality has oresented 
the greatest difficulty for you. 
MENTAL HEALTH CENTER 
Sangamon- Menard Office 
707 North Rutledge 
Springfield. Illinois 62702 
Fred A. Ludwig. A.C.S.W. 
Executive Director (217) 525·1 064 
Dear Madam or Sir: 
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A United Way Agency 
SANGAMON MENARD 
LOGAN MASON 
COUNTIES 
C. N. Joluuton,Jr. A.C.S.W. 
Clinical Director 
In ~ovember, 1979, you were sent a copy of the enclosed survey and question-
naire and our records indicate that we have not yet received a reply. It 
w~uld be greatly appreciated if you would fill out this surJey regarding 
confidentiality in psychotherapy so that this study may be completed this 
spring. The Mental Health Center of Sangamon-Menard Counties is sponsoring 
this research in an effort to provide data that will be helpful in deter-
mining policy and to lawmakers. In addition, I will be using the results in 
a Doctoral Dissertation for the fulfillment of Ph.D. requirements at Loyola 
University of Chicago. 
If you have completed and returned the first copy of this survey, please simply 
fill out the postcard indicating that you have already replied. Several more 
surveys than postcards have been received in response (perhaps the smaller 
postcards were lost in the mail). In such cases, I apologize for the intru-
sion of. this reminder letter. 
All responses to the survey and questionnaire will be kept confidential. It 
is not necessary to put your name on the survey or questionnaire. If there 
are any questions which you feel may identify you, please feel free to omit 
them. 
Please fill out the enclosed postcard when you return the questionnaire. 
This will enable me to send second reminder letters only to those who have 
not returned the postcard. If you wish to receive a summary of the results 
and conclusions, please indicate this on the postcard. 
Thank you in advance for your time and consideration. They are very much 
appreciated. 
Sincerely, 
~I!~ 
Helen P. Appleton, M.A. 
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